ONLINE APPENDIX

Repression and Refuge. Why Only Some Politically Excluded Ethnic Groups Rebel

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Appendix 1: Coding rules

1. Outcome

Outcome	Coding rules	Definitions	Sources
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	1.0 = Group members launch an ethnically-based armed challenge to the government, which causes at least 25 battle-related deaths in at least one year 0.0 = All other cases	Drawing on the UCDP/PRIO definition of civil war, civil war is defined as any armed confrontation between government troops and rebel organizations, which cause at least 1000 battle-related deaths in one year. A civil war is categorized as ethnically-based if the rebels (a) pursue ethnic aims, and (b) recruit fighters and forge alliances on the basis of ethnic affiliations, following the coding rules of the Ethnic Armed Conflict dataset.	Ethnic Armed Conflict (EAC) dataset: http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/epr/faces/study/StudyPage.xhtml?studyId=36583 (February 26, 2012) While we took the EAC dataset as a starting point, we always checked whether the EAC code was in fact correct. Drawing on a large variety of sources, we identified 12 additional cases of ethnic civil war and decided that upon closer examination two of the civil wars that EAC codes as ethnic are non-ethnic in nature.

2. Conditions

Conditions	Coding rules	Definitions	Sources
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	1.0 = Group members are disadvantaged in terms of access to basic economic assets and education ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ and $Soecmarg_{education} \geq 1.0$) 0.0 = All other cases	Our measurement of socioeconomic marginalization focuses on access to basic economic assets and education. Data on the ethnic distribution of seven household assets (availability of electricity, a radio, a television, a refrigerator, a bicycle, a motorcycle, and a car) and educational attainment (years of education completed)	The Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) program (http://www.measuredhs.com/). G-Econ dataset: Cederman et al. 2011

	Wherever DHS data was not available, we alternatively relied on the G-Econ dataset: 1.0 = Group members are economically poorer than the country average according to G-Econ data 0.0 = All other cases	was available for most countries from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS). We calculated asset and educational inequality using the following formulas: $$\text{Soecmarg}_{assets} = A/a \text{ if } a < A$$ $$0 \text{ otherwise}$$ $$\text{Soecmarg}_{education} = E/e \text{ if } e < E$$ $$0 \text{ otherwise}$$ where a/ e is the average asset/ educational attainment score of the ethnic group, and A/ E is the average asset/ educational attainment score of all ethnic groups in the country.	
Cultural marginalization *(culmarg)*	1.0 = Group members face restrictions in two of the following three dimensions: religious freedoms; language rights; recognition of ethnocultural practices 0.0 = All other cases	*Restrictions on religious freedoms:* Lack of recognition of a religion, of religious schools, and/ or of corresponding observances such as holidays and festivals. *Restrictions on language rights:* Lack of language rights, including for education and broadcasting in the vernacular, and/ or of language recognition. *Restrictions on ethnocultural practices:* Lack of recognition of ethno-cultural practices such as rituals, dress and appearances, holidays and festivals, customary law and/ or leadership.	Own investigation using a variety of sources.
Indiscriminate repression *(indisrep)*	1.0 = Group members are subjected to indiscriminate state repression. 0.0 = All other cases	State repression is defined as 'all behavior (…) to bring about political quiescence and facilitate the continuity of the regime through some sort of restriction or	Own investigation using a variety of sources.

		violation of political and civil liberties' (Davenport 2000, 6). Indiscriminate state repression implies the targeting of entire groups through arrests, beatings, torture, killings etc. ('collective targeting'): Victims are thus selected on the basis of real or alleged membership in an (ethnic) group associated with a particular, oppositional political position.	
Territorial reach of the state's security apparatus *(secureach)*	1.0 = The state's security forces (military, police and/ or secret services) maintain a presence even in the rural areas of the ethnic group's regional base 0.0 = All other cases	We define 'rural areas' as a city, town, village or unincorporated area that has a population of not more than 20,000 inhabitants. We define an ethnic group's regional base as the spatially contiguous region that it settles in according the GeoEPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011).	Own investigation using a variety of sources. A particular useful source for the qualitative assessment of the situation were the Area Handbooks/ Country Studies by the US government, which routinely include information on the territorial organization of the country's security apparatus.
Territorial reach of the ruling/dominant political party *(partyreach)*	1.0 = The ruling/ dominant party maintains a presence even in the rural areas of the ethnic group's regional base, with party structures down to the village level 0.0 = All other cases	We define 'rural areas' as a city, town, village or unincorporated area that has a population of not more than 20,000 inhabitants. We define an ethnic group's regional base as the spatially contiguous region that it settles in according the GeoEPR dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011).	Own investigation using a variety of sources. A particular useful source for the qualitative assessment of the situation were the Area Handbooks/ Country Studies by the US government, which routinely include information on the territorial organization of political parties.
Territorial reach of the state (*statereach*)	1.0 if *secureach* and/ or *partyreach* = 1.0 0.0 if *secureach* and *partyreach* = 0.0		

External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1.0 = Group members have the opportunity to organize and pursue dissident activities on the territory of a neighboring country. The government of the latter supports or tolerates these activities or is simply too weak to prevent them 0.0 = All other cases	We here define 'support' as financial and/ or military support (see below).	Own investigation using a variety of sources.
International support (*intsup*)	1.0 = Group members within the country receive financial and/ or military support from foreign governments or other external actors 0.0 = All other cases	We define 'financial support' as the provision of financial resources (cash, loans etc.) that can be mobilized to finance the start-up and maintenance of a rebel organization. We define 'military support' as the provision of weapons and other military equipment, the supply of soldiers, the carrying out of military training and/ or assistance through intelligence sharing.	Own investigation using a variety of sources.
External support (*exsup*)	1.0 if *exsanc* and/ or *intsup* = 1.0 0.0 if *exsanc* and *intsup* = 0.0		

Appendix 2: Additional tables

Table 1: Cases of ethnic civil war

Northerners, 2000-02 (Côte d'Ivoire)*	Kru, 1960-93 (Côte-Ivoire)**
Ewe, 1967-90 (Togo)*	Lari/Bakongo, 1969-71 (Congo)**
Ijaw, 1999-2005 (Nigeria)*	Nibolek, 1998-2005 (Congo)**
Muslim Sahel groups, 1960-75 (Chad)*	Baganda, 1966-69 (Uganda)**
Arabs, 1960-75 (Chad)*	Luo, 1979-2002 (Kenya)**
Lari/Bakongo, 1998-2005 (Congo)*	Bakongo, 1975-2002 (Angola)**
Langi/Acholi, 1972-73 (Uganda)*	Ndebele-Kalanga, 1982-87 (Zimbabwe)**
Ovimbundu-Ovambo, 1975-2002 (Angola)*	Berbers, 1956-2005 (Morocco)**
Dinka, 1983-2003 (Sudan)*	Dinka, 1956-71 (Sudan)**
Mayas, 1946-85 (Guatemala)*	Other Northern groups, 1983-2003 (Sudan)**
Albanians, 1993-99 (Yugoslavia)*	Russians, 1991-2000 (Moldova)**
Kurds, 1946-2005 (Turkey)*	Sunni Arabs, 2003-2005 (Iraq)**
Kurds, 1976-90 (Iraq)*	
Palestinians, 1971-91 (Lebanon)*	[Quechua, 1946-52 (Bolivia)]***
Sri Lankan Tamils, 1964-83 (Sri Lanka)*	[Aymara, 1946-52 (Bolivia)]***

* These cases were coded as cases of ethnic civil war by both EAC coders and ourselves.
** These cases were coded as cases of ethnic civil war by ourselves but not by EAC coders.
*** These cases were coded as cases of ethnic civil war by EAC coders but not by ourselves.
For details see the below section on individual coding decisions.

Table 2: Predicted probabilities for ethnic groups of varying size

The following two graphs show predicted probabilities based on the EPR dataset. Both graphs are based on logistic regressions with the subsample of excluded groups and ethnic conflict onset as the dependent variable. As controls, we included the exact power status (discriminated, powerless, regional power only), GDP, the size of the country's population, political regime at the country level (anocracy, democracy, or autocracy), political instability at the country level, the number of years passed since independence, oil per capita, whether a group was previously included, and the history of previous armed conflicts at the group level (a count variable). The two graphs were produced using a Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing algorithm available in Stata. It gives a reasonably fine-grained representation of how conflict probabilities change with group size.

Predicted conflict probability and group size for minorities

Predicted conflict probability and group size for majorities

Table 3: Necessary conditions for ethnic civil war

	Consistency	Coverage
soecmarg	0,67	0,37
culmarg	0,44	0,48
indisrep	0,81	0,79
~statereach	0,59	0,44
exsup	0,74	0,80

Table 4: Sufficient conditions for ethnic civil war

Model: ethnicwar = f (soecmarg, culmarg, indisrep, statereach, exsup)

COMPLEX SOLUTION
Frequency cutoff: 2.0
Consistency cutoff: 0.80

	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
soecmarg*indisrep*exsup	0.56	0.56	0.94
~soecmarg*~culmarg*indisrep*~statereach	0.19	0.19	1.00

Solution coverage: 0.74
Solution consistency: 0.95

PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
Frequency cutoff: 2.0
Consistency cutoff: 0.80

	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
indisrep*~statereach	0.56	0.04	1.00
~soecmarg*indisrep	0.22	0.04	1.00
soecmarg*exsup	0.56	0.00	0.88
indisrep*exsup	0.67	0.00	0.95

Solution coverage: 0.81
Solution consistency: 0.92

INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
Frequency cutoff: 2.0
Consistency cutoff: 0.80
Assumptions: soecmarg (present), culmarg (present), indisrep (present), ~statereach (absent), exsup (present)

	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
indisrep*~statereach	0.56	0.22	1.00
soecmarg*indisrep*exsup	0.56	0.22	0.94

Solution coverage: 0.78
Solution consistency: 0.95

Table 5: Necessary conditions for ethnic peace

	Consistency	Coverage
~soecmarg	0,52	0,79
~culmarg	0,80	0,78
~indisrep	0,91	0,92
statereach	0,69	0,80
~exsup	0,92	0,90

In line with the main analysis, a brief investigation of the correlates of ethnic peace shows that there are two necessary conditions: the absence of indiscriminate repression (consistency score: 0.91) and the absence of external support (0.92) (see Table 5). These two conditions also have very high coverage (0.92 and 0.90) and thus exercise a strong constraining effect on the outcome. Together, this indicates that the absence of indiscriminate violence and the absence of external support both represent a necessary and sufficient condition for ethnic peace.

Further analysis identified an additional, sufficient (but not necessary) path to ethnic peace (see Table 6). It involves the absence of cultural marginalization, the presence of a state with high territorial reach, and again the absence of external support (*~culmarg*statereach*~exsup*). Even though this path also covers a substantial number of cases (raw coverage: 58%), it has low unique coverage and thus adds rather little to the analysis of ethnic war avoidance.

Table 6: Sufficient conditions for ethnic peace

Model: ~ethnicwar = f (soecmarg, culmarg, indisrep, statereach, exsup)

COMPLEX SOLUTION
Frequency cutoff: 2.0
Consistency cutoff: 0.75

	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
~culmarg*~indisrep*~exsup	0.68	0.46	0.96
soecmarg*~indisrep*~exsup	0.37	0.15	0.92
soecmarg*~culmarg*statereach*~exsup	0.18	0.08	0.92

Solution coverage: 0.91
Solution consistency: 0.95

PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION
Frequency cutoff: 2.0
Consistency cutoff: 0.75

	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
~indisrep*~exsup	0.85	0.28	0.95
statereach*~exsup	0.65	0.08	0.91

Solution coverage: 0.92
Solution consistency: 0.94

INTERMEDIATE SOLUTION
Frequency cutoff: 2.0
Consistency cutoff: 0.75
Assumptions: ~soecmarg (absent), ~culmarg (absent), ~indisrep (absent), statereach (present), ~exsup (absent)

	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
~indisrep*~exsup	0.85	0.34	0.95
~exsup*statereach*~culmarg	0.58	0.08	0.93

Solution coverage: 0.92
Solution consistency: 0.94

Appendix 3: Code book

Northern (Bariba, Gurmanché/Betamaribe etc.), 1966-1967 (Benin)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1996 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that northerners were disadvantaged in terms of both educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 1,72$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,11$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Dahomey's small armed forces were the least cohesive across francophone Africa, with many conflicting ethnic and political allegiances (Decalo 1990, 99-100). Due to budgetary limitations, the troops were mostly stationed near the major urban centers of the coastal areas. The police functions in the hinterland were carried out by two structures, including the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Surété Nationale (Decalo 1995, 285-286). The Gendarmerie Nationale was mainly concerned with maintaining order throughout the territory. Even though relatively small in numbers (1,500 men), it apparently also had some reach into more rural areas through six regionally dispersed companies (see also Bebler 1973, 13). The Surété Nationale was more involved with criminal and investigatory work and had 1,000 men in local units at its disposal.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Military regime = no ruling political party (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
		Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun), 1968-1969 (Benin)
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1996 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that southeasterners were not deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Dahomey's small armed forces were the least cohesive across francophone Africa, with many conflicting ethnic and political allegiances (Decalo 1990, 99-100). Due to budgetary limitations, the troops were mostly stationed near the major urban centers of the coastal areas. The police functions in the hinterland were carried out by two structures, including the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Surété Nationale (Decalo 1995, 285-286). The Gendarmerie Nationale was mainly concerned with maintaining order throughout the territory. Even though relatively small in numbers (1,500 men), it apparently also had some reach into more rural areas through six regionally dispersed companies (see also Bebler 1973, 13). The Surété Nationale was more involved with criminal and investigatory work and had 1,000 men in local units at its disposal.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Zinsou was designated as President by the army in 1968 and subsequently received massive popular support in a referendum (Decalo 1973, 464-469). However, political parties were still banned at the time, i.e. there was no ruling political party in 1968-69.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1970, 1973; Allen 1989; Amoussou-Yeye 1998).

		Kru, 1960-1993 (Cote d'Ivoire)
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Members of the Kru ethnic group, and more specifically of the Bété subgroup, launched a rebellion in October 1970 (Dozon 1985b, 81-82; Vogt 2007, 64). The rebellion started after the Bété student Nragbé Kragbé tried to found an opposition party. When his demand was denied, a few hundreds of armed Bété farmers occupied the public buildings in Gagnoa and Kragbé announced a new state under his leadership. However, the army attacked the city in an operation that lasted several days and was expanded to the surrounding villages where the rebellion had originated. While some claim that up to 6,000 people died (Dozon 1985, 344-347), others report 79 battle-related deaths (Gadji Dagbo 2002). We here prefer the more conservative estimate.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1998-99 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Kru were not deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) but marginally deprived in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,07$). Langer (2005) presents more detailed data, including some historical data on regional economic disparities during the 1970s, which show that the southern parts of the country – including those populated by the Kru – were considerably better off than the national average.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Roberts et al. 1984; Dozon 1985a, 1985b; Boone 2003; Vogt 2007).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Members of the Kru ethnic group faced considerable state-sanctioned violence throughout the 1960s. The bulk of this violence was perpetrated by Baule settlers who appropriated land from Kru farmers with the open support of Houphouet-Boigny's Baule-dominated government (Dozon 1985b, 80-81; Woods 2003, 647). Moreover, leading Kru elites were arrested in the context of the 1963 coup attempt (Dozon 1985b, 80). However, the available evidence suggests that this anti-Kru violence remained selective in nature. It was only <u>after</u> the start of the 1970 rebellion that the violence turned more indiscriminate, evident in the brutal suppression of the uprising (see below).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The country's security forces had strong territorial reach. The regular police, the Sûrété Nationale, was dependable and efficient, with urban and rural forces stationed throughout the country (Roberts et al. 1984, 403-407). Even more important in terms of territorial control was the gendarmerie – a national police force charged with the maintenance of public order and security (ibid., 421-422). Endowed with 1,500 well-trained and disciplined men, this elite corps was regionally organized (with departmental companies and mobile squadrons) and clearly counted among the country's best most effective institutions. The army was also stationed around the country (ibid., 417). Moreover, Houphouet-Boigny 'colonized' the regional administration with military staff whereby almost half of all prefects and sub-prefects were serving officers in the Ivorian army (Kieffer 2000, 30-31). This not only helped to placate the army but also further bolstered the territorial reach of the security apparatus.

Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	In Southern Côte d'Ivoire, colonial and post-colonial rulers found no pre-existing hierarchies that could serve as footholds for the state (Boone 2003). As a result, they followed a strategy of 'administrative occupation' – a modern form of direct rule where the administrative and political apparatuses remained concentrated at the center and local political authority was centralized in the hand of the regime's direct agents who had no social connections to the localities. The ruling *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) relied on external agents (mostly Dioula traders) and never developed a significant presence at the grassroots. The on-the-ground presence of the party-state was especially thin in the South-West where the Kru-speakers, most notably the Bété, felt threatened by the westward expansion of the plantation economy and hence remained peripheral in the PDCI.
External sanctuary *(exsanc)*	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Roberts et al. 1984; Dozon 1985a, 1985b; Boone 2003; Vogt 2007).
International support *(intsup)*	0,00	No evidence for international support (Roberts et al. 1984; Dozon 1985a, 1985b; Boone 2003; Vogt 2007).

Northerners, 1994-1999 (Cote d'Ivoire)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	1,00	The available DHS data suggest that Northerners were deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 1{,}47$) but not in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$) (1998-99 DHS survey, available at http://www.measuredhs.com/). However, more detailed date presented by Langer (2005, 35-39) suggest that Northerners in fact faced quite serious economic deprivation. Moreover, the 1998 land law in Côte d'Ivoire not only excluded foreigners from land ownership but also implicitly privileged autochthony as the main source of legitimate entitlement to ownership rights, which paved the way for the disappropriation of all non-autochthons in the south-west, in particular Northerners and foreigners. Against this backdrop we code Northerners to be 'more in than out' of the set of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization *(culmarg)*	0,00	Northerners faced discrimination in terms of religious rights but not in terms of language rights and recognition of ethnocultural practices. In Côte d'Ivoire, Northerners are mostly Muslim, while the Akan, Krou and Southern Mande are predominantly Christian – ethnic and religious cleavages are thus mutually reinforcing. Widespread perceptions of non-recognition and secondary status of the Muslim religion, which reach back to the construction of the Catholic Basilica in Yamoussoukro in the 1980s, apparently also played an important role in fostering Northern grievances (Langer 2005, 32).

Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Bédié's ultra-nationalist policies, in particular his exclusionary citizenship policies, were accompanied by instances of anti-Northern violence (HRW 2001; Toungara 2001; Marshall-Fratani 2006). However, in sharp contrast to the situation after 1999 (see below), this anti-Northern violence remained largely selective in nature.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	In a context of economic turmoil and reduced public spending, the territorial reach of the security forces declined, in particular in the northern and western parts of the country. The gendarmerie was the only security force that retained a national presence but did no longer reach beyond the urban areas (Kadet 2011, 57). The police force was under-equipped and very unequally distributed across the territory, with the whole north being severely underserviced (ibid, 58-63). The army was also under-equipped and almost entirely absent from the northern parts of the country. The various intelligence services, finally, were poorly coordinated and hampered by extremely weak capacities (ibid., 63-68). As a result of all this, the state had effectively lost its monopoly of violence in the North by the 1990s. This manifested itself in escalating insecurity and crime and the emergence of rival 'violence actors', most notably traditional hunters (*dozo*) who came to play a key role in the provision of public security in many parts of the North (Bassett 2004; Hellweg 2004; Förster 2004).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	In the early 1990s, the PDCI experienced escalating internal divisions, opposing the 'old guard' led by Henri Konan Bédié (a Baoulé) to reform-oriented technocrats led by Allasane Ouattara (a Malinke Muslim) (Crook 1997). These divisions came to a head after Houphouet-Boigny's death in 1993 when Bédié, the constitutional heir-apparent, became President and pro-Ouattara reformers formed a new party, the RDR, which became widely perceived as representing 'Northern' interests. The emergence of the RDR put an end to Houphouet's 'old alliance with the North and curtailed the PDCI's presence in the North: As the so-called *Grand Nord* emerged as a rival political force, PDCI structures in the North were either destroyed or taken over by ex-PDCI politicians and regional notables who used the old networks to mobilise mass support.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).

Kru, 1994-99 (Cote d'Ivoire)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization	0,00	Data from the 1998-99 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/) suggest that the Kru were not deprived in terms of educational attainment

(*soecmarg*)		(Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 0) but *marginally* deprived in terms of asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 1,07). However, Langer (2005) presents more detailed socioeconomic data, which show that the ethnic groups in the South – including the Kru – were better off than the national average throughout the 1990s. Against this backdrop we code the Kru as 'fully out' of the set of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Members of the Kru ethnic group, in particular activists of Laurent Gbagbo's *Front Populaire Ivorien* (FPI), suffered acts of state repression between 1994 and 1999, which however remained selective in nature (HRW 2001; Toungara 2001).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	In a context of economic turmoil and reduced public spending, the territorial reach of the security forces declined, in particular in the northern and western parts of the country. The gendarmerie was the only security force that retained a national presence but did no longer reach beyond the urban areas (Kadet 2011, 57). The police force was under-equipped and very unequally distributed across the territory, with the whole west being severely underserviced (ibid, 58-63). The army was also under-equipped and entirely absent from the western parts of the country. The various intelligence services, finally, were poorly coordinated and hampered by extremely weak capacities (ibid., 63-68).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	As detailed above, Houphouet-Boigny's PDCI never developed a significant presence at the grassroots in south-west Côte d'Ivoire. After the return to multi-party politics in 1990, the PDCI lost even further ground to Laurent Gbagbo (a Bété) and his FPI, which garnered 18,3% of the vote and henceforth dominated the political scene in the south-west by mobilizing ethnic support (Crook 1997).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).

Southern Mande, 1994-99 (Cote d'Ivoire)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005). Note that members of the Southern Mande ethnic group(s), with Gen. Robert Guei (a Yacouba) in the forefront, were active participants in the 1999 military coup. However, this coup appears to have been bloodless (Toungara 2001; Langer 2005).

Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Data from the 1998-99 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/) suggest that the Southern Mande were deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 1,09$) and especially in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,39$).
		The more detailed socioeconomic data presented by Langer (2005) confirm that the Southern Mande were the by far most deprived ethnic group in the southern parts of the country.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	In a context of economic turmoil and reduced public spending, the territorial reach of the security forces declined, in particular in the northern and western parts of the country. The gendarmerie was the only security force that retained a national presence but did no longer reach beyond the urban areas (Kadet 2011, 57). The police force was under-equipped and very unequally distributed across the territory, with the whole west being severely underserviced (ibid, 58-63). The army was also under-equipped and entirely absent from the western parts of the country. The various intelligence services, finally, were poorly coordinated and hampered by extremely weak capacities (ibid., 63-68).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	In Southern Côte d'Ivoire, colonial and post-colonial rulers found no pre-existing hierarchies that could serve as footholds for the state (Boone 2003). As a result, they followed a strategy of 'administrative occupation' – a modern form of direct rule where the administrative and political apparatuses remained concentrated at the center and local political authority was centralized in the hand of the regime's direct agents who had no social connections to the localities. The ruling PDCI relied on external agents (mostly Dioula traders) and never developed a significant presence at the grassroots.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).

Northerners, 2000-2002 (Cote d'Ivoire)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war	1,00	On 19 September 2002, a coup attempt by Northern soldiers quickly turned into

(*ethnicwar*)		organised insurgency. By the end of the month, the rebels, referring to them as the *Mouvement patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI), had gained control of the whole north. In November 2002, two further rebel groups emerged in the west, including the Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP). Soon after, the MPCI, MPIGO and MJP merged to become the *Forces Nouvelles* (FN), led by Guillaume Soro, a former leftist student leader from the North. The fighting between 2002 and 2004 caused 843 battle-related deaths (UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	The available DHS data suggest that Northerners were deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 1,47$) but not in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$) (1998-99 DHS survey, available at http://www.measuredhs.com/). However, more detailed date presented by Langer (2005, 35-39) suggest that Northerners in fact faced quite serious socioeconomic marginalization. Moreover, the 1998 land law in Côte d'Ivoire not only excluded foreigners from land ownership but also implicitly privileged autochthony as the main source of legitimate entitlement to ownership rights, which paved the way for the disappropriation of all non-autochthons in the south-west, in particular Northerners and foreigners. Against this backdrop we code Northerners to be 'more in than out' of the set of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Northerners faced discrimination in terms of religious rights but not in terms of language rights and recognition of ethnocultural practices. In Côte d'Ivoire, Northerners are mostly Muslim, while the Akan, Krou and Southern Mande are predominantly Christian – ethnic and religious cleavages are thus mutually reinforcing. Widespread perceptions of non-recognition and secondary status of the Muslim religion, which reach back to the construction of the Catholic Basilica in Yamoussoukro in the 1980s, apparently also played an important role in fostering Northern grievances (Langer 2005, 32).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	The diffusion of anti-Northern violence began under Bédié and escalated under Guei and, even more so, under Gbagbo who used his paramilitary youth organizations to impose political order through terror. The 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections were marred by unprecedented political violence, leaving over 200 people dead and hundreds wounded (HRW 2001). The icon of this election violence was the massacre of Yopougon (a suburb of Abidjan) where a mass grave of 57 bullet ridden bodies (all of whom were Northerners) was found on October 27, 2000. Moreover, there were scores of other extrajudicial executions, 'disappearances', sexual violence, hundreds of cases of torture, and the wanton destruction of property. The victims were overwhelmingly presumed members of Ouattara's RDR, Northerners, foreigners and/or Muslims. The repression was clearly indiscriminate in nature, i.e. victims were selected 'less on the basis of their political affiliation than solely and explicitly on the basis of their religion, ethnic group, and/or perceived nationality' (ibid., 4). This means that security forces and FPI youth militias did not limit their attacks to known RDR activists but instead targeted anyone who was suspected to be of Northern or foreign origin. The situation was particularly bad in the South-West and in Abidjan 'where Northerners in popular neighborhoods were subjected to regular roundups in which they were stripped to the waist, relieved of their documents, and carted off in trucks like cattle' (Marshall-Fratani 2006, 28).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	In a context of economic turmoil and reduced public spending, the territorial reach of the security forces declined, in particular in the northern and western parts of the country. The gendarmerie was the only security force that retained a national presence but did no longer reach beyond the urban areas (Kadet 2011, 57). The police force was under-equipped and very unequally distributed across the territory, with the whole north being severely underserviced (ibid, 58-63).

		The army was also under-equipped and almost entirely absent from the northern parts of the country. The various intelligence services, finally, were poorly coordinated and hampered by extremely weak capacities (ibid., 63-68). As a result of all this, the state had effectively lost its monopoly of violence in the North by the 1990s. This manifested itself in escalating insecurity and crime and the emergence of rival 'violence actors', most notably traditional hunters (*dozo*) who came to play a key role in the provision of public security in many parts of the North (Bassett 2004; Hellweg 2004; Förster 2004).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	We could find no evidence that the ruling FPI had a significant organizational presence in the northern parts of the country, which remained the uncontested stronghold of Ouattara's RDR (Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).
External sanctuary *(exsanc)*	1,00	Burkina Faso offered sanctuary to army officers from northern Côte d'Ivoire who had been purged from the military under Guei and Gbagbo (Banegas and Otayek 2003; ICG 2003b). Enjoying high-level support within Burkina Faso's political and military leadership, these soldiers lived in government-owned villas, drove expensive cars, trained openly and made no secret of their intention to overthrow the Gbagbo government. They were not only trained in logistics, communication, and clandestine operations but also equipped with weapons. During the first half of 2002, a number of diplomatic incidents led to escalating tensions between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. As a result, the Compaoré regime reinforced its ties with Northern dissidents and finally gave the go-ahead for the rebellion.
International support *(intsup)*	0,00	No evidence for international support (Crook 1997; Toungara 2001; Woods 2003; Langer 2005).

Peul, 1986-2005 (Guinea)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Charles 1989; Groelsema 1998; ICG 2003a; ICG 2005; O'Toole and Baker 2005; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	1,00	Data from the 1999 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/) suggest that the Peul were deprived in terms of both educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 1,22) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 1,06).
Cultural marginalization *(culmarg)*	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Charles 1989; Groelsema 1998; ICG 2003a; ICG 2005; O'Toole and Baker 2005).
Indiscriminate Repression *(indisrep)*	0,00	Lansana Conté military regime was very repressive in character, evident in extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, inhuman prison conditions, and severe restrictions on the freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly (DoS 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2002, 2000, 2004, 2006; AI 1991, 2000; AI 2002; HRW 2011). Members of the Peul political parties (see below) were

		also repeatedly targeted, in particular in the context of national elections, yet this repression remained selective in nature.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Conté's security forces exercised very strong territorial control. The armed forces spread palpable fear by their ever-present control over the country's political and social life (ICG 2003c, 11-14; HRW 2011, 49). The regime not only placed loyal military cadres in strategic positions at the national level but also systematically 'colonized' the local administration with military staff (Charles 1989, 15-18). Beyond the regular army, the government could rely on the Gendarmerie – a paramilitary police force charged with law enforcement, public safety, and security throughout the country (O'Toole and Baker 2005, 98). At least one of its Brigades was assigned to each administrative unit. The Gendarmerie was reinforced by the Garde Républicain, which was established to patrol the rural areas in administrative regions (ibid., 97).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	Under colonial rule, Touré's *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG) had established the highest degree of party organisation at the grassroots across French West Africa (Schmidt 2009, 13-14). After independence in 1958, the authoritarian one-party state further extended its territorial presence through thousands of local party committees, which existed in every corner of the country (Adamolekun 1976, 16-17). When Conté took power in the 1984 military coup, the structures of the one-party state were dismantled and political activity remained illegal until December 1992 (O'Toole and Baker 2005, 161). Afterwards, Conté and his followers created the *Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès* (PUP), which came to dominate the Guinean political scene during the 1990s and 2000s. Significantly, and in contrast to the other parties in the country, the PUP had local cells throughout the country and in many ways resembled Touré's PDG (Yansané 2010), even though it apparently began to lose cohesion from 2001-2002 (O'Toole and Baker 2005, 55).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Charles 1989; Groelsema 1998; ICG 2003a; ICG 2005; O'Toole and Baker 2005).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Charles 1989; Groelsema 1998; ICG 2003a; ICG 2005; O'Toole and Baker 2005).

Malinke, 1986-2005 (Guinea)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war. Note that Condé and other leading Malinke were accused of being involved in a coup attempt (1996) and another coup plot (1998) – allegations that were never proven. At the turn of the century, there were rumors that Malinke dissidents were behind the mysterious Rally of Democratic Forces of Guinea (RFDG) that claimed responsibility for the heavy fighting in Southern Guinea in 2000-01 ("The forces involved in the fighting in Guinea" 2001). Yet, there is no evidence that the RFDG ever made reference to Malinke grievances. Also, the most informed observers suggest that the violence was not due to a domestic uprising but rather the result of a foreign invasion by Charles Taylor and his regional allies (ICG 2003c, 1; 2005, 22).

Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Data from the 1999 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/) suggest that the Malinke were (marginally) deprived in terms of asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 1,10) but not in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 0).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Charles 1989; Groelsema 1998; ICG 2003a; ICG 2005; O'Toole and Baker 2005).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Lansana Conté military regime was very repressive in character, evident in extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrest, inhuman prison conditions, and severe restrictions on the freedoms of speech and peaceful assembly (DoS 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2002, 2000, 2004, 2006; AI 1991, 2000; AI 2002; HRW 2011). Members of the Malinke-based RPG (see below) were the main targets of repression: RPG assemblies and demonstrations were routinely prevented or violently dispersed (with several fatal casualties), while party organizers regularly suffered arrests, detentions and mistreatment in custody (ibid.). However, strong territorial control and the corresponding availability of precise information on dissident activities meant that the anti-Malinke violence was *selective* in nature, i.e. there was an intention to ascertain individual 'guilt' rather than to assign collective guilt.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Conté's security forces exercised very strong territorial control. The armed forces spread palpable fear by their ever-present control over the country's political and social life (ICG 2003c, 11-14; HRW 2011, 49). The regime not only placed loyal military cadres in strategic positions at the national level but also systematically 'colonized' the local administration with military staff (Charles 1989, 15-18). Beyond the regular army, the government could rely on the Gendarmerie – a paramilitary police force charged with law enforcement, public safety, and security throughout the country (O'Toole and Baker 2005, 98). At least one of its Brigades was assigned to each administrative unit. The Gendarmerie was reinforced by the Garde Républicain, which was established to patrol the rural areas in administrative regions (ibid., 97).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	1,00	Under colonial rule, Touré's *Parti Démocratique de Guinée* (PDG) had established the highest degree of party organisation at the grassroots across French West Africa (Schmidt 2009, 13-14). After independence in 1958, the authoritarian one-party state further extended its territorial presence through thousands of local party committees, which existed in every corner of the country (Adamolekun 1976, 16-17). When Conté took power in the 1984 military coup, the structures of the one-party state were dismantled and political activity remained illegal until December 1992 (O'Toole and Baker 2005, 161). Afterwards, Conté and his followers created the *Parti de l'Unité et du Progrès* (PUP), which came to dominate the Guinean political scene during the 1990s and 2000s. Significantly, and in contrast to the other parties in the country, the PUP had local cells throughout the country and in many ways resembled Touré's PDG (Yansané 2010), even though it apparently began to lose cohesion from 2001-2002 (O'Toole and Baker 2005, 55).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Charles 1989; Groelsema 1998; ICG 2003a; ICG 2005; O'Toole and Baker 2005).

International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Charles 1989; Groelsema 1998; ICG 2003a; ICG 2005; O'Toole and Baker 2005).

Northern Groups (Temne, Limba), 1964-1967 (Sierra Leone)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Kandeh 1992; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2005; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2008 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Temne were disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 1,13$) but not in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Kandeh 1992; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2005)
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Kandeh 1992; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2005).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The security forces had considerable territorial reach, in particular the Sierra Leone Police Force (ca. 4,000 men), which was regarded as one of the best in Africa (Kaplan 1976b, 349-353). The police was organized into five geographic divisions, each subdivided into a number of formations.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	After independence, Sierra Leone political parties were weak and febrile bodies not possessing much of an organization at the local level (Tangri 1978, 167). Politicians of the ruling *Sierra Leone People's Party* (SLPP) made little attempt to recruit support directly on a popular level, instead they relied on indirect rule through the chiefs who retained a large measure of independence (ibid., 168-169). All this means that local party organization existed more on paper than on the ground (ibid., 171).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Kandeh 1992; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2005).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Kandeh 1992; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2005).

Mende, 1968-1991 (Sierra Leone)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Kandeh 1992; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2005; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2008 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Mende were disadvantaged in terms of both educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 1,11) and asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 1,21).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Kandeh 1992; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2005).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	The Mende-dominated southern parts of the country received the brunt of APC violence, with SPLA leaders and members being intimidated, arrested, beaten or even killed throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Zack-Williams 1999, 144). Beyond these targeted forms of state repression, the Mende also suffered more indiscriminate state violence (Kandeh 1999, 360). The worst incident occurred in the context of the 1982 elections when thousands of peasant families were uprooted from their homes in the Mende-dominated Pujehun district; many fled to neighbouring Liberia as the entire district simmered with rage and violence.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The security forces had considerable territorial reach, in particular the Sierra Leone Police Force (ca. 4,000 men), which was regarded as one of the best in Africa (Kaplan 1976b, 349-353). The police was organized into five geographic divisions, each subdivided into a number of formations. Of particular importance was a Cuban-trained and well-armed special police group (the so-called Special Security Division), which was established in 1971 and responsible directly to President Sinka Stevens (Hayward 1989, 169-170; Keen 2005, 17). This paramilitary unit was present throughout the country, including in the rural parts of Mendeland, where it repeatedly terrorized dissident politicians and local elites (Keen 2005, 17). The regular army, by contrast, was not firmly under political control. This is why Stevens kept the small force to a largely ceremonial role and built the Special Security Division as a counterweight.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Even though the ruling All People's Congress (APC) portrayed itself as the people's party and initially apparently gained some support among the masses by criticizing the abuses of power by chiefs (Hayward 1989, 167-169), local party organization always existed more on paper than on the ground (Tangri 1978, 167, 171). This means that the APC was a weak and febrile body, which did not possess much of an organization at the local level and was therefore unable to directly appeal to the people in the villages (see also Kaplan 1976, 185).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Kandeh 1992; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2005).

International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Kandeh 1992; Zack-Williams 1999; Keen 2005).

Ewe, 1970-1971 (Ghana)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ ethnic war (Goldsworthy 1973; Chazan 1983; Langer 2005, UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1970sare not available. We therefore use data from the 1988 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Ewe were disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,34$) but not in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$). This is in line with historical evidence: According to Langer (2009, 538), "Ghana is confronted with a serious developmental divide between its northern and southern regions (…).The situation in the Ewe-dominated Volta Region was in many ways comparable to the Northern Territories because it is also mainly unsuitable for the commercial cultivation of tree crops such as cocoa and coffee, nor does it possess significant quantities of easily exploitable mineral resources. Similarly, ever since the Volta Region (as part of Trans Volta Togo) came under British colonial rule in the wake of World War I, very little was done to develop it (…). However, due to intensive missionary work from early colonial times, the people living in the Volta Region were comparatively well educated".
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Goldsworthy 1973; Chazan 1983; Langer 2005).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Even though Ghana's Second Republic was formally a multi-party democracy, it was nonetheless characterized by a considerable degree of authoritarianism, evident in the fact that the government's rule became increasingly paranoid and destructive of the Constitution (Goldsworthy 1973, 19-24). The Ewe opposition (organized in the NAL as described below) often complained of the Akan government's high handedness towards it, of its refusal to accept criticism or advice in any form (ibid., 13). As a consequence, the protest walk-out became one of the most frequently used of Opposition tactics. These tensions notwithstanding, we could not find any evidence that members of the Ewe ethnic group faced selective acts of state violence (arrests, beatings, torture, killings), let alone indiscriminate repression.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The Ghanaian security forces were relatively well-paid and well-equipped by African standards (Dowse 1975, 16-17). The police had about 18,000 men and was organized into nine police regions, subdivided into 52 police districts (in total 558 stations and posts) (Kaplan 1971, 347-353). Police presence was generally more pronounced in urban areas but also extended into rural areas (albeit to different degrees). As for the army, the central supporting units and installations were near Accra, yet battalion cantonments were widely dispersed

		through the country, including in Eweland (ibid., 365).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	We found almost no information on the territorial reach of the ruling PP. The latter was created in 1969 and had its strongholds in the in the Akan-dominated parts of the country (Goldsworthy 1973, 12). As such, it clearly did not have a grassroots presence throughout the country. However, the PPD did win a few seats in the Ewe-dominated Volta Region during the 1969 elections, which indicates that it must have had at least some organizational presence.
External sanctuary *(exsanc)*	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Goldsworthy 1973; Chazan 1983; Langer 2005).
International support *(intsup)*	0,00	No evidence for international support (Goldsworthy 1973; Chazan 1983; Langer 2005).

Ewe (and related groups), 1967-1990 (Togo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	1,00	On 23 September 1986, a group of some 70 armed Togolese dissidents crossed into Lomé from Ghana in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Eyadéma government (UCDP 2013). The coup was apparently an attempt by the exiled MTD to topple Eyadéma and to install its leader, Gilchrist Olympio, as president. The rebels attacked strategic targets including the radio station, military barracks housing President Eyadéma, and RPT headquarters. Fighting also broke out to the west of the capital, near the border with Ghana. Following a night of clashes, the rebels were defeated by government forces. The fighting claimed between 26 and 80 battle-related deaths. The official death toll was 26.
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1998 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Ewe were not deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 0) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 0. This is in line with historical evidence. The Ewe and related ethnic groups in the south had been greatly favored by the German and (later) French colonialists. As a result, they were privileged in terms of access to economic opportunities and social services after independence (Horowitz 1985, 482).
Cultural marginalization *(culmarg)*	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Toulabor 1986).
Indiscriminate Repression *(indisrep)*	0,00	The Eyadéma regime was generally extremely repressive in character (Toulabor 1986, 186-192). The Ewe and other southerners were preferred targets of the Northern-dominated regime, yet this repression remained selective in nature (see also Toulabor 1999).

Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The army generally played an overwhelming role in Togolese politics. This also involved high levels of territorial control, with military camps being evenly spread across the country (Toulabor 1986, 95-103, 188; 1999, 108; Manley 2003, 5-6). The military's omnipresence was particularly pronounced in the Ewe-dominated south (three military camps alone in Lomé). Beyond the army, the regime could also rely on the strength of the gendarmerie and the secret services, which contributed to establishing a system of pervasive surveillance throughout the country.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	1,00	The single party, the *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* (RPT), was created in 1969 to exercise complete social control (Toulabor 1986, 88). To perform this task it was endowed with party structures down to the village level (ibid., 203-208). This gave the party a relatively strong territorial presence, even though its structures were apparently often much weaker on the ground than on paper.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	It seems that MTD leader Gilchrist Olympio and some of his followers were given external sanctuary in neighboring Ghana and Burkina Faso where they were assisted in recruiting, arming and training the rebel group, which invaded Togo in September 1986 (see below) (Everett 1986).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Toulabor 1986, 1999).

Ijaw, 1960-1964 (Nigera)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ ethnic civil war (Mustapha 2003; Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2007).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2008 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Ijaw were disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 1,37) but not in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 0). However, historical evidence suggests that the Ijaw lagged behind in socioeconomic development under colonial rule, with the Western Ijaw (as opposed to the Eastern Ijaw) being particularly badly affected (Ukiwo 2007, 592-594). This did not change after independence in 1960 as the Ijaw continued to suffer from economic and social marginalization (Zinn 2005, 109; Watts 2007, 641-642; HRW 2005, 7-8). Against this backdrop we code the Ijaw to be 'more in than out' of the set of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Unwanted cultural assimilation or exclusion is generally not an important issue in Nigeria (Mustapha 2003, 19). The only exception is the policy on languages, which discriminates against ethnic minority languages (including the Ijaw language) to the extent that it confers a special status on the ethnic majority languages (Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa/Fulani).

Conditions/Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	During the early 1960s, selected Ijaw leaders suffered majoritarian oppression by the Igbo-dominated *National Council of Nigeria Citizens* (NCNC), which sought to fight off opposition from ethnic minorities in the eastern region (Mustapha 2003, 16; ICG 2006c, 5). We could not find any evidence for more indiscriminate forms of anti-Ijaw state violence.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	The security forces had only limited territorial reach in the oil-rich Niger Delta. The Ijaw homelands were policed entirely by the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) (Nelson et al. 1972, 391-393). When compared with those other federal states, the NPF forces maintained in the Rivers and Mid-Western States were relatively small in size and police posts and stations were found only in the larger urban centers, mainly on the rail lines and major highways.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	The dominant party after independence was the Hausa- and Fulani-dominated *Northern People's Congress* (NPC), which represented the more populous North and got a built-in veto power within the federation. However, due to the post-independence federal arrangement, all three regions were governed under virtual single party rule – the NPC controlled the North, the Yoruba-based *Action Group* (AG) the West, and the NCNC the East (ICG 2006c, 5). As such, the ruling NPC had no significant organizational presence in the southern parts of the country, including in the Ijaw homelands of the Niger Delta.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Mustapha 2003; Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2007).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Mustapha 2003; Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2007).

Ijaw, 1979-1983 (Nigera)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ ethnic civil war (Mustapha 2003; Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2007).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1970s and 1980s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2008 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Ijaw were disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 1,37) but not in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 0).

However, historical evidence suggests that the Ijaw lagged behind in socioeconomic development under colonial rule, with the Western Ijaw (as opposed to the Eastern Ijaw) being particularly badly affected (Ukiwo 2007, 592-594). This did not change after independence in 1960 as the Ijaw continued to suffer from economic and social marginalization (Zinn 2005, 109; Watts 2007, 641-642; HRW 2005, 7-8). Against this backdrop we code the Ijaw to be |

		'more in than out' of the set of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Unwanted cultural assimilation or exclusion is generally not an important issue in Nigeria (Mustapha 2003, 19). The only exception is the policy on languages, which discriminates against ethnic minority languages (including the Ijaw language) to the extent that it confers a special status on the ethnic majority languages (Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa/Fulani).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for anti-Ijaw state violence (Mustapha 2003; Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2007).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	The security forces had only limited territorial reach in the oil-rich Niger Delta. The Ijaw homelands were policed entirely by the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) (Nelson et al. 1972, 391-393). When compared with those other federal states, the NPF forces maintained in the Rivers and Mid-Western States were relatively small in size and police posts and stations were found only in the larger urban centers, mainly on the rail lines and major highways.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	The ruling *National Party of Nigeria* (NPN) was from the onset a Hausa/ Fulani platform, yet it was the only political party during the Second Republic that built a country-wide political organization and thus came to command a nationally representative following (Osaghae 1998, 118-123). The NPN's nationwide expansion helped President Shagari to become the first ever nationally elected leader with a majority of the votes in nine states, second position in another nine states, and 33,76% of the popular vote (Mustapha 2006, 38). Though Shagari was from the far north, five minority states – including in the Ijaw-dominated south – voted solidly for him.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Mustapha 2003; Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2007).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Mustapha 2003; Ukiwo 2007; Watts 2007).

Yoruba, 1992-1998 (Nigeria)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war. Note, however, that the confrontation between the government and the OPC escalated into armed conflict from 1999, with hundreds of battle-related deaths (Akinyele 2001, 627; Guichaoua 2009, 526).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2008 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Yoruba were not deprived

		in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$). This is in line with other sources: After independence, the Western Region, the homeland of the Yoruba, had a very privileged position in terms of access to economic opportunities and social services (Mustapha 2006, 7-10). This did not change until the 1990s when the southwestern zone was still economically and socially advantaged (for details see ibid, 10-15).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Akinyele 2001; Falola 2004; Guichaoua 2009).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	The Abacha military regime was generally extremely repressive in character, unleashing violence at both real and imagined opponents (Ogbondah 2000). The Yoruba became the butt of state violence because protests against the annulment of the 1993 presidential elections were loudest in the south-west (Ukiwo 2009, 20). However, anti-Yoruba repression remained selective in nature (Ukiwo 2009, 20; Guichaoua 2009, 525-526): While many Yoruba dissidents were arrested (e.g. the OPC leader Fasehun) or even killed (e.g. Abiola's wife), state violence was always targeted at specific individuals (who were perceived to be a threat to the regime) rather than at the Yoruba as a whole.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	Nigerians faced an appalling security situation throughout the 1990s (Meagher 2007, 23-26; Ukiwo 2009, 24). The security forces were very large in size but poorly equipped and controlled by the government. This was especially true for the Nigerian police, which remained grossly underfunded and neglected (Jemibewon 2001, 109-127). As a result, it effectively ceased to be a force for law and order and instead even became a source of insecurity and terror. In a context of escalating crime, the state even encouraged the formation of informal community-based vigilante groups.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Military regime = no ruling political party.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Akinyele 2001; Falola 2004; Guichaoua 2009).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	Many Yoruba organizations in the United States and Europe, amalgamated in the Egbe Omo Yoruba (EOY), supported the Yoruba cause from abroad (Falola 2004, 161). The EOY published a handbook and a magazine, in addition to maintaining a web page. It is however unclear if and to what extent it also provided Yoruba dissidents in Nigeria with financial support.

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
		Igbo, 1992-1998 (Nigeria)
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Ukiwo 2009; Onuoha 2012; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2008 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Igbo were not deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 0) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 0). This is in line with other sources: By the 1990s. the south-eastern parts of the country, the homeland of the Igbo, not only suffered lower poverty rates than the national average but also benefitted from relatively privileged access to education and other social services (Mustapha 2006, 10-15). These privileges notwithstanding, the Igbo lamented the alleged discrimination in matters of revenue allocation, financial aid, federal government investments and other amenities (Onuoha 2012, 37).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	The Igbo did not face restrictions in terms of language rights or recognition of ethnocultural practices. As far as religion is concerned, the Abacha regime was dominated by Northerners who were for the most part Muslim (Abacha himself was a Kanuri Muslim), while the Igbo were overwhelmingly Christians. Recurrent religious riots in Northern Nigerian cities notwithstanding (see below), there is no evidence to suggest that the Igbo suffered state-sanctioned restrictions on religious practices.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	The Abacha military regime was generally extremely repressive in character, unleashing violence at both real and imagined opponents (Ogbondah 2000). Members of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) – mainly Yoruba but also a number of Igbo – were repeatedly targeted by the state's security forces but the violence remained selective in nature (Ukiwo 2009, 20). Note that the Igbo also experienced more indiscriminate violence in the context of the many religious riots in Northern Nigerian cities during the 1990s. (Ukiwo 2009, 20, 23-24). However, it seems that the Abacha regime was not directly implicated in these riots (even though it clearly failed to curb them). As such, it is most plausible to conclude that the Igbo did not suffer *state-sanctioned* indiscriminate repression between 1992 and 1998.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	Nigerians faced an appalling security situation throughout the 1990s (Meagher 2007, 23-26; Ukiwo 2009, 24). The security forces were very large in size but poorly equipped and controlled by the government. This was especially true for the Nigerian police, which remained grossly underfunded and neglected (Jemibewon 2001, 109-127). As a result, it effectively ceased to be a force for law and order and instead even became a source of insecurity and terror. In a context of escalating crime, the state even encouraged the formation of informal community-based vigilante groups.
Territorial	0,00	Military regime = no ruling political party.

reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)		
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Ukiwo 2009; Onuoha 2012).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Ukiwo 2009; Onuoha 2012).

Ijaw, 1992-1998 (Nigeria)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Zinn 2005; Ukiwo 2007, 2009; Obi 2009; UCDP 2013) .
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1990s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2008 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Ijaw were disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,37$) but not in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$). However, other sources suggest that poverty levels in the Ijaw's Niger Delta region remained among the country's highest, and its education rates among the country's lowest (Zinn 2005, 109). The poverty level is exacerbated by the high cost of living. The influx of people employed in the well-paid oil sector has made Port Harcourt and the other urban areas of the region among the most expensive in Nigeria, but the oil sector employs only a small percentage of the indigenous workforce. For further details on the appalling development situation in the Delta see HRW (2005, 7-8), Watts (2007, 641-642) and Obi (2009, 114-117). Against this backdrop we code the Ijaw to be 'more in than out' of the set of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Unwanted cultural assimilation or exclusion is generally not an important issue in Nigeria (Mustapha 2003, 19). The only exception is the policy on languages, which discriminates against ethnic minority languages (including the Ijaw language) to the extent that it confers a special status on the ethnic majority languages (Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa/Fulani).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Faced with political mobilization in the Niger Delta, the state's undisciplined security forces did not hesitate to harass, detain or even kill Ijaw activists (Watts 2007, 652). However, we could not find any evidence that anti-Ijaw state violence turned indiscriminate under Abacha.
Territorial reach of the security	0,00	Nigerians faced an appalling security situation throughout the 1990s (Meagher 2007, 23-26; Ukiwo 2009, 24). The security forces were very large in size but poorly equipped and controlled by the government. This was especially true for

apparatus (*secureach*)		the Nigerian police, which remained grossly underfunded and neglected (Jemibewon 2001, 109-127). As a result, it effectively ceased to be a force for law and order and instead became a source of insecurity and terror. In a context of escalating crime, the state even encouraged the formation of informal community-based vigilante groups. In the oil-rich Niger delta, the security forces managed to retain a relatively strong presence in urban areas and around oil installations but were largely absent in the more rural areas, especially in the swamps and creeks of the delta that are particularly difficult to secure (Ukiwo 2007, 601-602).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Military regime = no ruling political party.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Zinn 2005; Ukiwo 2007, 2009; Obi 2009).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Zinn 2005; Ukiwo 2007, 2009; Obi 2009).

Ijaw, 1999-2005 (Nigeria)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Ijaw youths began to engage in a mix of antigovernment violence, ethnic clashes (with the Itsekiri) and militant actions against oil multinationals in March 1997 after the relocation of the Warri Southwest local government headquarters (and the corresponding access to municipal patronage, oil royalties, and government funds) from an Ijaw to an Itsekiri town (Zinn 2005, 109). The 1997 antigovernment violence caused four battle-related deaths (ibid., 92, 110). Escalation into ethnic armed conflict occurred in December 1998 when the Ijaw Youth Council issued the Kaiama Declaration, which among other demands, insisted on the Ijaw control of Ijaw oil (Obi 2009, 119-120). Using the slogan 'Operation Climate Change' it asked all oil companies to leave the Niger Delta before the end of the year. The military government sent in troops that forcefully put down the uprising against the oil companies. The violent clashes between Ijaw youths and government forces in late 1998 and early 1999 caused 223 battle-related deaths (Zinn 2005, 110). In July 2004, the *Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (*NDPVF), led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, declared an armed struggle against the federal government and Rivers State Governor Peter Odili (UCDP 2013). It claimed to fight for the interest of the ethnic Ijaw People of the delta region, which it says have suffered neglect and deprivation despite being the source of Nigeria's oil wealth. In September the army announced that it was taking over security in Rivers State from the police to "cleanse the state of all forms of armed banditry." Between July and September at least some 70 people died as a consequence of the battle between government forces and NDPVF. The conflict between NDPVF and the Nigerian government is regarded as terminated by the

		ceasefire signed on 29 September 2004.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1990s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2008 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Ijaw were disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 1,37) but not in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 0). However, other sources suggest that poverty levels in the Ijaw's Niger Delta region remained among the country's highest, and its education rates among the country's lowest (Zinn 2005, 109). The poverty level is exacerbated by the high cost of living. The influx of people employed in the well-paid oil sector has made Port Harcourt and the other urban areas of the region among the most expensive in Nigeria, but the oil sector employs only a small percentage of the indigenous workforce. For further details on the appalling development situation in the Delta see HRW (2005, 7-8), Watts (2007, 641-642) and Obi (2009, 114-117). Against this backdrop we code the Ijaw to be 'more in than out' of the set of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Unwanted cultural assimilation or exclusion was generally not an important issue (Mustapha 2003, 19). The only exception was the policy on languages, which discriminated against ethnic minority languages (including the Ijaw language) to the extent that it conferred a special status on the ethnic majority languages (Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa/Fulani).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Faced with political mobilization in the Niger Delta, the state's undisciplined security forces engaged in increasingly harsh repression against protesters (Watts 2007, 652). State violence turned indiscriminate on 30 December 1998 when the security forces randomly shot and killed unarmed Ijaw protesters (Zinn 2005, 110). This indiscriminate violence prompted a series of increasingly clashes between Ijaw youths and the security forces. After the onset of ethnic rebellion, the Nigerian army engaged in punitive expeditions against alleged dissidents, razing entire Ijaw communities and leaving thousands injured, homeless or dead (Obi 2009, 120). The appalling destruction of Odi (1999) and Odiama (2001) and the violence meted out by the Joint Military Task Force based in Warri were the most dramatic instances of state intimidation (Watts 2007, 652). 2,000 Ijaw civilians were killed during the Odi massacre in November 1999 (Zinn 2005, 110).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	Nigerians faced an appalling security situation during the 1990s (Meagher 2007, 23-26; Ukiwo 2009, 24). The security forces were very large in size but poorly equipped and controlled by the government. This was especially true for the Nigerian police, which remained underfunded and neglected (Jemibewon 2001, 109-127). As a result, it effectively ceased to be a force for law and order and instead became a source of insecurity and terror. In a context of escalating crime, the state even encouraged the formation of informal community-based vigilante groups. In the oil-rich Niger delta, the security forces managed to retain a relatively strong presence in urban areas and around oil installations but were largely absent in the more rural areas, especially in the swamps and creeks of the delta that are particularly difficult to secure (Ukiwo 2007, 601-602).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Transitional military regime (Maj. Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar) = no ruling political party.

Conditions/Outcome	Coding	Rationale
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Zinn 2005; Ukiwo 2007, 2009; Obi 2009).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Zinn 2005; Ukiwo 2007, 2009; Obi 2009).

Muslim Sahel groups, 1960-1975 (Chad) **[Ouaddai, Baguirmien, Kanem-Bornou, Fitri-Batha, Hadjarai)**		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Uncoordinated rebellion began in November 1965 with the Mangalmé tax riots in the Batha prefecture and then spread into Ouadai and Salamat (Decalo 1977, 240-241, 1980a, 38-41). The spread of the rebellion was facilitated by the formation of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FROLINAT) in Nyala, Sudan on 22 June 1966. FROLINAT was mainly a merger of Abatcha's UNT and Moussa's MNLT. The rebellion, which was an immediate response to the marginalization and brutalization of the north, subsequently underwent several splits and reconfigurations and lasted until 1975. While the total number of casualties is unknown, it is generally agreed that the 1,000 battle-related deaths per year threshold was reached (for example, UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1996 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that members of the Muslim Sahel groups were seriously disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 2,36) and also disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 1,22). This is in line with historical sources, which show that members of the Muslim Sahel groups (and 'northerners' more generally) were already heavily disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms at the time of independence – a situation that reflected the colonial distinction between the 'Tchad utile' (in the south) and the 'Tchad inutile' (in the north) (Decalo 1980, 27; Lemarchand 1986, 29; Nolutshungu 1996, 32). For details on socioeconomic North-South disparities in post-independence Chad see Buijtenhuijs (1978, 77-91).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	Colonial rule fostered the emergence of a strong divide between a Muslim North and a Christian/ Animist South (Nolutshungu 1996, 27-31). After independence, the Tombalbaye government categorically refused to adopt Arabic as the country's second official language (Buijtenhuijs 1978, 119). More generally, the mostly Sara civil servants in the north exhibited a high degree of cultural insensitivity towards the local population (Nolutshungu 1996, 55). This manifested itself in open aversion not only to Islam but also to Northern customs (wearing turbans, carrying daggers, etc.).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Members of the Muslim Sahel ethnic groups faced massive repression by the Southern-dominated Tombalbaye regime, especially after the imposition of a one-party state in 1962. The repression manifested itself in mass arrests of Muslim political leaders, of whom at least 33 were liquidated in custody (Decalo 1980, 38-39). This selective state violence against potential political rivals gave rise to more indiscriminate violence: In response to the arrest of key Muslim

		leaders, a series of explosive popular riots occurred in Fort Lamy, Am Timan and other localities in September 1963 (Decalo 1977, 125; 1980, 38-39). Crowds attempting to separate the arresting officials from those being arrested were fired upon and up to 500 people were killed. Moreover, the rural population in the north experienced enduring repression and violence at the hands of the mostly southern civil servants, especially by tax collectors who were typically accompanied by armed guards (Buijtenhuijs 1978, 85-87).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	The state apparatus simply never extended over much of the periphery (Decalo 1980, 23), never enjoyed any real authority over the rural areas of the North (Nolutshungu 1996, 54-57). After independence, the armed forces were composed of four different structures, including the regular army, the Garde Nationale, the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Sûreté Nationale (Decalo 1977, 41-44). The Sara-dominated regular army had only 500 troops in 1964, which were poorly trained, under-weaponed and mostly garrisoned near the capital (lacking in mobility). The Sûreté Nationale acted as the police in the major urban areas (ibid., 268), while the Gendarmerie disposed of mobile units dispersed in the countryside (ibid., 134-135). The latter were however seriously understaffed (only 600 men in 1964) and almost exclusively concentrated in southern prefectures. The Garde Nationale et Nomade, finally, was composed of the non-mobile countryside Garde Nationale and special units equipped to secure order in semi-nomadic areas (ibid., 133-134). Yet, its real influence on the ground remained extremely limited due to a lack of personnel and poor training.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	The country's ruling party, the *Parti Progressiste Tchadien* (PPT), was founded in 1946 with an anti-chiefly and against cotton cultivation agenda (Decalo 1977, 217-218; Decalo 1980, 34-39). While it initially had a considerable presence throughout the country (including in the centre and north), it soon evolved into a southern-based political party (with a solid ethnic support among the Sara) and subsequently became the vehicle of the non-Muslim intelligentsia. In organizational terms, the PPT was largely moribund, especially after it was made the single party in 1962: Party organization atrophied with all decisions being taken by Tombalbaye and his immediate cronies.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	By the mid-1960s, hundreds of thousands Chadian refugees, mainly from the north, had found sanctuary in neighboring Sudan (Buijtenhuijs 1978, 110). Some of these refugees used this external sanctuary to organize rebel activities. The two main rebel groups were Ibrahim Abatcha's UNT (Arab-dominated) and Ahmed Moussa's *Mouvement Nationale de Libération du Tchad* (MNLT) (dominated by members of the Sahel Muslim groups, especially from Ouadai) (ibid., 110-121). While the Sudanese government did little to prevent rebel activities on its territory, it apparently provided the rebels with only very limited direct financial and tactical support (Nolutshungu 1996, 63-64).
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	The domestically-based rebels in eastern Chad received financial and material support from exiled Chadians in Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Egypt (Nolutshungu 1996, 58).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
		Arabs, 1960-1975 (Chad)
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Uncoordinated rebellion began in November 1965 with the Mangalmé tax riots in the Batha prefecture and then spread into Ouadai and Salamat (Decalo 1977, 240-241, 1980a, 38-41). The spread of the rebellion was facilitated by the formation of the *Front de Libération Nationale* (FROLINAT) in Nyala, Sudan on 22 June 1966. FROLINAT was mainly a merger of Abatcha's UNT and Moussa's MNLT. The rebellion, which was an immediate response to the marginalization and brutalization of the north, subsequently underwent several splits and reconfigurations and lasted until 1975. While the total number of casualties is unknown, it is generally agreed that the 1,000 battle-related deaths per year threshold was reached (for example, UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1996 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that Arabs were seriously disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 1{,}86$) but not disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$). Historical sources suggest however that Arabs were heavily disadvantaged in socioeconomic terms at the time of independence – a situation that reflected the colonial distinction between the 'Tchad utile' (in the south) and the 'Tchad inutile' (in the north) (Decalo 1980, 27; Lemarchand 1986, 29; Nolutshungu 1996, 32). For details on socioeconomic North-South disparities in post-independence Chad see Buijtenhuijs (1978, 77-91). Against this backdrop we code Arabs to be 'more in than out' of the set of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	Colonial rule fostered the emergence of a strong divide between a Muslim North and a Christian/ Animist South (Nolutshungu 1996, 27-31). After independence, the Tombalbaye government categorically refused to adopt Arabic as the country's second official language (Buijtenhuijs 1978, 119). More generally, the mostly Sara civil servants in the north exhibited a high degree of cultural insensitivity towards the local population (Nolutshungu 1996, 55). This manifested itself in open aversion not only to Islam but also to Northern customs (wearing turbans, carrying daggers, etc.).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Arabs faced massive repression by the Southern-dominated Tombalbaye regime, especially after the imposition of a one-party state in 1962. The repression manifested itself in mass arrests of Muslim political leaders, of whom at least 33 were liquidated in custody (Decalo 1980, 38-39). This selective state violence against potential political rivals gave rise to more indiscriminate violence: In response to the arrest of key Muslim leaders, a series of explosive popular riots occurred in Fort Lamy, Am Timan and other localities in September 1963 (Decalo 1977, 125; 1980, 38-39). Crowds attempting to separate the arresting officials from those being arrested were fired upon and up to 500 people were killed. Moreover, the rural population in the north experienced enduring repression and violence at the hands of the mostly southern civil servants, especially by tax collectors who were typically accompanied by armed guards (Buijtenhuijs 1978, 85-87).
Territorial reach of the	0,00	The state apparatus simply never extended over much of the periphery (Decalo 1980, 23), never enjoyed any real authority over the rural areas of the North

security apparatus (*secureach*)		(Nolutshungu 1996, 54-57). After independence, the armed forces were composed of four different structures, including the regular army, the Garde Nationale, the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Surété Nationale (Decalo 1977, 41-44). The Sara-dominated regular army had only 500 troops in 1964, which were poorly trained, under-weaponed and mostly garrisoned near the capital (lacking in mobility). The Surété Nationale acted as the police in the major urban areas (ibid., 268), while the Gendarmerie disposed of mobile units dispersed in the countryside (ibid., 134-135). The latter were however seriously understaffed (only 600 men in 1964) and almost exclusively concentrated in southern prefectures. The Garde Nationale et Nomade, finally, was composed of the non-mobile countryside Garde Nationale and special units equipped to secure order in semi-nomadic areas (ibid., 133-134). Yet, its real influence on the ground remained extremely limited due to a lack of personnel and poor training.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	The country's ruling party, the *Parti Progressiste Tchadien* (PPT), was founded in 1946 with an anti-chiefly and against cotton cultivation agenda (Decalo 1977, 217-218; Decalo 1980, 34-39). While it initially had a considerable presence throughout the country (including in the centre and north), it soon evolved into a southern-based political party (with a solid ethnic support among the Sara) and subsequently became the vehicle of the non-Muslim intelligentsia. In organizational terms, the PPT was largely moribund, especially after it was made the single party in 1962: Party organization atrophied with all decisions being taken by Tombalbaye and his immediate cronies.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	By the mid-1960s, hundreds of thousands Chadian refugees, mainly from the northern parts of the country, had found sanctuary in neighboring Sudan (Buijtenhuijs 1978, 110). Some of these refugees used this external sanctuary to organize rebel activities. The two main rebel groups were Ibrahim Abatcha's UNT (Arab-dominated) and Ahmed Moussa's *Mouvement Nationale de Libération du Tchad* (MNLT) (dominated by members of the Sahel Muslim groups, especially from Ouadai) (ibid., 110-121). While the Sudanese government did little to prevent rebel activities on its territory, it apparently provided the rebels with only very limited direct financial and tactical support (Nolutshungu 1996, 63-64).
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	The domestically-based rebels in eastern Chad received financial and material support from exiled Chadians in Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR) and Egypt (Nolutshungu 1996, 58).

Batéké, 1960-1963 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Batéké were not deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$).

Conditions/Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	A national army was only created in 1962. Its troops were initially small in numbers and exclusively garrisoned in the southern cities (mainly Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire) (Decalo 1990, 59-60; Lebi 2009, 115-128). Much stronger in terms of territorial control was the gendarmerie, a largely southern-staffed part of the armed forces (Clark and Decalo 2012, 197). The gendarmerie was not only present in all urban areas but also had some reach into the rural areas (Lebi 2009, 129). As such, it became President Youlou's most important and reliable security organ, providing him with information on suspect political activities. Moreover, the President apparently managed to reorganize the police and built into a more effective national force (ibid., 130).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Congo's main post-colonial political parties all emerged with an ethnic base, and neither ever managed to gain substantial influence in the rival ethnic communities (Clark 2008, 61-68). This was also true for the ruling part, Félix Youlou's *Union Démocratique pour la Défense des Intérêts Africains* (UDDIA), which had only a very limited territorial presence outside its Bakongo and Lari strongholds.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Mbochi, 1960-1963 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Mbochi were not deprived in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 0) and asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 0).
Cultural	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville

marginalization (*culmarg*)		1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008). Note that MSA leader Jacques Opangault was arrested in 1959 but released before independence (and subsequently even made Vice-President) (Clark 2008, 65-66).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	A national army was only created in 1962. Its troops were initially small in numbers and exclusively garrisoned in the southern cities (mainly Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire) (Decalo 1990, 59-60; Lebi 2009, 115-128). Much stronger in terms of territorial control was the gendarmerie, a largely southern-staffed part of the armed forces (Clark and Decalo 2012, 197). The gendarmerie was not only present in all urban areas but also had some reach into the rural areas (Lebi 2009, 129). As such, it became President Youlou's most important and reliable security organ, providing him with information on suspect political activities. Moreover, the President apparently managed to reorganize the police and built into a more effective national force (ibid., 130).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Congo's main post-colonial political parties all emerged with an ethnic base, and neither ever managed to gain substantial influence in the rival ethnic communities (Clark 2008, 61-68). This was also true for the ruling part, Félix Youlou's *Union Démocratique pour la Défense des Intérêts Africains* (UDDIA), which apparently had a very limited territorial presence outside its Bakongo and Lari strongholds.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Lari, 1964-1968 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Lari were not disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) but slightly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,13$).
Cultural marginalization	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

(*culmarg*)		
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	As detailed below, militants of the single party's youth wing, the *Jeunesse du Mouvement Nationale de la Révolution* (JMNR), hunted out and harassed alleged opponents and 'counter revolutionaries', especially in 1964-1965. The main targets of this repression were alleged supporters of former President Youlou (the 'Youlouists'), most of whom were Lari (Decalo 1990, 56, 61; Radu and Sommerville 1989, 165-166). However, the available evidence suggests that this repression always remained selective in nature.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	While the army remained small and garrisoned in the urban areas of the south, the gendarmerie remained present throughout the entire country (Lebi 2009, 131). At the same time it bears emphasis that many of the gendarmerie's responsibilities were increasingly usurped by the JMNR and its armed wing (see below for details), which evolved into the government's main security prop (Decalo 1990, 62).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	In 1964, the *Mouvement Nationale de la Révolution* (MNR) was established as the single party. It featured a countrywide network of party cells, supplemented by women's and youth mass movements (Clark and Decalo 2012, 299). Of particular significance in terms of territorial control was the JMNR, which gained a reputation for having eyes and ears everywhere, including in the countryside, and took on itself the role of hunting out and harassing perceived opponents and 'counter revolutionaries' (in particular 'Youlouists') (Decalo 1990, 56, 61; Radu and Sommerville 1989, 165-166). With up to 35,000 members, the JMNR dwarfed the regular army by sheer numbers and tapped independent sources of finance and arms from Cuba and North Vietnam. Moreover, it possessed a Cuban-trained armed wing, the Civil Defense Corps (about 2,000 men).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Batéké, 1964-1968 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Batéké were not deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$).

Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	As detailed below, militants of the single party's youth wing, the *Jeunesse du Mouvement Nationale de la Révolution* (JMNR), hunted out and harassed alleged opponents and 'counter revolutionaries', especially in 1964-1965. The main targets of this selective repression were alleged supporters of former President Youlou (the 'Youlouists'), most of whom were Lari (Decalo 1990, 56, 61; Radu and Sommerville 1989, 165-166). We were unable to find any definite evidence that members of the Batéké ethnic group were also affected.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	While the army remained small and garrisoned in the urban areas of the south, the gendarmerie remained present throughout the entire country (Lebi 2009, 131). At the same time it bears emphasis that many of the gendarmerie's responsibilities were increasingly usurped by the JMNR and its armed wing (see below for details), which evolved into the government's main security prop (Decalo 1990, 62).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	1,00	In 1964, the *Mouvement Nationale de la Révolution* (MNR) was established as the single party. It featured a countrywide network of party cells, supplemented by women's and youth mass movements (Clark and Decalo 2012, 299). Of particular significance in terms of territorial control was the JMNR, which gained a reputation for having eyes and ears everywhere, including in the countryside, and took on itself the role of hunting out and harassing perceived opponents and 'counter revolutionaries' (in particular 'Youlouists') (Decalo 1990, 56, 61; Radu and Sommerville 1989, 165-166). With up to 35,000 members, the JMNR dwarfed the regular army by sheer numbers and tapped independent sources of finance and arms from Cuba and North Vietnam. Moreover, it possessed a Cuban-trained armed wing, the Civil Defense Corps (about 2,000 men).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Mbochi, 1964-1968 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that

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(*soecmarg*)		the Mbochi were not deprived in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 0) and asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 0).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	As detailed below, militants of the single party's youth wing, the *Jeunesse du Mouvement Nationale de la Révolution* (JMNR), hunted out and harassed alleged opponents and 'counter revolutionaries', especially in 1964-1965. The main targets of this selective repression were alleged supporters of former President Youlou (the 'Youlouists'), most of whom were Lari (Decalo 1990, 56, 61; Radu and Sommerville 1989, 165-166). Even though it is likely that former members of the Mbochi-based MSA were also affected, we were unable to find any definite evidence on this subject. As such, we prefer to code the Mbochi as 'fully out' of the set of indiscriminately repressed ethnic groups.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	While the army remained small and garrisoned in the urban areas of the south, the gendarmerie remained present throughout the entire country (Lebi 2009, 131). At the same time it bears emphasis that many of the gendarmerie's responsibilities were increasingly usurped by the JMNR and its armed wing (see below for details), which evolved into the government's main security prop (Decalo 1990, 62).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	In 1964, the *Mouvement Nationale de la Révolution* (MNR) was established as the single party. It featured a countrywide network of party cells, supplemented by women's and youth mass movements (Clark and Decalo 2012, 299). Of particular significance in terms of territorial control was the JMNR, which gained a reputation for having eyes and ears everywhere, including in the countryside, and took on itself the role of hunting out and harassing perceived opponents and 'counter revolutionaries' (in particular 'Youlouists') (Decalo 1990, 56, 61; Radu and Sommerville 1989, 165-166). With up to 35,000 members, the JMNR dwarfed the regular army by sheer numbers and tapped independent sources of finance and arms from Cuba and North Vietnam. Moreover, it possessed a Cuban-trained armed wing, the Civil Defense Corps (about 2,000 men).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Lari/Bakongo, 1969-1971 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war	1,00	On 23 March 1970, a small group of 'Youlouist' rebels, led by Pierre Kikanga,

(*ethnicwar*)		crossed the river from Zaire and attempted to rally the Lari against the northern-based regime (Radu and Sommerville 1989, 170-171). The rebels unsuccessfully offered the presidency to a fellow Lari, but one born and educated in the north, Yhombi Opango, then a paratrooper commander. The fighting caused between 30 and 65 casualties.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Lari/Bakongo were not disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) but slightly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,09$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	As President Marien Ngouabi established a northern-dominated regime, Lari and Bakongo cadres faced increasing repression. While this repression remained mostly selective in nature, there was also at least one incident of indiscriminate violence, which occurred in the context of escalating tensions between the Lari/Bakongo-dominated JMNR Civil Defense Corps (led by André Hombessa) and the Mbochi-dominated armed forces (led by Ngouabi himself) (Decalo 1990, 66; Clark 2008, 147). As Hombessa and his followers refused to surrender their arms and submit to the army's authority in September 1968, Ngouabi ordered his men to open fire on the JNMR militants. Between 100 and 300 militants died and the JNMR was crushed.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	During the late 1960s, there were serious divisions within the country's security apparatus, which undermined the latter's territorial reach: While the Northern-dominated army was loyal to President Ngouabi (himself a Kouyou from the North), the police and the gendarmerie were still dominated by Lari and Bakongo (Decalo 1990, 69-73). As a result, the gendarmerie either "failed" to report dissident activities by the 'Youlouist' opposition or even actively participated in coup plots (Clark and Decalo 2012, 197). It was only after the 1970 rebellion by Kikanga and his followers (see below) that the gendarmerie and the police were disbanded and reorganized.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	In late 1969, President Ngouabi created a nominally Marxist-Leninist single party, the *Parti Congolais du Travail* (PCT) (Radu and Sommerville 1989, 191-195; Clark 2008, 71). While claiming to be deeply implanted at the grassroots level, the PCT was weakened by shrinking membership: in the context of recurrent purges membership fell to only 164 cadres by the early 1970s (Decalo 1990, 41). As most party branches closed due to a lack of leaders and members, the single party had virtually no territorial reach.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	Former President Youlou and some of his mostly Lari followers benefitted from external sanctuary in neighboring Zaire, from where they repeatedly tried to destabilize the Ngouabi regime (Decalo 1990, 63, 71). While it remains unclear to what extent the government in Kinshasa supported these activities, it seems clear that at least it did little to contain them.
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Lari/Bakongo, 1972-1976 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Lari/Bakongo were not disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 0) but slightly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 1,09).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	During the early 1970s, the political scene in Congo was characterised by arrests, detention without trial and torture (Clark and Decalo 2012, 45). Allegedly disloyal Lari and Bakongo cadres were the main targets of this repression (especially in 1971-72 and 1975-76), which however remained selective in nature (Decalo 1990, 76-77).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The territorial reach of the security forces increased after the police and the gendarmerie were disbanded and reorganized in 1971-1972. Most importantly, the gendarmerie was replaced by a 'people's militia' – an ideologically committed force tied to the military, which was recruited from the gendarmerie's most militant and loyal elements (Decalo 1990, 73). The new militia was present throughout the country, including in rural areas, and meant to exercise 'permanent vigilance'. However, it soon became clear that the new security force was not entirely loyal to the regime as some of its militants supported the 1972 coup attempt by Ange Diawara (Clark and Decalo 2012, 197).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	President Ngouabi made efforts to revive the PCT through a process of enlargement and reorganization, albeit with limited success (Clark and Decalo 2012, 348-349). The most important developments of this period was the recruitment of new members (about 1,500 by the mid-1970s) and the party's expansion into the regions, where 10 political commissars were posted to reorganize and guide its development. Also, new party units were created throughout the country. Revolutionary rhetoric notwithstanding, the party really remained semicomatose and without an effective national role to play (Radu and Sommerville 1989, 146-147). There was never any doubt that the ultimate source of power in the country was the military rather than the party.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Batéké, 1972-1976 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Batéké were not deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 0) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 0).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The territorial reach of the security forces increased after the police and the gendarmerie were disbanded and reorganized in 1971-1972. Most importantly, the gendarmerie was replaced by a 'people's militia' – an ideologically committed force tied to the military, which was recruited from the gendarmerie's most militant and loyal elements (Decalo 1990, 73). The new militia was present throughout the country, including in rural areas, and meant to exercise 'permanent vigilance'. However, it soon became clear that the new security force was not entirely loyal to the regime as some of its militants supported the 1972 coup attempt by Ange Diawara (Clark and Decalo 2012, 197).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	President Ngouabi made efforts to revive the PCT through a process of enlargement and reorganization, albeit with limited success (Clark and Decalo 2012, 348-349). The most important developments of this period was the recruitment of new members (about 1,500 by the mid-1970s) and the party's expansion into the regions, where 10 political commissars were posted to reorganize and guide its development. Also, new party units were created throughout the country. Revolutionary rhetoric notwithstanding, the party really remained semicomatose and without an effective national role to play (Radu and Sommerville 1989, 146-147). There was never any doubt that the ultimate source of power in the country was the military rather than the party.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International	0,00	No Evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville

support (*intsup*)		1989; Clark 2008).

Lari/Bakongo, 1977-1978 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Lari/Bakongo were not disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 0) but slightly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 1,09).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Allegedly disloyal Lari and Bakongo cadres remained the main targets of (selective) state repression, especially after Ngouabi's assassination in 1977 (Decalo 1990, 77-78.).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The territorial reach of the security forces increased after the police and the gendarmerie were disbanded and reorganized in 1971-1972. Most importantly, the gendarmerie was replaced by a 'people's militia' – an ideologically committed force tied to the military, which was recruited from the former gendarmerie's most militant and loyal elements (Decalo 1990, 73). The new militia was present throughout the country, including in rural areas, and meant to exercise 'permanent vigilance'.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Joachim Yhombi-Opango's interregnum marked a pause in the PCT's revolutionary process (Clark and Decalo 2012, 349). While the President formally confirmed the overall supremacy of the PCT, party activities in the country largely came to a standstill.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Batéké , 1977-1978 (Congo)		
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Batéké were not deprived in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The territorial reach of the security forces increased after the police and the gendarmerie were disbanded and reorganized in 1971-1972. Most importantly, the gendarmerie was replaced by a 'people's militia' – an ideologically committed force tied to the military, which was recruited from the former gendarmerie's most militant and loyal elements (Decalo 1990, 73). The new militia was present throughout the country, including in rural areas, and meant to exercise 'permanent vigilance'.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Joachim Yhombi-Opango's interregnum marked a pause in the PCT's revolutionary process (Clark and Decalo 2012, 349). While the President formally confirmed the overall supremacy of the PCT, party activities in the country largely came to a standstill.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

		Lari/Bakongo, 1979-1984 (Congo)
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1970s and 1980s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Lari/Bakongo were not disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) but slightly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,09$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	There was considerably less state repression against alleged Lari and Bakongo 'counter-revolutionaries' than during the 1970s. Nevertheless, selected Lari and Bakongo continued to face repression, i.e. in 1984 when the last remaining senior Lari officer in the army was arrested for plotting and subsequently retired (Clark and Decalo 2012, 45).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	We could not find much information on the territorial reach of the security apparatus between 1979 and 1984. In general, Nguesso could rely on a loyal Northern-dominated army (tensions between Mbochi and Kouyou officers notwithstanding). Moreover, he established a Cuban-trained Garde Presidentielle (the Red Berets), which was well-armed and composed of handpicked northerners (Clark and Decalo 2012, 46). Finally, there is (albeit scant) evidence that the 'people's militia' was reinforced at the grassroots and thus better able to uncover potential dissent (Kounougous 2009, 119-120).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	The PCT was revived when Nguesso came to power in 1979 (Clark and Decalo 2012, 248-350). Membership was considerably increased (about 9,000 members by the mid-1980s) and new efforts were made to strengthen the party not only at the centre but also in the regions. We could not find any information on whether this increased the PCT's territorial reach. On the whole, however, it seems clear that the single party continued to play a rather marginal national role, especially when compared with the army (Radu and Sommerville 1989, 146-147).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Lari/Bakongo, 1985-1990 (Congo)		
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1978s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Lari/Bakongo were not disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 0) but slightly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 1,09).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	There was considerably less state repression against alleged Lari and Bakongo 'counter-revolutionaries' than during the 1970s. Nevertheless, selected Lari and Bakongo continued to face repression, i.e. in 1984 when the last remaining senior Lari officer in the army was arrested for plotting and subsequently retired (Clark and Decalo 2012, 45).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	We could not find much information on the territorial reach of the security apparatus between 1985 and 1990. In general, Nguesso could rely on a loyal Northern-dominated army (tensions between Mbochi and Kouyou officers notwithstanding). Moreover, he established a Cuban-trained Garde Presidentielle (the Red Berets), which was well-armed and composed of handpicked northerners (Clark and Decalo 2012, 46). Finally, there is (albeit scant) evidence that the 'people's militia' was reinforced at the grassroots and thus better able to uncover potential dissent (Kounougous 2009, 119-120).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	The PCT was revived when Nguesso came to power in 1979 (Clark and Decalo 2012, 248-350). Membership was considerably increased (about 9,000 members by the mid-1980s) and new efforts were made to strengthen the party not only at the centre but also in the regions. We could not find any information on whether this increased the PCT's territorial reach. On the whole, however, it seems clear that the single party continued to play a rather marginal national role, especially when compared with the army (Radu and Sommerville 1989, 146-147). The rapidity with which the PCT and its associated organizations evaporated in 1990-1991revealed the shallowness of their roots in society.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Decalo 1990; Radu and Sommerville 1989; Clark 2008).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
		Nibolek (Bembe etc.), 1998-2005 (Congo)
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	After Sassou-Nguessou's Cobra militia seized power in late October 1997, aided by Angolan troops, the remnants of former President Pascal Lissouba's Cocoye militia hid and regrouped in their native Nibolek region (UCDP 2013). By March 1998 serious fighting erupted between government forces and the Cocoyes, who initially claimed some successes. In early 1999 the Cocoyes launched a major attack on the town of Dolisie, which it temporarily occupied. Fighting subsequently continued in the countryside throughout 1999, with government and Angolan troops slowly gaining the upper hand. A cease-fire agreement was signed in Pointe-Noir on 16 November 1999. The armed conflict caused more than 25 but less than 1000 battle-related deaths in both 1998 and 1999 (ibid.).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1990s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Nibolek (Bembe, Punu, Lali) were disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 1,08$) but not disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Bazenguissa-Ganga and Patrice 1999; Englebert and Ron 2004; Clark 2008; Clark and Decalo 2012).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	After Sassou-Nguesso's military victory, the defeated Cocoye militia as well as Nibolek civilians came to suffer indiscriminate repression (Bazenguissa-Ganga and Yengo 1999, 191-192; UCDP 2013). While the Cocoyes expected amnesty and re-integration into the security forces, the new army – made up of Sassou loyalists, the Cobra militia and Angolan and Chadian troops – engaged in a hunt for the fleeing militias (Operation Colombe II). As the latter were difficult to identify, everybody capable of carrying a gun in the Nibolek region was indiscriminately treated as a potential militia. This led to gross human rights violations not only against former combatants but also against the civilian population, including looting, rape and summary executions.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	When Sassou-Nguesso returned to power via force of arms in late 1997, his grip on the country was still extremely tentative, in particular in the southern parts of the territory (Clark and Decalo 2012, 23-24). Far from controlling every corner of the country, large groups of armed people remained loyal to either Lissouba or Kolélas. Sassou-Nguesso's new army and its Angolan allies had some presence in the south, which was however insufficiently strong to maintain control, especially in the countryside. Beyond the army, Sassou-Nguesso maintained the new gendarmerie, which Lissouba had created in 1992 as a rural police (ibid., 197). Yet, this force first had to be restaffed/ retrained and was therefore not operational until the early 2000s.
Territorial reach of the ruling political	0,00	Once Sassou-Nguesso regained power in the 1997 civil war, his PCT re-emerged as the dominant political party in the country (Clark and Decalo 2012, 350-351). However, the PCT had become an ethno-regional party after the end of the

		Marxist-Leninist one-party state in 1990, with almost no party structures and popular support outside its traditional strongholds in the north. As such, it had virtually no reach into the Nibolek-dominated parts of the country, which remained the fief of Lissouba's UPADS and the associated militias.
party *(partyreach)*		
External sanctuary *(exsanc)*	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Bazenguissa-Ganga and Patrice 1999; Englebert and Ron 2004; Clark 2008; Clark and Decalo 2012).
International support *(intsup)*	0,00	No evidence for international support (Bazenguissa-Ganga and Patrice 1999; Englebert and Ron 2004; Clark 2008; Clark and Decalo 2012).

Lari/Bakongo, 1998-2005 (Congo)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	1,00	After Sassou-Nguessou's Cobra militia seized power in late October 1997, aided by Angolan troops, the remnants of former Prime Minister Bernard Kolélas's Ninja militia hid and regrouped in their native Pool region (UCDP 2013). As Kolélas fled the country, divisions arouse among the fighters. As a consequence, by mid-1998 the Ninjas were no longer the sole representatives of the Lari people, but saw fierce competition from a second rebel outfit, the Ntsiloulous who were led by the charismatic preacher Pasteur Ntoumi. Fighting in the Pool region and in Brazzaville continued throughout 1999, with both rebel groups having initial successes, but with government and Angolan troops slowly gaining the upper hand. In November 1999, the Ninjas signed a cease-fire agreement with the government in Pointe-Noir, whereas the Ntsiloulous refused to take part. In late March 2002 fighting re-erupted between government troops and the Ntsiloulous. A peace accord was finally reached in March 2003. While the fighting between the Ninjas and government troops caused less than 1,000 battle-related deaths in both 1998 and 1999, the reverse is true for the fighting between the Ntsiloulous and Sassou-Nguessou's forces (more than 3,000 fatalities in 1998) (ibid.).
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1990s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2005 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Lari/Bakongo were not disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 0) but slightly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 1,09).
Cultural marginalization *(culmarg)*	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Bazenguissa-Ganga and Patrice 1999; Englebert and Ron 2004; Clark 2008; Clark and Decalo 2012).
Indiscriminate Repression *(indisrep)*	1,00	After Sassou-Nguesso's military victory, the defeated Ninja militia as well as Lari and Bakongo civilians came to suffer indiscriminate repression (Bazenguissa-Ganga and Yengo 1999, 191-192; UCDP 2013). While the Ninjas expected amnesty and re-integration into the security forces, the new army – made up of Sassou loyalists, the Cobra militia and Angolan and Chadian troops – engaged in a hunt for the fleeing militias (Operation Colombe II). As the latter

		were difficult to identify, everybody capable of carrying a gun in the Pool region was indiscriminately treated as a potential militia. This led to gross human rights violations not only against former combatants but also against the civilian population, including looting, rape and summary executions.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	When Sassou-Nguesso returned to power via force of arms in late 1997, his grip on the country was still extremely tentative, in particular in the southern parts of the territory (Clark and Decalo 2012, 23-24). Far from controlling every corner of the country, large groups of armed people remained loyal to either Lissouba or Kolélas. Sassou-Nguesso's new army and its Angolan allies had some presence in the south, which was however insufficiently strong to maintain control, especially in the countryside. Beyond the army, Sassou-Nguesso maintained the new gendarmerie, which Lissouba had created in 1992 as a rural police (ibid., 197). Yet, this force first had to be restaffed/ retrained and was therefore not operational until the early 2000s.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Once Sassou-Nguesso regained power in the 1997 civil war, his PCT re-emerged as the dominant political party in the country (Clark and Decalo 2012, 350-351). However, the PCT had become an ethno-regional party after the end of the Marxist-Leninist one-party state in 1990, with almost no party structures and popular support outside its traditional strongholds in the north. As such, it had virtually no reach into the Lari and Bakongo-dominated parts of the country, which remained the fief of Kolelas's MCDDI and the associated militias.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Bazenguissa-Ganga and Patrice 1999; Englebert and Ron 2004; Clark 2008; Clark and Decalo 2012).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Bazenguissa-Ganga and Patrice 1999; Englebert and Ron 2004; Clark 2008; Clark and Decalo 2012).

Mongo, 1966-1990 (DRC)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Callaghy 1984; Young and Turner 1985; Schatzberg 1988; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are not available and the 2007 DHS does not contain Mongo-specific information. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that the Mongo were slightly disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with data on regional differences in GNP per capita in 1970, which show that Equateur region (where members of the Mongo ethnic group are concentrated) was worse off than most of the other regions, especially when compared with Kinshasa, Shaba and (albeit to a lesser extent) Bas-Zaire (Young and Turner 1985, 82). Equateur also ranked near the bottom in terms of access to education (ibid., 155).

Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Callaghy 1984; Young and Turner 1985; Schatzberg 1988).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	The Mobutu regime was generally very repressive in character: Real or alleged dissidents were routine subjected to beatings, arbitrary arrests and torture or even killed (Schatzberg 1988, 30-70). While it is likely that members of the Mongo ethnic group also experienced acts of (selective) state violence, we could not find any concrete evidence in this regard. As such, we prefer to code the Mongo as 'fully out' of the set of indiscriminately repressed ethnic groups.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The by far most effective security outfit was the *Centre National de Documentation* (CND), Mobutu's ubiquitous political police (the "state's ear"), which acted as a reliable source of information on life in the hinterland (Schatzberg 1988, 30-31, 38-51). The CND was endowed with an unusual degree of financial, judicial and political autonomy and its agents enjoyed wide authority to arrest, interrogate and detain all those they considered to be a threat to the regime. Disposing of a countrywide network of informers, it effectively gathered information on political dissent even in the most rural areas. As such, the CND could fulfill its task to repress, coerce and control the population through intimidation and fear.

The other security forces were less effective. Mobutu succeed in achieving ascendancy over most of the army but his control was always incomplete – many units were notoriously unreliable and routinely engaged in brutal anti-civilian violence (Young and Turner 1985, 260-271; Schatzberg 1988, 52-70). The same was true for the Gendarmerie Nationale (GDN), which had a police mission in both urban and rural areas. Such inefficiency and violence notwithstanding, the security forces exercised relatively strong territorial control: The army troops were dispersed about the country (one groupement per region), while the GDN and the local police were present even at the most rural level. From the vantage point of the villagers, even a ragtag, underpaid, poorly disciplined and corrupt security force represented an awesome power, which could not be overthrown without significant outside assistance (Schatzberg 1988, 67-71). The security forces were poorly controlled by the centre but local people paradoxically thought that they were acting at the behest of the central state. |
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	The country's single party, the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR), was formally the highest political organ, with committees at the provincial, district, territorial, section and cell levels (Young and Turner 1985, 189-193). However, the subordination of the state to the party took the opposite form at the provincial and local level: Here, the state (administration) absorbed the party; which negatively affected the militantism of the cadres and turned the party into a 'moribund' organization. Nevertheless, the ruling political party had at least some organizational presence at the grassroots through its youth wing, the JMPR (ibid., 219; Schatzberg 1988, 64). The latter's disciplinary brigades performed their tasks – "vigilance", the prevention of "incidents" and the provision of information – with relative efficacy and hence helped to identity, co-opt or repress potential troublemakers.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Callaghy 1984; Young and Turner 1985; Schatzberg 1988).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Callaghy 1984; Young and Turner 1985; Schatzberg 1988).

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3" align="center">Bakongo, 1966-1990 (DRC)</td></tr>
<tr><td align="center">Conditions/
Outcome</td><td align="center">Coding</td><td align="center">Rationale</td></tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic civil war (<i>ethnicwar</i>)</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Callaghy 1984; Young and Turner 1985; Schatzberg 1988; UCDP 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic marginalization (<i>soecmarg</i>)</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>Relevant DHS data for the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are not available. We therefore use data from the 2007 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that that the Bakongo were privileged in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 0) and asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 0). This is in line with data on regional differences in GNP per capita in 1970, which show that Bas-Zaire region (where members of the Kongo ethnic group are concentrated) was better off than most of the other regions (except Kinshasa and Shaba) (Young and Turner 1985, 82).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural marginalization (<i>culmarg</i>)</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>No evidence for cultural marginalization (Callaghy 1984; Young and Turner 1985; Schatzberg 1988).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiscriminate Repression (<i>indisrep</i>)</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>The Mobutu regime was generally very repressive in character: Real or alleged dissidents were routine subjected to beatings, arbitrary arrests and torture or even killed (Schatzberg 1988, 30-70). However, we could not find any concrete evidence that members of the Bakongo ethnic group were also affected. In fact, the scant available evidence suggests that Bakongo elites entered into relatively good relations with the Mobutu regime and were allowed to concentrate in big business and trade (Willame 1997, 4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial reach of the security apparatus (<i>secureach</i>)</td>
<td>1,00</td>
<td>The by far most effective security outfit was the <i>Centre National de Documentation</i> (CND), Mobutu's ubiquitous political police (the "state's ear"), which acted as a reliable source of information on life in the hinterland (Schatzberg 1988, 30-31, 38-51). The CND was endowed with an unusual degree of financial, judicial and political autonomy and its agents enjoyed wide authority to arrest, interrogate and detain all those they considered to be a threat to the regime. Disposing of a countrywide network of informers, it effectively gathered information on political dissent even in the most rural areas. As such, the CND could fulfill its task to repress, coerce and control the population through intimidation and fear.

The other security forces were less effective. Mobutu succeed in achieving ascendancy over most of the army but his control was always incomplete – many units were notoriously unreliable and routinely engaged in brutal anti-civilian violence (Young and Turner 1985, 260-271; Schatzberg 1988, 52-70). The same was true for the Gendarmerie Nationale (GDN), which had a police mission in both urban and rural areas. Such inefficiency and violence notwithstanding, the security forces exercised relatively strong territorial control: The army troops were dispersed about the country (one groupement per region), while the GDN and the local police were present even at the most rural level. From the vantage point of the villagers, even a ragtag, underpaid, poorly disciplined and corrupt security force represented an awesome power, which could not be overthrown</td>
</tr>
</table>

		without significant outside assistance (Schatzberg 1988, 67-71). The security forces were poorly controlled by the centre but local people paradoxically thought that they were acting at the behest of the central state.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	The country's single party, the *Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR), was formally the highest political organ, with committees at the provincial, district, territorial, section and cell levels (Young and Turner 1985, 189-193). However, the subordination of the state to the party took the opposite form at the provincial and local level: Here, the state (administration) absorbed the party; which negatively affected the militantism of the cadres and turned the party into a 'moribund' organization. Nevertheless, the ruling political party had at least some organizational presence at the grassroots through its youth wing, the JMPR (ibid., 219; Schatzberg 1988, 64). The latter's disciplinary brigades performed their tasks – "vigilance", the prevention of "incidents" and the provision of information – with relative efficacy and hence helped to identity, co-opt or repress potential troublemakers.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Callaghy 1984; Young and Turner 1985; Schatzberg 1988).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Callaghy 1984; Young and Turner 1985; Schatzberg 1988).

South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda), 1966-1969 (Uganda)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1995 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that south-westerners were privileged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus	1,00	During the late 1960s, there were important divisions within the country's security apparatus, mainly opposing President Obote's Langi and Acholi followers in the regular army and Army Commander Idi Amin's West Nile supporters in the Military Police (Omara-Otunnu 1987). Trying to ensure his

(*secureach*)		own survival, Obote mainly relied on the *Special Forces* (created in 1968) and the *General Service Unit* (GSU), which were stuffed with ethnic Langi (Obote himself was Langi). It is not entirely clear how effective these two paramilitary organizations really were but it seems that their agents were present throughout the country (with at least some reach into rural areas), monitoring the political climate and reporting disloyalty. GSU agents, in particular, were widely feared among Ugandans as spies in their midst. (Byrnes 1992, 228). The regular police force, finally, was relatively large in size (8,000 men) but concentrated on urban police activities (ibid.).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	In 1962, Milton Obote's *Uganda People's Congress* (UPC) had inherited political power without adequate organizational strength, lacking a coherent and well-articulated party organization covering the entire country (Sathyamurthy 1975, 449-454). During the early post-colonial years, few efforts were made to build an organization capable of reaching down to the grassroots since the party was kept busy by internal division and the mounting conflict with the powerful Buganda Kingdom (see also Jørgensen 1981, 213-227). As a consequence, the UPC remained fragmented into local party organizations with little central control. During the late 1960s, the UPC finally tried to elaborate its organization with a view of establishing a continuum of political power from the remotest mulukao or parish to the highest levels of party and government (ibid, 454-456). In the end, Obote's efforts to provide the UPC with organizational teeth failed and there was no sign of the party after the 1971 coup.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).

Baganda, 1966-1969 (Uganda)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Ethnic civil war occurred in May 1966 when government troops clashed with supporters of the Buganda Kingdom, the main political and cultural entity of the largest ethnic group (Jørgensen 1981, 213-31; Kasozi 1994, 82-87). On 20 May, the Buganda Parliament (Lukiiko) made a secessionist bid by ordering the government to withdraw from Buganda soil, which the centre regarded as an 'act of rebellion' (Sathyamurthy 1986, 437-438). The conflict escalated into open violence only three days later when, following the arrest of three Baganda saza chiefs, angry mobs attacked police stations and battled with security forces. On 24 May, the army assaulted the palace of the Buganda King (Kabaka), allegedly because illegal arms had been found hidden in the grounds. The Kabaka and his followers put up fierce armed resistance for about 12 hours but were finally subordinated. While the Obote government claimed that this 'Battle of Mengo' caused 40 battle-related deaths, the Baganda's own figure of between 400 and 4000 appears to be more accurate (Kasozi 1994, 86).
Socioeconomic	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use

marginalization (*soecmarg*)		data from the 1995 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Baganda were privileged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$). Historical socioeconomic data suggest that the Central Region (where the Baganda are concentrated) was already the by far most privileged region during the 1960s and 1970s (Klugman, Neyapti, and Stewart 1999, 40).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	While the Buganda Kingdom was politically marginalized before the 1966 'Battle of Mengo' (Jørgensen 1981, 230; Sathyamurthy 1986, 435), cultural marginalization started only after violent subordination of the Kingdom (Kasfir 1976, 212-213, for details see below).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Following the above-mentioned secessionist bid by the Buganda Parliament, the Obote government arrested the three responsible Baganda saza chiefs, which provoked a wave of protests throughout Buganda. Subsequently, 'security forces attacked demonstrators indiscriminately and violence was sparked off' (Sathyamurthy 1986, 438). Angry mobs joined by Baganda ex-servicemen showed increasingly violent resistance, with attacks against police posts, thus provoking an even more violent response by the security forces. It was in this overall context of escalating violence that the Kabaka's bodyguards and Baganda ex-serviceman finally clashed with Amin's troops on 24 May 1966.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Relatively small and unimportant on the eve of independence, the Ugandan army rapidly gained prominence under Obote I, especially after the 1964 mutiny. Accordingly, its size grew from 2,000 in 1962 to 11,000 in 1966, while military expenditures exploded from \$840,000 in 1962 to \$14,3 million in 1966. In the context of the rapidly escalating conflict between the Obote government and the Buganda Kingdom, the large and well-financed army was deployed throughout Buganda, in particular in and around Kampala (the capital of the Kingdom) but also in more remote areas (Omara-Otunnu 1987). The regular police force was also relatively large in size (8,000 men), yet concentrated mainly on urban police activities (Byrnes 1992, 228).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	In 1962, Milton Obote's *Uganda People's Congress* (UPC) had inherited political power without adequate organizational strength, lacking a coherent and well-articulated party organization covering the entire country (Sathyamurthy 1975, 449-454). During the early post-colonial years, few efforts were made to build an organization capable of reaching down to the grassroots since the party was kept busy by internal division and the mounting conflict with the powerful Buganda Kingdom (see also Jørgensen 1981, 213-227). As a consequence, the UPC remained fragmented into local party organizations with little central control.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence international support (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).

South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda), 1970-1971 (Uganda)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1995 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that south-westerners were privileged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	During the late 1960s, there were important divisions within the country's security apparatus, mainly opposing President Obote's Langi and Acholi followers in the regular army and Army Commander Idi Amin's West Nile supporters in the Military Police (Omara-Otunnu 1987). Trying to ensure his own survival, Obote mainly relied on the *Special Forces* (created in 1968) and the *General Service Unit* (GSU), which were stuffed with ethnic Langi (Obote himself was Langi). It is not entirely clear how effective these two paramilitary organizations really were but it seems that their agents were present throughout the country (with at least some reach into rural areas), monitoring the political climate and reporting disloyalty. GSU agents, in particular, were widely feared among Ugandans as spies in their midst. (Byrnes 1992, 228). The regular police force, finally, was relatively large in size (8,000 men) but concentrated on urban police activities (ibid.).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	In 1962, Milton Obote's *Uganda People's Congress* (UPC) had inherited political power without adequate organizational strength, lacking a coherent and well-articulated party organization covering the entire country (Sathyamurthy 1975, 449-454). During the early post-colonial years, few efforts were made to build an organization capable of reaching down to the grassroots since the party was kept busy by internal division and the mounting conflict with the powerful Buganda Kingdom (see also Jørgensen 1981, 213-227). As a consequence, the UPC remained fragmented into local party organizations with little central control. During the period 1969-70, the UPC finally tried to elaborate its organization with a view of establishing a continuum of political power from the remotest mulukao or parish to the highest levels of party and government (ibid, 454-456). In the end, Obote's efforts to provide the UPC with organizational teeth failed and there was no sign of the party after the 1971 coup.
External sanctuary	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).

(*exsanc*)		
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).

Baganda, 1970-1971 (Uganda)

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1995 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Baganda were privileged in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 0) and asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 0). Historical socioeconomic data suggest that the Central Region (where the Baganda are concentrated) was already the by far most privileged region during the 1960s and 1970s (Klugman, Neyapti, and Stewart 1999, 40).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	After the violent subordination of the Buganda Kingdom in 1966 (the 'Battle of Mengo), President Obote ordered his Northern-based security forces to destroy many of the kingdom's cultural symbols: While the Kabaka's palace in Kampala was turned into an army barracks, the Bulange – home of the Buganda Parliament (the Lukiiko) – became on office building for the Ministry of Defence (Kasfir 1976, 212-213). Also, Obote treated the deposed Kabaka with outright disrespect when he first refused to offer the exiled monarch a pension (in contrast to other deposed kings) and later even rejected the demand to bring his body back for burial at home. This uncompromising attitude earned Obote lasting enmity in Buganda.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	After the violent subordination of the Buganda Kingdom in 1966, members of the Baganda ethnic group continued to face serious repression by Obote's security forces (Mutibwa 2008, 121-138; Kasozi 1994, 94). However, this state violence remained selective in nature, i.e. it was targeted at members of the royal family and the leading members of the Mengo establishment rather than at the Baganda as a whole. After the assassination attempt made on Obote in December 1969, for instance, the President ordered the incarceration of the most prominent among the remnants of the Buganda royal family: Princess Nnalinya Mpologoma (the Kabaka's sister) and Prince Badru Kakungulu (the Kabaka's uncle and leader of the Uganda Muslim Community).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	During the late 1960s, there were important divisions within the country's security apparatus, mainly opposing President Obote's Langi and Acholi followers in the regular army and Army Commander Idi Amin's West Nile supporters in the Military Police (Omara-Otunnu 1987). Trying to ensure his own survival, Obote mainly relied on the *Special Forces* (created in 1968) and the *General Service Unit* (GSU), which were stuffed with ethnic Langi (Obote himself was Langi). It is not entirely clear how effective these two paramilitary

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
		organizations really were but it seems that their agents were present throughout the country (with at least some reach into rural areas), monitoring the political climate and reporting disloyalty. GSU agents, in particular, were widely feared among Ugandans as spies in their midst. (Byrnes 1992, 228). The regular police force, finally, was relatively large in size (8,000 men) but concentrated on urban police activities (ibid.).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	In 1962, Milton Obote's *Uganda People's Congress* (UPC) had inherited political power without adequate organizational strength, lacking a coherent and well-articulated party organization covering the entire country (Sathyamurthy 1975, 449-454). During the early post-colonial years, few efforts were made to build an organization capable of reaching down to the grassroots since the party was kept busy by internal division and the mounting conflict with the powerful Buganda Kingdom (see also Jørgensen 1981, 213-227). As a consequence, the UPC remained fragmented into local party organizations with little central control. During the period 1969-70, the UPC finally tried to elaborate its organization with a view of establishing a continuum of political power from the remotest mulukao or parish to the highest levels of party and government (ibid, 454-459). There is some evidence to suggest that the UPC did extend its support in certain rural areas of Buganda after 1967, but its success in these areas was no more than marginal. Altogether, Obote's efforts to provide the UPC with organizational teeth failed and there was no sign of the party after the 1971 coup.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence international support (Jørgensen 1981; Kasfir 1976; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).

South-Westerners (Ankole, Banyoro, Toro, Banyarwanda), 1972-1973 (Uganda)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict /civil war. Note that Museveni's FRONASA supported the below-mentioned 1972 invasion by Obote's *Kikoosi Maluum* (KM) (Avirgan and Honey 1982, 36; Legum 1973, B276; Museveni 1997, 70). However, the available evidence suggests that Museveni's guerrillas hardly participated in the fighting. Against this backdrop we prefer not to code an ethnic armed conflict.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1995 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that south-westerners were privileged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Jørgensen 1981; Kyemba 1977; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).

Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Idi Amin's reign witnessed large-scale political terror, which was mainly executed by his omnipresent secret services (Kyemba 1977, 39-144; Kasozi 1994, 110-116; Mutibwa 1992, 104-114.). The victims were real or alleged political opponents of the regime. In general, people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds were targeted, including members of the southwestern ethnic groups. However, we could not find any evidence for indiscriminate violence against westerners in 1972-73.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Idi Amin's security forces exercised very strong territorial control. While the police force was practically moribund under Amin, the President relied on a number of omnipresent secret services, including the notorious *State Research Department* (SRB), *the Public Safety Unit* (PSU) and *the Military Police* (Kyemba 1977; Omara-Otunnu 1987). Moreover, the military apparatus was highly deconcentrated: Military units were established in every district with battalion commanders being directly responsible for the districts in their areas (Omara-Otunnu 1987, 124-125). The centrally appointed District Commissioners (DCs) were again mostly military men and enjoyed immensely enlarged powers, including control over local expenditure.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Military regime = no ruling political party.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	Nyerere's Tanzania openly hosted and trained anti-Amin groups, including Yoweri Museveni's *Front of Salvation* (FRONASA) – a small rebel group that professed a Marxist agenda but had a distinct ethnic base among the Banyankole in western Uganda (Museveni 1997, 62; Weinstein 2007, 67-68)
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Jørgensen 1981; Kyemba 1977; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).

Baganda, 1972-1973 (Uganda)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Jørgensen 1981; Kyemba 1977; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1995 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Baganda were privileged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$). Historical socioeconomic data suggest that the Central Region (where the Baganda are concentrated) was already the by far most privileged region during the 1960s and 1970s (Klugman, Neyapti, and Stewart 1999, 40).

Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Jørgensen 1981; Kyemba 1977; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Idi Amin's reign witnessed large-scale political terror, which was mainly executed by his omnipresent secret services (Kyemba 1977, 39-144; Kasozi 1994, 110-116; Mutibwa 1992, 104-114.). The victims were real or alleged political opponents of the regime. In general, people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds were targeted, including members of the Baganda ethnic group. However, the available evidence suggests that there was no indiscriminate anti-Baganda violence.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Idi Amin's security forces exercised very strong territorial control. While the police force was practically moribund under Amin, the President relied on a number of omnipresent secret services, including the notorious *State Research Department* (SRB), *the Public Safety Unit* (PSU) and *the Military Police* (Kyemba 1977; Omara-Otunnu 1987). Moreover, the military apparatus was highly deconcentrated: Military units were established in every district with battalion commanders being directly responsible for the districts in their areas (Omara-Otunnu 1987, 124-125). The centrally appointed District Commissioners (DCs) were again mostly military men and enjoyed immensely enlarged powers, including control over local expenditure.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Military regime = no ruling political party.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Jørgensen 1981; Kyemba 1977; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Jørgensen 1981; Kyemba 1977; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).

Langi/Acholi, 1972-1973 (Uganda)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Ethnic armed conflict occurred in September 1972 when Obote's Langi- and Acholi-based KM crossed into Uganda to topple Amin (Legum 1973, B275-277; Avirgan and Honey 1982, 34-36). The invasion was however poorly organised and quickly put down by Amin's security apparatus, resulting in anywhere between 120 and 453 battle-related deaths.
Socioeconomic marginalization	067	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1995 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which

(*soecmarg*)		suggest that the Langi/Acholi were disadvantaged in terms of both educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 1,05) and asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 1,16).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Jørgensen 1981; Kyemba 1977; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Idi Amin's reign witnessed large-scale political terror, which was mainly executed by his omnipresent secret services (Kyemba 1977, 39-144; Kasozi 1994, 110-116; Mutibwa 1992, 104-114.). The victims were real or alleged political opponents of the regime. In general, people of all ethnic and religious backgrounds were targeted. Nevertheless, a few ethnic groups were specifically singled out for reprisals. This was first and foremost true for the Langi and Acholi who were suspected to be loyal to Obote and hence brutally persecuted, with thousands of deaths during the early 1970s. Initially, this repression mainly concerned Langi and Acholi soldiers in the army (Kyemba 1977, 44-45; Jørgensen 1981, 269-70; Kasozi 1994, 111). Soon, however, the increasingly indiscriminate violence targeted Langi and Acholi soldiers and civilians alike (Legum 1972, B229-230; 1973, B277-278).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Idi Amin's security forces exercised very strong territorial control. While the police force was practically moribund under Amin, the President relied on a number of omnipresent secret services, including the notorious *State Research Department* (SRB), *the Public Safety Unit* (PSU) and *the Military Police* (Kyemba 1977; Omara-Otunnu 1987). Moreover, the military apparatus was highly deconcentrated: Military units were established in every district with battalion commanders being directly responsible for the districts in their areas (Omara-Otunnu 1987, 124-125). The centrally appointed District Commissioners (DCs) were again mostly military men and enjoyed immensely enlarged powers, including control over local expenditure.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Military regime = no ruling political party
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	After the 1971 coup, Obote and his Langi and Acholi followers were given external sanctuary in the Sudan and Tanzania (Avirgan and Honey 1982, 31-42). The Sudanese government gave Obote a training base at Owiny-ki-Bul, only 16 kilometers from the Uganda border, and also promised to contribute troops to an invasion army. However, as Khartoum reached peace deal with the Anyanya in early 1972 and also agreed to make peace with Amin, the camp was closed in mid-1972 and Obote's 1,000 guerrillas were moved to Tanzania. Here, Nyerere had already granted his friend Obote a training facility at Kingolwira in early 1971 and now agreed to open another training camp near Handeni. This external training was crucial in that it allowed to build an organised military force – an achievement that would have been difficult, if not impossible inside Uganda where the Amin regime was quickly building-up military capacity.
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Jørgensen 1981; Kyemba 1977; Sathyamurthy 1986; Mutibwa 1992; Kasozi 1994).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
		Luo, 1967-1978 (Kenya)
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Throup and Hornsby 1998; Oyugi 1998; Branch 2011; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1998 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Luo were disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 1,07) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 1,03). This is in line with more detailed data on socioeconomic inequalities provided by Morrison (2007, 120-128) and Stewart (2010, 142-148).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Throup and Hornsby 1998; Morrison 2007; Stewart 2010; Branch 2011).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Members of the Luo ethnic group faced considerable repression (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 13-15). Initially, the main targets were cadres of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga's *Kenya People's Union* (KPU) who were repeatedly harassed and detained without trial during the late 1960s. In July 1969, anti-Luo repression moved beyond the KPU as KANU Secretary-General Tom Mboya, the leading Luo member of the ruling party, was assassinated by a Kikuyu gunmen, apparently with the connivance of the authorities (Muigai 2004, 213). This event deeply alienated the Luo community, which manifested itself in recurrent riots by Luo youths. In this overall context of mounting ethnic tensions, state repression became indiscriminate in nature (albeit only once): When President Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) visited Luoland to open Kisumu hospital in October 1969, he was greeted by a stone-throwing crowd of angry Luo youth who threatened Kenyatta's car. In response President's bodyguard opened fire on the crowd leaving at least 100 dead. Immediately afterwards, the KPU was banned and its leaders and MPs were detained.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The government's security forces had strong territorial control throughout the country, including in Luoland. The key security outfit in this respect was the relatively large Kenya police (14,000 men), which bore the main responsibility for internal security and was widely regarded a well-trained, effective and professional force (Kaplan 1976a, 379-391). Its Nairobi headquarters was the hub of a nationwide police communications system that was among the most advanced in Africa. There were eight provincial commands, with some 200 police stations and posts in cities, towns and other locations throughout the national territory. A separate 'Administrative Police' acted as the agent of law and order in the rural reaches of Kenya. Excellent communications allowed the quick dispatch of mobile units. Of particular importance was the General Service Unit (GSU) – a mobile paramilitary force, which was specially equipped and trained to deal with civil disturbances. Endowed with 1,800 men, the GSU had several units throughout the country, including in Luoland. The armed forces, by contrast, were relatively small (7,500) and played little role in the day-to-day political process of the country (ibid., 399-421). In fact, the Kikuyu-dominated GSU served a counterweight to the army (which Kenyatta deemed more unreliable) and was probably capable of defeating the entire army by itself (see also N'Diaye 2001, 127-129). Even though the army's four infantry battalions

		were stationed in garrisons throughout the country, it was not clear how effectively it could project power to the remoter reaches of the national domain.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	KANU throughout the Kenyatta years remained a weak organization at the local level and lacked ideological coherence (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 17-18). No attempt was made to mobilize or control the masses through the local party apparatus. By the mid-1970s, KANU had become a moribund organization: Although the ruling party existed in name, in practice it did not meet, had no powers, and was subordinated entirely to the power of the executive branch of government. After the March 1966 Limuru Conference, there was no formal party sub-branch, branch or national election for more than a decade.
External sanctuary *(exsanc)*	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Throup and Hornsby 1998; Oyugi 1998; Branch 2011).
International support *(intsup)*	0,00	No evidence for international support (Throup and Hornsby 1998; Oyugi 1998; Branch 2011).

		Kikuyu-Meru-Emb, 1979-2002 (Kenya)
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Throup and Hornsby 1998; Oyugi 1998; Branch 2011; UDDP 2013). As discussed below, senior Kikuyu politicians and officers in the army and the police who were angered by the by disbanding of GEMA and the increasing political and economic marginalization of the Kikuyu were involved in the 1982 coup attempt. However, the available evidence suggests that those who finally executed the coup plot were 'overwhelmingly Luo' (Branch 2011, 154-159). As such it seems more plausible not to code an ethnic armed conflict.
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	0,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1998 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Kikuyu were privileged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,03$). This is in line with more detailed data on socioeconomic inequalities provided by Stewart (2010, 142-148).
Cultural marginalization *(culmarg)*	0,00	Members of the Kikuyu-Meru-Emb ethnic groups experienced partial cultural marginalization in that the *Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association* (GEMA), which had been created in 1970 to further the social welfare of its members and to protect the cultural traditions, was banned in 1980 (see below for details).
Indiscriminate Repression *(indisrep)*	0,00	The Kikuyu-Meru-Emb faced considerable state repression, which however remained selective in nature. After 1978, the new President Arap Moi (a Kalenjin) adopted an increasingly authoritarian stance (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 27-30). Members of the powerful Kikuyu ethnic group were among the preferred targets. In 1980, all 'tribal associations', including GEMA, were

		banned for disrupting national unity. In this context, Kikuyu elites were not only sacked from posts in government, the civil service and the parastatals but also harassed and arrested (Branch 2011, 148-149). One example among others would be Waruru Kanja who became the first political prisoner of the Moi era in September 1981. In the context of the re-introduction of multi-party politics during the early 1990s, there was ethnic violence against non-Kalenjin settlers in the Rift Valley, with hundreds of deaths (Oyugi 1998, 302). While the Kikuyu were among the main targets of this more indiscriminate violence, the latter was apparently not directly instigated by the government (even though inflammatory statements by Kalenjin leaders certainly played an important role).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	As discussed above, the Kenya Police had been able to exercise strong territorial control during the 1960 and 1970s. We could find no evidence that this changed after 1978. Instead, the police, in particular the GSU, apparently continued to be the regime's key repressive arm against domestic foes (N'Diaye 2001, 131).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	As discussed above, KANU had been a very weak organization at the local level under Kenyatta. We could find no information that this changed after Moi took power in 1978: While the new President apparently made some attempts to revive the party and use it as an instrument for consolidating his own power (Oyugi 1998, 300), the ruling party's territorial reach remained limited throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Throup and Hornsby 1998; Oyugi 1998; Branch 2011).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Throup and Hornsby 1998; Oyugi 1998; Branch 2011).

Luo, 1979-2002 (Kenya)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	On 1 August 1982, rank and file members of the Air Force staged a coup attempt. At least two distinct groups were involved (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 31-32). One group was comprised of senior Kikuyu politicians and officers in the army and the police who were angered by the by disbanding of GEMA and the increasing political and economic marginalization of the Kikuyu. The second group involved Luo junior officers in the Air force who had made contact with the disgruntled Odinga and his followers (including his son Raila Odinga). Significantly, the latter group struck first. As such, those who executed the plot were 'overwhelmingly Luo' (Branch 2011, 154-159). In the end the coup attempt was crushed several hours after it started. At least two hundred but probably more people died due to heavy fighting (ibid., N'Diaye 2001, 134).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1970s and 1980s are not available. We therefore use data from the 1998 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the Luo were disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment

		(Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 1,07) and asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 1,03). This is in line with more detailed data on socioeconomic inequalities provided by Morrison (2007, 120-128) and Stewart (2010, 142-148).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Members of the Luo ethnic group experienced partial cultural marginalization in that the *Luo Union*, an influential ethnic association ostensibly established to further the social welfare of its members and to protect the cultural traditions, was banned in 1980 (see below for details).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	The Luo faced considerable state repression, which however remained selective in nature. After 1978, the new President Arap Moi (a Kalenjin) adopted an increasingly authoritarian stance (Throup and Hornsby 1998, 27-30). Members of the Luo ethnic group were among the preferred targets. In 1979, KANU refused to clear former KPU leaders Oginga Odinga and Achieng' Oneko to contest the 1979 general election on the KANU ticket. In 1980, all 'tribal associations', including the Luo Union, were banned for disrupting national unity. In 1981, Odinga was not only again barred to contest a by-election on the KANU ticket but also publicly humiliated by President Moi (Branch 2011, 149-154). Afterwards, Odinga and some of his associates tried to form an opposition party. The government reacted by expelling Odinga from KANU and detaining several of his associates without trial (e.g. George Anyona).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	As discussed above, the Kenya Police had been able to exercise strong territorial control during the 1960 and 1970s. We could find no evidence that this changed after 1978. Instead, the police, in particular the GSU, apparently continued to be the regime's key repressive arm against domestic foes (N'Diaye 2001, 131).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	As discussed above, KANU had been a very weak organization at the local level under Kenyatta. We could find no information that this changed after Moi took power in 1978: While the new President apparently made some attempts to revive the party and use it as an instrument for consolidating his own power (Oyugi 1998, 300), the ruling party's territorial reach remained limited throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Throup and Hornsby 1998; Oyugi 1998; Branch 2011).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Throup and Hornsby 1998; Oyugi 1998; Branch 2011).

		Ovimbundu-Ovambo, 1975-2002 (Angola)
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	UNITA formally declared war on the MPLA on 1 August 1975, i.e. before independence in November 1975 (Kaplan 1978, 132-135). While most accounts refer to battles in 1975, on the eve of independence, as the opening rounds of the

		Angolan civil war, the first skirmishes of the civil war really commenced as early as 1961 and, in a sporadic fashion, paralleled the next 14 years of the anti-Portuguese struggle (Weigert 2011, 53-54). In any case, the ethnic civil war caused a very high number of battle-related deaths and – several interruptions notwithstanding – dragged on until Savimbi's death in 2002 (UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest the Ovimbundu-Ovambo were slightly disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Kaplan 1979; James 1992; Hodges 2004; Weigert 2011).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	After the transitional government was sworn in on 31 January 1975, UNITA was the only of the three liberation movement that seemed truly committed to the electoral process (Henderson 1979, 249-251). This was not only because its trained military forces were relatively small but also because it represented the largest ethnic group in the country and could thus hope to win the elections. Accordingly, Jonas Savimbi, in the midst of the MPLA-FNLA confrontations (see below), declared the neutrality of UNITA. From June 1975, however, Savimbi and his followers were subjected to increasingly indiscriminate attacks by the MPLA, which tried to establish complete control of Luanda and began 'invading' the UNITA zone of influence in the south. In early June, MPLA members killed 260 UNITA recruits (Weigert 2011, 59). In early July, following the FNLA-UNITA Nakuru Agreement, the MPLA first attacked a column of fleeing UNITA supports (up to 1,000 deaths) and expelled nearly all remaining UNITA and FNLA supporters from the capital (3,000 deaths).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	In 1975, there was no central government with territory-wide security apparatus. Instead, the country was divided into three territories: The MPLA (the future ruling party) controlled the capital Luanda and a strip from Luanda eastward to the Zairean border, while the FNLA and UNITA controlled the northwest and the south respectively (Kaplan 1978, 179). Tellingly, the provision in the transitional agreement (Alvor Accord) to create a national police force was never implemented (Weigert 2011, 58). A countrywide security apparatus, including a national police, was only set up in 1976 after the MPLA had emerged as the dominant military power with Cuban assistance (Kaplan 1978, 192).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach)*	0,00	As discussed above, the Mbundu-based *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* (MPLA) (the future ruling party) controlled only the capital Luanda and a strip from Luanda eastward to the Zairean border in 1975. As such, it had no territorial control in the Ovimbundu-dominated parts of the country.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	UNITA leader Savimbi was allowed to open an office in Lusaka in 1965, which was however closed down in 1967 after UNITA attacked the Benguela rail (Kaplan 1978, 127-130; Weigert 2011, 36-37). Afterwards UNITA lacked external sanctuary in a neighboring country (unlike FNLA) and thus remained in Angola, concentrating on building up an underground political movement among the Ovimbundu. It was only <u>after</u> UNITA's (temporary) defeat by the MPLA in 1976 that South Africa provided the rebels with rear bases in northern Namibia and also offered training, armaments and logistical support (Hodges 2004, 10).

International support (*intsup*)	1,00	Until 1974, UNITA lacked substantial external support, even though it apparently received small financial contributions from China and Iraq (Weigert 2011, 36-37). From 1975, however, South Africa forged an alliance of convenience with UNITA (providing massive financial, military and logistical support) and even invaded southern Angola in support of Savimbi's rebels (Hodges 2004, 9). Moreover, the United States gave covert support to both UNITA and the FNLA to counter-balance Soviet and Cuban military assistance to the MPLA.

Bakongo, 1975-2002 (Angola)

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	In August 1975, the FNLA withdrew from the provisional government in Luanda and formally declared war on the MPLA, i.e. the civil war started before independence in November 1975 (Kaplan 1978, 132-135). The FNLA was virtually destroyed as a fighting force in 1975-76 and subsequently suffered further setbacks when the Mobutu regime in Zaire established more cordial relations with the MPLA government in 1978-79 (Hodges 2004, 9-10). UCDP (2013) data suggest that the armed confrontation between the MPLA and the FNLA did not cause more than 1,000 battle-related deaths per year in the period 1975-79. This seems however doubtful since the FNLA at the time disposed of a formidable military force (15,000 troops), which engaged in very heavy fighting with the MPLA in 1975-76 (Henderson 1979, 247-258; Weigert 2011, 57-64). Against this backdrop we prefer to code a full-blown ethnic civil war.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest the Bakongo were privileged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Kaplan 1979; James 1992; Hodges 2004; Weigert 2011).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	After the transitional government was sworn in on 31 January 1975, localized armed skirmishes began between MPLA and FNLA forces began within days, followed by more serious armed clashes in the following months (Kaplan 1978, 132-135; Henderson 1979, 247-250). It is not entirely clear who bore the main responsibility for these armed clashes: While some mainly blame the FNLA and its external backers in Zaire (Weigert 2011, 57-59), others cite witnesses in the capital who held the MPLA responsible for the renewed hostilities (James 1992, 57). What seems safe to say is that FNLA supporters suffered increasingly indiscriminate violence from mid-1975 when MPLA forces and militias began to expel nearly all remaining FNLA and UNITA supporters from the capital, killing up to 3,000 people (Weigert 2011, 59).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus	0,00	In 1975, there was no central government with territory-wide security apparatus. Instead, the country was divided into three territories: The MPLA (the future ruling party) controlled the capital Luanda and a strip from Luanda eastward to the Zairean border, while the FNLA and UNITA controlled the northwest and

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(*secureach*)		the south respectively (Kaplan 1978, 179). Tellingly, the provision in the transitional agreement (Alvor Accord) to create a national police force was never implemented (Weigert 2011, 58). A countrywide security apparatus, including a national police, was only set up in 1976 after the MPLA had emerged as the dominant military power with Cuban assistance (Kaplan 1978, 192).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	As discussed above, the Mbundu-based *Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola* (MPLA) (the future ruling party) controlled only the capital Luanda and a strip from Luanda eastward to the Zairean border in 1975. As such, it had no territorial control in the Bakongo-dominated parts of the country.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	The FNLA benefitted from external sanctuary in Zaire (Kaplan 1978, 124; Hodges 2004, 8). During the 1960s, the FNLA came to be based in Zaire where Mobutu's army (the Zairean President had family ties with FNLA leader (Holden Roberto) took on organizing, training and equipping the FNLA. Before independence, the FNLA functioned mainly outside the country, fighting a low-key guerilla war in north-western Angola from its bases in Zaire. By 1974, there were about 2,000 guerillas operating inside Angola and up to 12,000 making forays from bases in Zaire.
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	The FNLA forces in Zaire but also in Angola enjoyed massive international support (Kaplan 1978, 133; Hodges 2004, 9; Weigert 2011, 58). Zaire not only provided the rebels with a safe haven and ample material and logistical support (see above) but also invaded Angola in support of the FNLA in 1975. Moreover, the FNLA received considerable assistance from the US, China and Romania, especially after it set up offices in Luanda and other urban centers in 1974-75.

Ovimbundu-Ovambo, 2003-2005 (Angola)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (ICG 2003a; Messiant 2008; Roque 2009; Soares de Oliveira 2011; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest the Ovimbundu-Ovambo were slightly disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (ICG 2003a; Messiant 2008; Roque 2009; Soares de Oliveira 2011).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Post-2002 Angola witnessed the 'consolidation of hegemonic power' (Messiant 2008, 106-121). In this overall context, UNITA members and supporters experienced widespread intimidation (EIU 2004, 9; 2005, 6). However, we could not find evidence for physical violence, let alone indiscriminate repression.

Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	After independence, the security threats facing the MPLA drove it to construct a strong security apparatus, with powerful armed forces and internal security services. After the end of the war, this security apparatus was maintained and even strengthened to underline the regime's hegemonic ambitions (Hodges 2004, 72-75). The *Forcas Armadas de Angolanas* (FAA) continued to be the backbone of the regime, with up to 110,000 men even in times of peace. The army was backed up by a huge National Police, which included a substantial paramilitary component, the *Policia de Intervencao Rápida* (PIR), popularly known as the ninjas. The PIR had up to 10,000 men and were very important in terms of exercising territorial control and detecting dissent. Equally important were the security and intelligence services (Serviços de Internos de Informaçaos, or SINFO) whose influence in state administration and control of the population exceeded that of any ministry or provincial government (Roque 2009, 140-141). The members of SINFO were omnipresent throughout the country, creating an extensive network of informers and promoting a culture of fear, and thus helped the regime to neutralize any form of serious opposition. The *Organization for Civil Defense* (ODC) civil militias, finally, played a key role in defending the interests of the ruling party among the rural population.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	1,00	After independence in 1975, the MPLA government proclaimed a one-party state. However, in a context of increasingly personalized and militarized political power, the ruling party was long of secondary importance (Hodges 2004, 52-54). After 2002, however, the dos Santos government successfully managed to consolidate 'a party-state domination' (Soares de Oliveira 2011, 293): In contrast to the past when the MPLA had at most a plurality of supporters in some areas of the country, it now acquired the status of a 'catch-all party' with four million members (in a country of some 16 million people) and nationwide support. In the process the ruling party recruited new members in former opposition strongholds (in particular in Ovimbundu-dominated areas) and used affiliated groups such as its youth and women's leagues to cement its influence at all levels of society and in all corners of the country (Roque 2009, 140).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (ICG 2003a; Messiant 2008; Roque 2009; Soares de Oliveira 2011).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (ICG 2003a; Messiant 2008; Roque 2009; Soares de Oliveira 2011).

Bakongo, 2003-2005 (Angola)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (ICG 2003a; Messiant 2008; Roque 2009; Soares de Oliveira 2011; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest the Bakongo were privileged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.

Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (ICG 2003a; Roque 2009; Soares de Oliveira 2011).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Post-2002 Angola witnessed the 'consolidation of hegemonic power' (Messiant 2008, 106-121). While it is likely that members and supporters of the FNLA were also affected by the widely used tactics of intimidation, we could not find any concrete evidence in this respect.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	After independence, the security threats facing the MPLA drove it to construct a strong security apparatus, with powerful armed forces and internal security services. After the end of the war, this security apparatus was maintained and even strengthened to underline the regime's hegemonic ambitions (Hodges 2004, 72-75). The *Forcas Armadas de Angolanas* (FAA) continued to be the backbone of the regime, with up to 110,000 men even in times of peace. The army was backed up by a huge National Police, which included a substantial paramilitary component, the *Policia de Intervencao Rápida* (PIR), popularly known as the ninjas. The PIR had up to 10,000 men and were very important in terms of exercising territorial control and detecting dissent. Equally important were the security and intelligence services (Serviços de Internos de Informaçaos, or SINFO) whose influence in state administration and control of the population exceeded that of any ministry or provincial government (Roque 2009, 140-141). The members of SINFO were omnipresent throughout the country, creating an extensive network of informers and promoting a culture of fear, and thus helped the regime to neutralize any form of serious opposition. The *Organization for Civil Defense* (ODC) civil militias, finally, played a key role in defending the interests of the ruling party among the rural population.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	After independence in 1975, the MPLA government proclaimed a one-party state. However, in a context of increasingly personalized and militarized political power, the ruling party was long of secondary importance (Hodges 2004, 52-54). After 2002, however, the dos Santos government successfully managed to consolidate 'a party-state domination' (Soares de Oliveira 2011, 293): In contrast to the past when the MPLA had at most a plurality of supporters in some areas of the country, it now acquired the status of a 'catch-all party' with four million members (in a country of some 16 million people) and nationwide support. In the process the ruling party recruited new members in former opposition strongholds (in particular in Ovimbundu-dominated areas) and used affiliated groups such as its youth and women's leagues to cement its influence at all levels of society and in all corners of the country (Roque 2009, 140).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (ICG 2003a; Messiant 2008; Roque 2009; Soares de Oliveira 2011).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (ICG 2003a; Messiant 2008; Roque 2009; Soares de Oliveira 2011).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga), 1982-1987 (Zimbabwe)		
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	In 1980-1981, relations between ZANU and ZAPU were strained by armed clashes between former combatants of their armed wings – ZANLA and ZIPRA, respectively. Simmering tensions came to a head in 1982 with the discovery of arms caches in ZAPU-owned properties and the ensuing brutal persecution of former ZIPRA fighters by government forces (Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger 2000). From mid-1982, rebel activities flared up across the predominantly Ndebele-speaking provinces of Matabeleland North and South. There was no high command organizing the dissidents. Instead, the rebels operated in small bands, sporadically attacking government installations, killing commercial white farmers, and abusing civilians. We could find no detailed information on battle-related deaths. Yet, the available information suggests that while the intensity of the fighting was relatively low, the 25 battle-related deaths threshold was crossed (ibid., CCJ and LRF 2007). The conflict ended in late 1987 when the Unity Accord between ZANU and ZAPU was signed.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that the Ndebele-Kalanga were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	After independence in 1980, the Ndebele-Kalanga experienced partial cultural marginalization: While there was no religious and linguistic discrimination (Ndebele was even actively promoted as an official national language alongside Shona and English), Ndebele cultural history was marginalized in that the Mugabe regime used the Shona pre-colonial heroes and historical monuments to imagine the nation (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007, 283-286).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Members of the Ndebele ethnic group suffered massive state repression during the early post-colonial years (Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger 2000, 189-196; CCJ and LRF 2007, 52-65). While this violence was initially targeted a key political and military leaders, it became increasingly indiscriminate from mid-1982 as real or alleged former ZIPRA soldiers were ruthlessly persecuted, beaten, tortured or even killed by Mugabe's security forces. This drove many former guerillas back into the bush and eventually triggered a 'war of survival'. The ensuing counter-insurgency campaign, which was spearheaded by the army's notorious Fifth Brigade, involved a bizarre combination of random killing, abduction and torture. The Ndebele being collectively considered as 'dissidents', up to 20,000 civilians were killed.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	After independence in 1980, the Mugabe government faced a difficult security situation, with thousands of demobilized ZANLA and ZIPRA guerrillas in assembly camps and mounting crime and violence throughout the country. Nevertheless, the regime was able to exercise relatively strong territorial control by relying on the security apparatus of the former Rhodesian government (still largely staffed by former Rhodesians), which was able to perform effectively in crime control, security, investigations and intelligence roles (Nelson 1983, 239-240, 268-282; Sylvester 1991, 77). Field units of the army were divided among five regionally-based brigades. Two of these brigades were located in Matabeleland and the Midlands, including the First Brigade (in Bulawayo) and the Fifth Brigade (in Gweru). Even more important in terms of territorial control

		were the Police and the secret service. The Zimbabwe Republic Police was territorially divided into nine police provinces, with provincial police forces in all urban and rural districts. Particularly effective was the Elite Police Support Unit – a highly professional paramilitary unit (known as the 'blackboots') that was widely feared for its expertise in tracking and accuracy in shooting (Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger 2000, 200). Similarly effective was that the omnipresent Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) whose powers were substantially increased after independence.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	During the independence struggle, ZANU's strongholds were in the Shona-dominated eastern provinces of the country where its guerilla operations were centered (Nelson 1983: 209-212). This did not change after independence when the party apparatus became closely linked with administration in Shona rural areas. In Matabeleland, by contrast, the ruling party had only limited territorial reach: Even though it tried to mobilize nationwide support after 1980, it had little organizational presence in the western and southwestern provinces, in particular the ZAPU-dominated rural areas.
External sanctuary *(exsanc)*	1,00	There is substantial evidence that South Africa provided financial and military assistance to Ndebele dissidents (Johnson and Martin 1988, 69-86; Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger 2000, 196-197; CCJ and LRF 2007, 50). Under 'Operation Drama', South Africa formed and funded a dissident faction called 'Super ZAPU', which was recruited among former ZIPRA soldiers in refugee camps in Botswana and trained in four camps in the former Transvaal province of South Africa. After its launch in late 1982, Super ZAPU had about 100 fighters in Zimbabwe who enjoyed South African backing in the shape of arms and other logistics.
International support *(intsup)*	1,00	There is substantial evidence that South Africa provided financial and military assistance to Ndebele dissidents (Johnson and Martin 1988, 69-86; Alexander, McGregor, and Ranger 2000, 196-197; CCJ and LRF 2007, 50). Under 'Operation Drama', South Africa formed and funded a dissident faction called 'Super ZAPU', which was recruited among former ZIPRA soldiers in refugee camps in Botswana and trained in four camps in the former Transvaal province of South Africa. After its launch in late 1982, Super ZAPU had about 100 fighters in Zimbabwe who enjoyed South African backing in the shape of arms and other logistics.

Manyika (Shona sub-group), 1988-1991 (Zimbabwe)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Knight 1991; Sithole 1997; Laakso 2003; Kriger 2005; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	0,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that the Manyika were relatively privileged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Knight 1991; Sithole 1997; Laakso

Conditions/Outcome	Coding	Rationale
marginalization (*culmarg*)		2003; Kriger 2005; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	The Mugabe regime continued to exhibit authoritarian tendencies, evident in the enduring state of emergency – an important part of the rationale being Renamo attacks across the Mozambican border in the eastern districts of Manicaland – and government repression of Harare tertiary students, the press and organized labor (Kriger 2005, 14). Members of the Manyika ethnic group were also affected, in particular *Zimbabwe Unity Movement* (ZUM) leader Edgar Tekere (himself from Manicaland) and his followers who faced significant intimidation and repression before and after the 1990 elections (ibid., 14-20; Laakso 2003).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Mugabe's security forces continued to exercise strong territorial control. This was not only true for the army, the backbone of the regime, but also for the Police Support Unit and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) (Alao 2012, 35-105). The security agents were present throughout the country, flashing their identification cards in bars and striking fear into people. An especially notorious episode occurred in 1999 when CIO agents short a ZUM candidate, Patrick Kombayi, who nearly died (Sithole 1997, 133).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	Regional variation notwithstanding, ZANU and ZAPU at independence both had strong organizational structures in the rural areas (not least by African standards), which was largely an inheritance from the guerilla war (Herbst 1990, 34). After the 1987 'Unity Accord', ZANU-PF could thus rely a countrywide party structure with strong local roots. This is not to deny that the ruling party's strength at the grassroots was somewhat hampered by the absence of middle-level organizational structures (ibid.) and relatively strong government bureaucracies. Nevertheless, the party maintained considerable territorial reach, not least through its paramilitary-style political youth wing, which was repeatedly used to repress political dissent at the local level (Kriger 2005).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Knight 1991; Sithole 1997; Laakso 2003; Kriger 2005; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Knight 1991; Sithole 1997; Laakso 2003; Kriger 2005; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007).

Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga), 2000-2005 (Zimbabwe)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Sithole 2001; Laakso 2003; Kriger 2005; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that the Ndebele-Kalanga were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.

Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Sithole 2001; Laakso 2003; Kriger 2005; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	The early 2000s witnessed high levels of state repression. The 2000 elections were overshadowed by sustained government-instigated violence, with up to 200,000 incidents of political violence in the first half of the year (Kriger 2005, 26-31). The main targets of this election violence, which was for the most part perpetrated by ZANU-PF youth and war veterans' militias, were white farmers (1,500 white-owned farms were invaded) and members of Morgan Tsvangirai's *Movement for Democratic Change* (MDC), the main opposition party. Members of the Ndebele ethnic group were also affected, yet – unlike during the early 1980s – they did not face indiscriminate persecution.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Mugabe's security forces continued to exercise strong territorial control. This was not only true for the army, the backbone of the regime, but also for the Police Support Unit and the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) (see Alao 2012, 35-105). In the context of the above-described 2000 election violence, for instance, the army and the intelligence services played a crucial co-coordinating and logistical role (McGregor 2002, 36).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	Regional variation notwithstanding, ZANU and ZAPU at independence both had strong organizational structures in the rural areas (not least by African standards), which was largely an inheritance from the guerilla war (Herbst 1990, 34). After the 1987 'Unity Accord', ZANU-PF could thus rely a countrywide party structure with strong local roots. This is not to deny that the ruling party's strength at the grassroots was somewhat hampered by the absence of middle-level organizational structures (ibid.) and relatively strong government bureaucracies. Nevertheless, the party maintained considerable territorial reach, not least through its youth wing, which was repeatedly used to repress political dissent at the local level (Kriger 2005).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Sithole 2001; Laakso 2003; Kriger 2005; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Sithole 2001; Laakso 2003; Kriger 2005; Muzondidya and Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2007).

Berbers, 1956-2005 (Morocco)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	The first years of independence witnessed a number of Berber uprisings, including those in the Tafilalt (1957), in the Rift (1958-59) and in the Middle Atlas highlands (1960) (Maddy-Weitzman 2011, 85-86). The by far most serious uprising took place in the Rift where Rifian Berbers resisted the imposition of the "modern", Istiqlal Party-dominated administration, in particular the appointment of outsiders to local posts. The conflict escalated in early 1959

		when the government sent the *Forces Armées Royales* (FAR) to put down the revolt. Fatalities most likely numbered in the thousands (ibid., 86). While there is little doubt that the 25 battle-related deaths threshold was reached, it is unclear whether the fighting caused more than 1000 battle-related deaths. It seems that most deaths incurred through 'wholesale indiscriminate bombings of villages' (ibid.). Against this background we prefer to code ethnic armed conflict rather than full-blown ethnic civil war.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. However, all available evidence suggests that the rural Berber-dominated regions in Morocco have long suffered very serious socio-economic deprivation when compared with the coastal and urban Arabized regions (Zartman 1987; Maddy-Weitzman 2001; Maddy-Weitzman 2011).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	Even though the most important 'Arabization' policies were only introduced in the early 1960s, the newly independent state was from the beginning Arabist in orientation (Maddy-Weitzmann 2011, 84-91). This became most apparent in the Rift where the newly-appointed Arab administrators displayed an unabashed attitude of cultural superiority towards the Berber population, imposing restrictions on the use of the Amazigh language and Berber cultural practices.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	We could find no evidence for state violence against members of the Berber ethnic group prior to the uprisings of the late 1950s (Zartman 1987; Maddy-Weitzman 2001; Maddy-Weitzman 2011).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The Moroccan military has long been an incredibly important and durable component of the state, emerging from not only the colonial French and Spanish militaries but also from the anti-colonial guerrillas (primarily Berbers) who joined the royal military following independence. Territorially, the Moroccan military was concentrated along the Algerian border, the Western Sahara, and the Rif valley, only the last of which has a substantial number of Berbers (Cordesman 2002, 69). In the center of the country (where most Berbers are concentrated) there was a relatively small military presence. The Gendarmerie, by contrast, had a presence throughout rural villages in Morocco, though much of the dessert was not policed.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	While the pro-royalist political parties were largely based in urban areas after independence in 1956, they managed to establish some control over the rural areas by recruiting local Berbers into the party apparatus (Willis 2008, 233).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Zartman 1987; Maddy-Weitzman 2001; Maddy-Weitzman 2011).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Zartman 1987; Maddy-Weitzman 2001; Maddy-Weitzman 2011).

Highlanders, 1960-1972 (Madagascar)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Spacensky 1970; Vérin 2000; Randrianja and Ellis 2009, UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest Highlanders were relatively privileged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Spacensky 1970; Vérin 2000; Randrianja and Ellis 2009).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	The First Republic was not a harsh autocracy (Spacensky 1970, 386-387) but clearly exhibited anti-democratic tendencies in that the Tsiranana regime allowed the opposition to exist but not to act (Randrianja and Ellis 2009, 182-183). Opposition politicians, including members of the Merina-dominated AKFM (see below), were on several occasions disqualified from standing for election or even arrested. Members of the ruling party were generally authorized to arrest suspected wrongdoers and hand them over to the police. The regime apparently became increasingly oppressive after 1966, especially in rural areas (Vérin 2000, 189). Nevertheless, we could find no evidence for indiscriminate state violence against highlanders.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	President Tsiranana (a Côtier) never trusted the Merina-dominated army and thus tried to keep it small and weak (2,700 men). Instead, he preferred to rely on the National Gendarmerie (3,600 men), which was dominated by coastal people and deliberately used as a counterweight to the army (Allen and Covell 2005, 179). The gendarmerie was also the key security outfit in terms of territorial control: Endowed with units stationed throughout the country, it had at least some reach into rural areas (Chapin Metz 1995, 300-301). The regular police force, by contrast, was mainly confined to the island's cities.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	The ruling *Parti Social Démocrate* (PSD) (more than one million members) had strong territorial reach through a countrywide network of party branches down to the village level, even though its organizational presence was apparently somewhat weaker in the highland areas (Spacensky 1970, 409-414). According to Marcus and Ratsimbaharison (2005, 499-500), '[t]he party support base was in the rural areas, where it neutralized all potential opposition through a combination of coercion and co-optation. The party organization was anchored in an extensive patron–client network that was nurtured and sustained through a pragmatic allocation of state resources to regional and local leaders in exchange for their political support. Operating more like an instrument of popular mobilization than a traditional political party, the PSD organizational framework fused party and state with interchangeable personnel combining political and administrative functions and monopolizing access to state resources, the allocation of state-sponsored development projects and the resulting distribution of economic benefits'.

External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Spacensky 1970; Vérin 2000; Randrianja and Ellis 2009).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Spacensky 1970; Vérin 2000; Randrianja and Ellis 2009).

Other Arab groups, 1956-1971 (Sudan)		
[Juhayna Arabs: Shukriyya, Kababish, Baqqara, Rufaa al-Hoi, etc.]		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Woodward 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that members of the other Arab groups were slightly disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Woodward 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression against members of other Arab groups (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Woodward 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	At independence in 1956, large areas in the south and the more remote regions of the north were still outside the reach of the security forces. Until the early 1970s, a system of communal security was retained since it was considered to be technically and economically impractical for the security forces to cover the entire territory of Sudan (Chapin Metz 1992).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	After independence, the ruling political party, the pro-Western Umma party, was a largely urban political organization, which lacked an effective organizational structure in the rural areas. A more efficient and effective electoral machine in the rural areas was only built under the second parliamentary governments during the second half of the 1960s (Collins 2008, 85).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Woodward 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Woodward 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Other Northern groups, 1956-1971 (Sudan) [Masalit, Zaghawa, Dagu, Berti, etc.)		
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Rolandsen 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tubiana 2011; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that members of the other Northern groups were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that members of the other northern groups, especially those in Darfur, suffered extreme socioeconomic neglect under colonial rule – a situation that hardly changed in the post-colonial period (Rolandsen 2007, 153; Flint and de Waal 2008, 12-14; Tubiana 2011, 136).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	There has been a persistent sense of cultural exclusion in Sudan's predominantly Muslim eastern and western peripheries: Local leaders and intellectuals resented not only the government's monopoly on power and wealth but also the culturally patronizing way that riverine Northern Arabs treated non-Arabs (Sharkey 2008, 25). The use of languages such as Masalit or Zaghawa, for instance, was not allowed in school and group-specific histories and customs were denied and repressed (Tubiana 2011, 136).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression against members of other Northern groups (Rolandsen 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tubiana 2011).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	At independence in 1956, large areas in the south and the more remote regions of the north were still outside the reach of the security forces. Until the early 1970s, a system of communal security was retained since it was considered to be technically and economically impractical for the security forces to cover the entire territory of Sudan (Chapin Metz 1992).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	After independence, the ruling political party, the pro-Western Umma party, was a largely urban political organization, which lacked an effective organizational structure in the rural areas. A more efficient and effective electoral machine in the rural areas was only built under the second parliamentary governments during the second half of the 1960s (Collins 2008, 85).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Rolandsen 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tubiana 2011).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Rolandsen 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tubiana 2011).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
		Dinka, 1956-1971 (Sudan)
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	During the early 1960s, an armed rebellion broke out in the south, involving former southern officers who had mutinied in 1955 and subsequently formed the Anya Nya movement. This rebel movement was based among different ethnic groups in the south: While the rebels were initially mostly ethnic Latuka, there was also significant Dinka participation, including William Deng – a young Dinka administrator from the Bahr al-Ghazal (Johnson 2006, 32; Collins 2008, 79-80). The rebellion escalated into ethnic armed conflict in 1963 (UCDP 2013) and became more casualty-intensive from the mid 1960s (Johnson 2006, 34).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that members of the Dinka were seriously disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that the people in Southern Sudan, including the Dinka, have long suffered extreme socioeconomic neglect (Johnson 2006, 16-19).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	The mostly non-Muslim and non-Arab people in the south, including the Dinka, were subjected to a process of Islamization and Arabization in post-colonial Sudan. At independence in 1956, the dominant Arab elites emphasized the Arab identity of the new country and imposed Arabic as the sole official language and Islam as the religion of state (Sharkey 2008, 34-36; Collins 2008, 78). Arabic was progressively introduced as the medium of instruction in schools and the activities of Christian missionaries were first restricted and then banned (see also Johnson 2006, 30) While Arab elites considered these policies as national integration, southerners regarded them as cultural colonialism/ imperialism.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Southerners, including the Dinka, came to face increasingly indiscriminate state repression from the late 1950s when the army began to burn entire villages in the southern parts of the country (Johnson 2006, 31). Such indiscriminate repressive activities greatly increased opposition to the Northern-dominated government and caused many Southerners to flee into neighbouring countries from where they organized armed resistance (see below).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	At independence in 1956, large areas in the south and the more remote regions of the north were still outside the reach of the security forces. Until the early 1970s, a system of communal security was retained since it was considered to be technically and economically impractical for the security forces to cover the entire territory of Sudan (Chapin Metz 1992).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	After independence, the ruling political party, the pro-Western Umma party, was a largely urban political organization, which lacked an effective organizational structure in the rural areas. A more efficient and effective electoral machine in the rural areas was only built under the second parliamentary governments during the second half of the 1960s (Collins 2008, 85).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	Southern Sudanese dissidents, including the Dinka leader William Deng, found sanctuary in both Uganda and Zaire during the late 1950s and early 1960s, which greatly facilitated the organization of armed resistance (Johnson 2006, 31;

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		Collins 2008, 79).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Johnson 2006, 31).

Other Arab groups, 1972-1982 (Sudan)
[Juhayna Arabs: Shukriyya, Kababish, Baqqara, Rufaa al-Hoi, etc.]

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Woodward 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that members of the other Arab groups were slightly disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Woodward 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	The 1970s and early 1980s witnessed high levels of political repression, with thousands of Sudanese being harassed, detained or even killed by the security forces (Collins 2008). Members of other Arab groups were also affected, i.e. Kababish elites who had previously supported the now-banned National Unionist Party. However, we could not find any evidence for indiscriminate violence.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	At independence in 1956, large areas in the south and the more remote regions of the north were still outside the reach of the security forces. Until the early 1970s, a system of communal security was retained since it was considered to be technically and economically impractical for the security forces to cover the entire territory of Sudan (Chapin Metz 1992). Alternatively, the government gave tribal leaders authority to keep order among their people. After Nimeiri took power in the 1969 coup, this system was finally abolished and the police force was expanded (from 18,000 in 1970 to 30,000 by the mid-1980s). The police was distributed in proportion to population density but was reinforced in areas where there was a likelihood of trouble, in particular in the conflict-ridden south. In the north, by contrast, the police were in some places too thinly scattered to provide any real security. Police posts could be staffed by as few as two police with insufficient transport or communications equipment. In Darfur, for example, the government lacked policing capacities whereby it became common for all groups (Arabs and 'Africains') to arm and organize self defense groups (Rolandsen 2007, 156). Beyond the police, the internal security and intelligence apparatus was developed into a feared institution after 1969 (Chapin Metz 1992). The most prominent feature of this apparatus was the *State Security Organisation* (SSO), which had 45,000 persons at its disposal (rivaling the army in size) and engaged in extensive spying and surveillance. Its presence was however apparently mostly restricted to urban areas.

Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	In 1972, President Nimeiri created the *Sudanese Socialist Union* (SSU), the sole legal political party in the country that functioned as the political apparatus of the military regime (Collins 2008, 115-116; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013, 410-411). The SSU consisted of a massive pyramid with considerable territorial reach: By 1984, it had organized 6,381 basic SSU units throughout the country, primarily at the village and town quarter levels.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Woodward 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Woodward 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).

Other Northern groups, 1972-1982 (Sudan) [Masalit, Zaghawa, Dagu, Berti, etc.)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war marginalization (Rolandsen 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tubiana 2011; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that members of the other Northern groups were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that members of the other northern groups, especially those in Darfur, suffered extreme socioeconomic neglect under colonial rule – a situation that hardly changed in the post-colonial period (Rolandsen 2007, 153; Flint and de Waal 2008, 12-14; Tubiana 2011, 136).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	There has been a persistent sense of cultural exclusion in Sudan's predominantly Muslim eastern and western peripheries: Local leaders and intellectuals resented not only the government's monopoly on power and wealth but also the culturally patronizing way that riverine Northern Arabs treated non-Arabs (Sharkey 2008, 25). The use of languages such as Masalit or Zaghawa, for instance, was not allowed in school and group-specific histories and customs were denied and repressed (Tubiana 2011, 136). Things got worse from the early 1980s when non-Arab groups in the North were faced with the 'ascent of Arab supremacism' (Sharkey 2008, 27; Flint and de Waal, 47). In a context of escalating racism, many Arabs openly stated that the *zurga* (blacks) had ruled Darfur long enough – a view that had supporters in Khartoum from the start.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	The 1970s and early 1980s witnessed high levels of political repression, with thousands of Sudanese being harassed, detained or even killed (Collins 2008). Members of other northern groups were also affected, i.e. Darfurian Islamists. However, we could not find any evidence for indiscriminate violence.

Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	At independence in 1956, large areas in the south and the more remote regions of the north were still outside the reach of the security forces. Until the early 1970s, a system of communal security was retained since it was considered to be technically and economically impractical for the security forces to cover the entire territory of Sudan (Chapin Metz 1992). Alternatively, the government gave tribal leaders authority to keep order among their people. After Nimeiri took power in the 1969 coup, this system was finally abolished and the police force was expanded (from 18,000 in 1970 to 30,000 by the mid-1980s). The police was distributed in proportion to population density but was reinforced in areas where there was a likelihood of trouble, in particular in the conflict-ridden south. In the north, by contrast, the police were in some places too thinly scattered to provide any real security. Police posts could be staffed by as few as two police with insufficient transport or communications equipment. In Darfur, for example, the government lacked policing capacities whereby it became common for all groups (Arabs and 'Africains') to arm and organize self defense groups (Rolandsen 2007, 156). Beyond the police, the internal security and intelligence apparatus was developed into a feared institution after 1969 (Chapin Metz 1992). The most prominent feature of this apparatus was the *State Security Organisation* (SSO), which had 45,000 persons at its disposal (rivaling the army in size) and engaged in extensive spying and surveillance. Its presence was however apparently mostly restricted to urban areas.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	In 1972, President Nimeiri created the *Sudanese Socialist Union* (SSU), the sole legal political party in the country that functioned as the political apparatus of the military regime (Collins 2008, 115-116; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013, 410-411). The SSU consisted of a massive pyramid with considerable territorial reach: By 1984, it had organized 6,381 basic SSU units throughout the country, primarily at the village and town quarter levels.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Rolandsen 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tubiana 2011).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Rolandsen 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tubiana 2011).

Other Arab groups, 1983-2003 (Sudan) [Juhayna Arabs: Shukriyya, Kababish, Baqqara, Rufaa al-Hoi, etc.]		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Salam Sidahmed 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013, UCDP 2013).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Salam Sidahmed 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).
Indiscriminate Repression	0,00	The 1980s, 1990s and 2000s witnessed high levels of political repression (Collins 2008). Selected members of the other Arab groups were also affected

Conditions/Outcome	Coding	Rationale
(*indisrep*)		but we could not find any evidence for indiscriminate violence.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	As discussed above, the post-independence governments lacked policing capacity in large parts of the remote north. We could not find any evidence that this changed from the 1980s. This is not to deny that the security apparatus was greatly strengthened after 1989 as the Al-Bashir regime tried to secure and consolidate its hold on power (Collins 2008, 188-189; Salam Sidahmed 2011, 100-105). Most importantly, the newly created *Internal Security Bureau* (IS-SOR) intimidated and terrorized the population in order to crush any real or potential dissent. This involved large-scale arbitrary arrests, brutal torture in detention centers ('ghost houses') and 'disappearances'. However, it appears that the presence of the intelligence services was mainly confined to Khartoum and the major urban centers (Collins 2008, 188-189). Similarly, the *Popular Defence Forces* (PDF), a politico-military militia, was mainly designed as an urban security force dedicated to the goals of the Islamist movement.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Following the fall of Nimeiri and his SSU in 1985, there was no longer a ruling party with significant territorial reach. After the return to multi-party politics in 1986, the Sudanese political scene was for a while dominated by unstable coalition governments (Woodward 2011, 92-93). In 1989, the *National Islamic Front* (NIF), an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, took over but was (at least formally) dissolved along with all other political parties (Salam Sidahmed 2011, 96-99). Afterwards, the secret *Islamic Movement* (IM) emerged as the undisputed constituency of the al-Bashir regime but was never developed into a coherent political party. In 1998, the NIF/ IM was reorganized into the *National Congress Party* (NCP), the new ruling political party. However, the NCP remained weak. Turabi tried to give the party some substance in 1998-99 (which led to a power struggle with al-Bashir) but failed as his plan to establish popular congresses from the local to the national level was never implemented.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Salam Sidahmed 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Salam Sidahmed 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).

Other Northern groups, 1983-2003 (Sudan) [Masalit, Zaghawa, Dagu, Berti, etc.)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Armed resistance in Darfur began in the early 2000s and escalated into ethnic civil war in 2003 (Flint and de Waal 2008, 81-82; UCDP 2013). There were two competing rebel groups, including the *Sudan Liberation Movement/ Army* (SLM/A) (based among the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) (mainly based among the Kobe, a Zaghawa sub-group). According to UCDP (2013) data, the SLM/A rebellion crossed the 1,000 battle-related deaths threshold in 2003 and 2004, whereas the JEM rebellion caused less than 1,000 (but more than 25) battle-related deaths during those years.

Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that members of the other Northern groups were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that members of the other northern groups, especially those in Darfur, suffered extreme socioeconomic neglect under colonial rule – a situation that hardly changed in the post-colonial period (Rolandsen 2007, 153; Flint and de Waal 2008, 12-14; Tubiana 2011, 136).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	There has been a persistent sense of cultural exclusion in Sudan's predominantly Muslim eastern and western peripheries: Local leaders and intellectuals resented not only the government's monopoly on power and wealth but also the culturally patronizing way that riverine Northern Arabs treated non-Arabs (Sharkey 2008, 25). The use of languages such as Masalit or Zaghawa, for instance, was not allowed in school and group-specific histories and customs were denied and repressed (Tubiana 2011, 136). Things got worse from the early 1980s when non-Arab groups in the North were faced with the 'ascent of Arab supremacism' (Sharkey 2008, 27; Flint and de Waal, 47). In a context of escalating racism, many Arabs openly stated that the *zurga* (blacks) had ruled Darfur long enough – a view that had supporters in Khartoum from the start.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Members of other northern groups in Darfur, in particular the Masalit and the Zaghawa (along with the Fur), were indiscriminately persecuted by government-sponsored Arab militias (the *Janjawiid*) (Rolandsen 2007, 156-158; Flint and de Waal 2008, 60-80). The violence began in the mid-1990s, became more systematic and widespread from the late 1990s and then escalated in the early 2000s: Entire villages were raided and burned downed and thousands of civilians were abducted, raped, mutilated and killed. The perpetrators of these atrocities were armed by the government, enjoyed complete immunity and in some cases were even supported by regular army troops and the air force.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	As discussed above, the post-independence governments lacked policing capacity in large parts of the remote north. We could not find any evidence that this changed from the 1980s. In fact, by the early 1990s, the camel-mounted police with colonial-era rifles was massively outgunned by well-organized gangs and militias in Darfur, which led to the total collapse of security in the area (Flint and de Waal 2008, 47). With few regular security forces in the region, the government turned to Arab militias for help. Tellingly, al-Bashir formed a committee for the 'Restoration of State Authority and Security in Darfur' in 2002 (ibid., 83-84). All this is not to deny that the national security apparatus was greatly strengthened after 1989 as the Al-Bashir regime tried to secure and consolidate its hold on power (Collins 2008, 188-189; Salam Sidahmed 2011, 100-105). Most importantly, the newly created *Internal Security Bureau* (IS-SOR) intimidated and terrorized the population in order to crush any real or potential dissent. This involved large-scale arbitrary arrests, brutal torture in detention centers ('ghost houses') and 'disappearances'. However, it appears that the presence of the intelligence services was largely confined to Khartoum and the major urban centers (Collins 2008, 188-189). Similarly, the *Popular Defence Forces* (PDF), a politico-military militia, was designed as an urban security force dedicated to the goals of the Islamist movement.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Following the fall of Nimeiri and his SSU in 1985, there was no longer a ruling party with significant territorial reach. After the return to multi-party politics in 1986, the Sudanese political scene was for a while dominated by unstable coalition governments (Woodward 2011, 92-93). In 1989, the *National Islamic Front* (NIF), an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, took over but was (at

		least formally) dissolved along with all other political parties (Salam Sidahmed 2011, 96-99). Afterwards, the secret *Islamic Movement* (IM) emerged as the undisputed constituency of the al-Bashir regime but was never developed into a coherent political party. In 1998, the NIF/ IM was reorganized into the *National Congress Party* (NCP), the new ruling political party. However, the NCP remained weak. Turabi tried to give the party some substance in 1998-99 (which led to a power struggle with al-Bashir) but failed as his plan to establish popular congresses from the local to the national level was never implemented.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Rolandsen 2007; Flint and de Waal 2008; Tubiana 2011).
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	Eritrea has supported the rebels before and during the conflict in the form of financial and material support including arms, ammunition and equipment (Flint and de Waal 2008, 92; UCDP 2013). The weapons were initially channeled through the SPLA in southern Sudan, which itself provided the rebels with weapons, training and political advice (Flint and de Waal 2008, 94).

Dinka, 1983-2002 (Sudan)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	The *Sudan People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPML/ A),* led by John Garang, launched a rebellion in 1983. It was mainly based among the Dina and Nuer ethnic groups. According to UCDP (2013) data, this was a very casualty-intensive civil war, which dragged on until 2002.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that members of the Dinka were seriously disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that the people in Southern Sudan, including the Dinka, have long suffered extreme socioeconomic neglect (Johnson 2006, 16-19).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	The mostly non-Muslim and non-Arab people in the south, including the Dinka, were subjected to a process of Islamization and Arabization in post-colonial Sudan. At independence in 1956, the dominant Arab elites emphasized the Arab identity of the new country and declared Arabic as the sole official language and Islam as the religion of state (Sharkey 2008, 34-36). Arabic was progressively introduced as the medium of instruction in schools and the activities of Christian missionaries were first restricted and then banned (see also Johnson 2006, 30) While Arab elites considered these policies as national integration, southerners regarded them as cultural colonialism/ imperialism. The 1972 Addis Ababa Accord brought minor relief as it accepted English as a language of regional administration in Southern Sudan. However, as the Muslim Brotherhood gained political strength from the late 1970s, President Nimeiri was threatened on his religious flank. He responded by showing his 'true' Islamic colors (wearing dress in Arab garb), and pressed for the re-introduction of the Islamic shari'a, which was proclaimed as the basis of the Sudanese legal system in 1983.

Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Southerners, including the Dinka, suffered indiscriminate violence. In the early 1980s, the number of northern troops in the south increased considerably and the often arbitrary harassment and shooting of civilians became common (Johnson 2006, 61). To make matters worse, in 1983 a battalion of ex-Anyanya soldiers in the Sudanese army refused orders to be transferred to the north and was subsequently attacked and persecuted by other army units (Johnson 2011, 127).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	At independence in 1956, large areas in the south and the more remote regions of the north were still outside the reach of the security forces. Until the early 1970s, a system of communal security was retained since it was considered to be technically and economically impractical for the security forces to cover the entire territory of Sudan (Chapin Metz 1992). Alternatively, the government gave tribal leaders authority to keep order among their people. After Nimeiri took power in the 1969 coup, this system was finally abolished and the police force was expanded (from 18,000 in 1970 to 30,000 by the mid-1980s). The police was distributed in proportion to population density but was reinforced in areas where there was a likelihood of trouble. This was especially the case in the southern parts of the country, which – due to the fragile peace after 1972 – not only exhibited a stronger presence of the police but also harbored two thirds of the army troops. Beyond the army and the police, the internal security and intelligence apparatus was developed into a feared institution after 1969 (ibid.). The most prominent feature of this apparatus was the State Security Organisation (SSO), which had 45,000 persons at its disposal (rivaling the army in size) and engaged in extensive spying and surveillance. Its presence was however apparently mostly restricted to urban areas.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	In 1972, President Nimeiri created the *Sudanese Socialist Union* (SSU), the sole legal political party in the country that functioned as the political apparatus of the military regime (Collins 2008, 115-116; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013, 410-411). The SSU consisted of a massive pyramid with considerable territorial reach: By 1984, it had organized 6,381 basic SSU units throughout the country, primarily at the village and town quarter levels.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	Members of the Dinka ethnic group, and southerners more generally, benefitted from external sanctuary in Ethiopia (Johnson 2006, 59-62; 2011, 126-127). The starting point was discontent among former Anyanya rebels over the Addis Ababa Agreement and their integration into the Sudanese army. This led to a series of small mutinies between 1975 and 1977 and the mutineers who were neither captured nor killed escaped into the bush. Many of them found their way to Ethiopia, where they received material and financial support from the Derg regime (in retaliation for Nimeiri's support for rebel movements in Ethiopia). The mutineers initially called themselves Anyanya II, engaging in hit-and-run attacks inside the Sudan from their bases in Ethiopia. In the early 1980s, the rebels in Ethiopia managed to recruit a growing number of deserters from the Sudanese army and police. In May 1983, they were joined by the ex-Anyanya soldiers in the army who had refused orders and were therefore attacked by other army units (see above). Two months later, SPLM/ A was founded in Ethiopia out of the amalgamation of the Anyanya II and the new mutineers.
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support: While the Ethiopian government hosted, equipped and trained the SPLA, it apparently did not provide support to domestically-based dissidents (Johnson 2006).

Conditions/ Outcome	Coding	Rationale
Other Arab groups, 2003-2005 (Sudan) [Juhayna Arabs: Shukriyya, Kababish, Baqqara, Rufaa al-Hoi, etc.]		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Salam Sidahmed 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013, UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that members of the other Arab groups were slightly disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Salam Sidahmed 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	The 1980s, 1990s and 2000s witnessed high levels of political repression (Collins 2008). Selected members of the other Arab groups were also affected but we could not find any evidence for indiscriminate violence.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	As discussed above, the post-independence governments lacked policing capacity in large parts of the remote north. We could not find any evidence that this changed during the early 2000s. This is not to deny that the security apparatus was greatly strengthened after 1989 as the Al-Bashir regime tried to secure and consolidate its hold on power (Collins 2008, 188-189; Salam Sidahmed 2011, 100-105). Most importantly, the newly created *Internal Security Bureau* (IS-SOR) intimidated and terrorized the population in order to crush any real or potential dissent. This involved large-scale arbitrary arrests, brutal torture in detention centers ('ghost houses') and 'disappearances'. However, it appears that the presence of the intelligence services was mainly confined to Khartoum and the major urban centers (Collins 2008, 188-189). Similarly, the *Popular Defence Forces* (PDF), a politico-military militia, was mainly designed as an urban security force dedicated to the goals of the Islamist movement.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	In 1989, the *National Islamic Front* (NIF), an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, took over but was (at least formally) dissolved along with all other political parties (Salam Sidahmed 2011, 96-99). Afterwards, the secret *Islamic Movement* (IM) emerged as the undisputed constituency of the al-Bashir regime but was never developed into a coherent political party. In 1998, the NIF/ IM was reorganized into the *National Congress Party* (NCP), the new ruling political party. However, the NCP remained weak. Turabi tried to give the party some substance in 1998-99 (which led to a power struggle with al-Bashir) but failed as his plan to establish popular congresses from the local to the national level was never implemented.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Salam Sidahmed 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).
International	0,00	No evidence for international support (Collins 2008; Sharkey 2008; Salam

support (*intsup*)		Sidahmed 2011; Kramer, Lobban, and Fluehr-Lobban 2013).

Mayas, 1946-1985 (Guatemala)		
Outcome/ conditions	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	The Guatemalan civil war began in the early 1960s when two Marxist groups – the MR-13 (*Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre*) and the FAR I (*Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes*) – took up arms against the government. However, virtually all of these guerillas were *Ladinos* (rather than Indians) and repeatedly failed to set up bases among the indigenous population (in fact, machete-wielding Indians turned the guerrillas over to the authorities) (Wickham-Crowley 1992, 29). The rebellions of the 1970s (the second wave), by contrast, were mainly based among the indigenous population, even though the Marxist agenda remained important. The two main groups – the EGP (*Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres*) and the ORPA (*Organizacíon del Pueblo en Armas*) were remnants of the then almost defeated 1960s guerilas and both developed strong bases of peasant support and recruitment in the Indian highlands of western Guatemala (ibid., 217-218). Both groups also altered their pure Marxist theory to fit their action, insisting that under Guatemalan conditions, they were pursuing not just a class-based socialist revolution, but also a 'national' revolution of Indians against their historical Hispanic oppressors. The rebellions of the 1970s crossed the 25 battle-related deaths per year threshold in 1975 (EGP) and 1979 (OPRA) (UCDP 2013). In 1982, EGP and OPRA merged with two other groups, FAR I and FAR II, to form the URNG (*Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca*). The 1000 battle-related deaths per year threshold was never reached until the end of the war in 1996, yet up to 200 000 civilians were killed or 'disappeared' during the civil war, the vast majority of them indigenous Mayans (ibid.).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1940s, 1950, 1960s and 1970s are not available. We thus use data from the 1987 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that the indigenous population (including Mayans) was strongly disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education}$ = 3,02) and asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets}$ = 1,76). In line with these data, other sources indicate that Mayans in Guatemala have long suffered from low income, landlessness, food insecurity and very poor access to basic social services (Barry 1991, 60; Zur 1998, 28-29; Grandin 2000, 223; Caumartin, Gray Molina, and Thorp 2008, 230-231).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	The Guatemalan state was founded on Spanish identity and language, with Mayans being seen as anachronistic remnants of the past. In this overall context, Mayan cultural practices and languages were marginalized (Caumartin, Gray Molina, and Thorp 2008, 232). It was not only the late 1980s that Mayan languages were 'recognized' by the state and bilingual education was introduced.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Initially, anti-Mayan violence was largely selective in nature: Following the 1954 restoration of military rule, indigenous elites were targeted and often killed by the military (Barry 1992, 46-47). During the 1960s, however, the indigenous population was suspected of supporting the Marxist insurgencies and

		increasingly violently repression. State violence further escalated in the 1970s when hundreds, if not thousands of Indian civilians were persecuted and killed (Goodwin 2001, 161-166). Indiscriminate military repression ultimately led to widespread defensive mobilization: Victimized by the military, the indigenous population became increasingly willing to turn to armed opposition. The latter was a result of state repression, not its cause.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The government's security apparatus had strong territorial reach. Since the 1930s, Mayan rural communities were overseen by military commissioners who were usually of indigenous background and elected by locals (Barry 1991, 223; Zur 1998, 94). Rural areas were further militarized during the early 1970s whereby the military was able to establish strong control over the countryside (Barry 1991, 46; Zur 1998, 34).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	None of the ruling parties during the period under investigation were able to create a national organization with significant territorial reach (Grandin 2000, 201-202).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	The emergence of one of the two main Mayan rebels groups, the EGP, was not least due to the availability of external sanctuary. Faced with internal divisions and harsh government repression in the late 1960s, some FAR I guerillas had gone into hiding in Mexico where they were able to regroup and reorganize (UCDP 2013). In 1972 they re-entered Guatemala through the jungle in the north and began recruiting new members for their new rebel group.
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Barry 1991; Wickham-Crowley 1992; Zur 1998; Grandin 2000).

Afrocolombians 1946-1991		
Outcome/ conditions	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Arocha 1998; Asher 2009; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1940, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s are not available and the 1986 and 1990 DHS do not contain information on the ethnic affiliation of the respondents. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Afrocolombians were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that the Afrocolombian regions along the Pacific and Atlantic coasts have long suffered from underdevelopment (Asher 2009, 40-41). This is particularly true for the Afrocolombian region of Chocho, which is the most backward and isolated region of Colombia, with the highest rates of poverty, unemployment and social neglect in the country (Arocha 1998, 79). Also, Afrocolombians have made successful claim to only 2% of arable land in Colombia (Ng'Weno 2007).

Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	Until 1991, integration was the main strategy for achieving national unity in Colombia and Afrocolombians were required to conceal their cultural identity, i.e. they were not recognized as an ethnic group (Arocha 1998). Official ideology presented Colombia as a nonblack country and, as late as the 1980s, high-school texts continued to stereotype black people as inherently lazy, libidinous, muscular, and stupid (ibid.).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	While Afrocolombians were politically, socioeconomically and culturally marginalized between 1946 and 1991, we could not find any evidence that they also suffered state repression (Arocha 1998; Asher 2009).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	Colombia has long been a weak state (Kline 2003). The government never really attempted to construct a countrywide police force of a size sufficient to enforce its decisions (especially in the countryside), which left effective power in local hands. In the remote and neglected Chocho region (where Afrocolombians have their largest concentration), the local police and army presence was even weaker than in the rest of the conflict-ridden country (Asher 2009).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Though the ruling political parties of Colombia have generally had rural linkages since *La Violencia* in the 1940s, such linkages were underdeveloped in the Chocho region (Osterling 1989).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Arocha 1998; Asher 2009).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Arocha 1998; Asher 2009).

Indigenous peoples, 1946-1989 (Ecuador)		
Outcome/ conditions	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Mijeski and Beck 2011; Mattiace 2012; UCDP 2013). In 1990, a series of indigenous protests spread throughout the highland region, with the support of Amazonian groups. Churches and regional capitals were occupied, widespread roadblocks and the voluntary closure of Indian-run markets dramatically reduced available food supplies. Yet, increased political mobilisation and sporadic acts of violence did not escalate into armed rebellion.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1940, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s are not available and the 1987 DHS does not contain information on the ethnic affiliation of the respondents. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that the indigenous people were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. Other sources indicate that the 'land question' was a particularly important source of grievances for the indigenous population. Until the 1960s,

		indigenous land was expropriated under the 'Law of Communities' (Mattiace 2012, 199-200). Land reforms in 1964 and 1973 were generally not implemented and institutionalized individual rather than collective land rights. The oil boom of the 1970s prompted infringement on land rights by large oil companies. The government continued to provide settlers in the Amazon region with easy access to credit and land titles throughout the 1970s and 1980s (Kimberling 2005, 427).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	The indigenous people suffered cultural marginalization in that the subsequent military dictators promoted the assimilation of Indians into 'white' society. The 1937 Law of Communities effectively treated indigenous people as second-class citizens (Mattiace 2012). There was no official bilingual education until after the 1979 democratic transition (Mijeski and Beck 2011, 13-15).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	There was repression against the indigenous population, which however remained selective in nature. In the late 1940s, the military repressed the *Ecuadorian Federation of Indians* (FEI) and forcefully closed its network of rural schools and arrested many of its leaders (Lucero 2008). During the 1970s and 1980s, the military repressed indigenous protests against oil companies and rising activism by the *Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador* (CONAIE) (Jaskoski 2013).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The indigenous people in Ecuador can be divided into those living in the highlands (about 80%) and those living in the lowlands (about 20%). All of these areas are difficult to police, not least the particularly remote lowlands. Nevertheless, the Ecuadorian military managed to establish a noticeable presence in the rural highlands and lowlands, especially in the petroleum rich northeastern lowlands (Selmeski 2007).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Ecuadoran political parties have been historically underdeveloped. We could find no evidence that subsequent ruling parties had significant territorial reach in the highlands, let alone in the lowlands (Lucero 2008; Mijeski and Beck 2011; Jaskoski 2013).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Mijeski and Beck 2011; Mattiace 2012; UCDP 2013).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Mijeski and Beck 2011; Mattiace 2012; UCDP 2013).

Quechua, 1946-1952 (Bolivia)		
Outcome/ conditions	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war. Throughout 1947, there were a number of dispersed rural uprisings, yet these were more 'peasant' than 'indigenous' in character (Gotkowitz 2008, 233-235). Note that the EAC dataset codes the 1952 National Revolution as an ethnic armed conflict with a Quechua/ Aymara

		agenda. However, this 'revolt was the work of a vanguard of revolutionaries supported by workers, miners, and middle-class students and intellectuals. Initially, the peasantry and the indigenous communities were not on the front lines of the revolution; consequently, the insurrection was primarily a proletarian and urban-based revolution (…)' (Morales 2003, 138).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1940 and 1950s are not available and the 1989 and 1994 DHS do not contain information on the ethnic affiliation of the respondents. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that the Quechua were slightly disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. Other sources confirm that the indigenous population has long been disadvantaged in terms of income and access to basic social services (Caumartin, Gray Molina, and Thorp 2008, 230-231). Indigenous people were largely peasants during this period, tied to the land through various mechanisms of servitude. Highland peasants did not have the opportunity to rent hacienda land as did their lowland counterparts (Dandler and Torrico 1987).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	The culture, language and traditions of the indigenous people were socially unacceptable to the dominant group, the Bolivians of European descent (Gurr 2000, 178). Indigenous languages were rarely taught in the schools. In urban areas indigenous people were expected to ride in the back of buses and move to the opposite site of the street in the presence of *gente decente*.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Indigenous people were subject to state repression, which was however largely selective in nature. Most notably, the leaders of the National Indian Congress were confronted with intimidation and detention after 1946 (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 362-363).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	We could find very little information on the territorial reach of the security apparatus. The scant available information suggests, however, that the Quechua-dominated areas remained largely beyond the state's control (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 358).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	We could not find any evidence that the ruling *Republican Socialist Union* (PURS) had any significant organizational presence in the indigenous-dominated areas of the country (Dandler and Torrico 1987; Morales 2003).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Dandler and Torrico 1987; Morales 2003).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Dandler and Torrico 1987; Morales 2003).

		Aymara, 1946-1952 (Bolivia)
Outcome/ conditions	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war. Throughout 1947, there were a number of dispersed rural uprisings, yet these were more 'peasant' than 'indigenous' in character (Gotkowitz 2008, 233-235). Note that the EAC dataset codes the 1952 National Revolution as an ethnic armed conflict with a Quechua/ Aymara agenda. However, this 'revolt was the work of a vanguard of revolutionaries supported by workers, miners, and middle-class students and intellectuals. Initially, the peasantry and the indigenous communities were not on the front lines of the revolution; consequently, the insurrection was primarily a proletarian and urban-based revolution (…)' (Morales 2003, 138).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1940 and 1950s are not available and the 1989 and 1994 DHS do not contain information on the ethnic affiliation of the respondents. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that the Aymara were slightly disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. Other sources confirm that the indigenous population has long been disadvantaged in terms of income and access to basic social services (Caumartin, Gray Molina, and Thorp 2008, 230-231). Indigenous people were largely peasants during this period, tied to the land through various mechanisms of servitude. Highland peasants did not have the opportunity to rent hacienda land as did their lowland counterparts (Dandler and Torrico 1987).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	The culture, language and traditions of the indigenous people were socially unacceptable to the dominant group, the Bolivians of European descent (Gurr 2000, 178). Indigenous languages were rarely taught in the schools. In urban areas indigenous people were expected to ride in the back of buses and move to the opposite site of the street in the presence of *gente decente*.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Indigenous people were subject to state repression, which was however largely selective in nature. Most notably, the leaders of the National Indian Congress were confronted with intimidation and detention after 1946 (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 362-363).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	We could find very little information on the territorial reach of the security apparatus. The scant available information suggests, however, that the Aymara-dominated areas remained largely beyond the state's control (Dandler and Torrico 1987, 358).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	We could not find any evidence that the ruling *Republican Socialist Union* (PURS) had any significant organizational presence in the indigenous-dominated areas of the country (Dandler and Torrico 1987; Morales 2003).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Dandler and Torrico 1987; Morales 2003).

International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Dandler and Torrico 1987; Morales 2003).

Albanians, 1992 (Yugoslavia)		
Outcome/ conditions	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Albanians were extremely disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that Kosovo has long been the by far poorest part of Yugoslavia: By 1979, the average per capita income in Kosovo was $795, while the Yugoslav national average was $2,635 (Judah 2000, 46). The same apparently remained true during the early 1990s (Sell 2002, 69). Moreover, about 100,000 Albanians lost their jobs due to a 'Law on Labour Relations in Exceptional Conditions' (Bieber and Daskalovski 2003, 36) and were prohibited from buying or selling property without government permission (Caplan 1998, 751).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	Following the destruction of Kosovo's regional autonomy in the late 1980s, all Albanian cultural institutions were closed or merged with the Serbian counterparts (Judah 2000, 62-63). The most dramatic application of the new measures came in the field of education: The Serbian curriculum was imposed on Albanian students (who had to pass Serbian language proficiency exams) and Albanian teachers were fired unless they signed oath to Serbia. Serbian students are given preference in the University of Pristina. From 1991-92, Albanian schools were no longer financed and thus had to close (see also Clark 2000; Bieber and Daskalovski 2003; Kostovicova 2005).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Albanians began to face increasingly indiscriminate state violence from the 1980s when hundreds, if not thousands were killed and more than 500,000 were arrested (Judah 2000, 40-41). Police repression was 'so unselective and chauvinistic – in relation to the entire Albanian population – that it produced a pattern of defensive homogenization on the part of Kosovo Albanians' (ibid.). This apparently did not change during the 1990s (ibid., 84-91): The police maintained a regime of constant surveillance with routine harassment, beatings and arrests of Albanians (see also Caplan 1998, 751; Bekaj 2010, 13). Significantly, whole villages were frequently surrounded and subjected to violent searches for weapons (HRW 1993).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Beginning in 1990 with the dismantling of the Kosovo autonomous police force, the Serbian state begins to expand its presence within Kosovo by arming Serbs and deploying the army and the police (Salla 1995, 432). As a consequence, there was overwhelming security presence in Kosovo during the 1990s (Judah 2000, 61, 66, 119). Nevertheless, the territorial reach of the security apparatus apparently remained limited in some rural areas near the border, allowing the KLA space to expand its activities (Bekaj 2010, 19).

Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	We could find no indication that the ruling *Socialist Party of Serbia* (SPS) had a significant presence outside of Pristina and the Serb-dominated north of Kosovo (Salla 1995; Judah 2000; Bekaj 2010).
External sanctuary *(exsanc)*	0,00	Radical Kosovo Albanian groups, including the KLA, benefitted from external sanctuary in Albania. However, during the early 1990s the Albanian government encouraged the Kosovars to come to an accommodation with Belgrade and sought to prevent the emergence of military training camps on its territory (Judah 2000, 96-97, 111-112).
International support *(intsup)*	1,00	The LDK and the KLA relied on financial support from the Kosovo diaspora in several European countries, which raised a lot of money, including 'dirty money' from the drug trade (Judah 2000, 70-71, 103-104, 129). These funds were used by the KLA to buy weapons on the black market (Bekaj 2010, 17).

Albanians, 1993-1999 (Yugoslavia)		
Outcome/ conditions	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	1,00	The Albanian-based *Kosovo Liberation Army* (UCK) waged ethnic civil war against the Yugoslavian government in 1998-99, claiming that the latter should stop occupying and colonizing Kosovo territory. The conflict became violent in early 1996, when UCK exploded a series of bombs in Serbian refugee camps and began attacking Serbian policemen (UCDP 2013). The conflict escalated dramatically in early 1998 when Serbian security forces were dispatched to Kosovo in order to quell UCK activity. The 1000 battle-related deaths threshold was crossed in both 1998 and 1999. The conflict ended in 1999 with a NATO-imposed peace agreement.
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Albanians were extremely disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that Kosovo has long been the by far poorest part of Yugoslavia: By 1979, the average per capita income in Kosovo was $795, while the Yugoslav national average was $2,635 (Judah 2000, 46). The same apparently remained true during the early 1990s (Sell 2002, 69). Moreover, about 100,000 Albanians lost their jobs due to a 'Law on Labour Relations in Exceptional Conditions' (Bieber and Daskalovski 2003, 36) and were prohibited from buying or selling property without government permission (Caplan 1998, 751).
Cultural marginalization *(culmarg)*	1,00	Following the destruction of Kosovo's regional autonomy in the late 1980s, all Albanian cultural institutions were closed or merged with the Serbian counterparts (Judah 2000, 62-63). The most dramatic application of the new measures came in the field of education: The Serbian curriculum was imposed on Albanian students (who had to pass Serbian language proficiency exams) and Albanian teachers were fired unless they signed oath to Serbia. Serbian students are given preference in the University of Pristina. From 1991-92, Albanian schools were no longer financed and thus had to close (see also Clark

		2000; Bieber and Daskalovski 2003; Kostovicova 2005).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Albanians began to face increasingly indiscriminate state violence from the 1980s when hundreds, if not thousands were killed and more than 500,000 were arrested (Judah 2000, 40-41). Police repression was 'so unselective and chauvinistic – in relation to the entire Albanian population – that it produced a pattern of defensive homogenization on the part of Kosovo Albanians' (ibid.). This apparently did not change during the 1990s (ibid., 84-91): The police maintained a regime of constant surveillance with routine harassment, beatings and arrests of Albanians (see also Caplan 1998, 751; Bekaj 2010, 13). Significantly, whole villages were frequently surrounded and subjected to violent searches for weapons (HRW 1993).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Beginning in 1990 with the dismantling of the Kosovo autonomous police force, the Serbian state begins to expand its presence within Kosovo by arming Serbs and deploying the army and the police (Salla 1995, 432). As a consequence, there was overwhelming security presence in Kosovo during the 1990s (Judah 2000, 61, 66, 119). Nevertheless, the territorial reach of the security apparatus apparently remained limited in some rural areas near the border, allowing the KLA space to expand its activities (Bekaj 2010, 19).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	We could find no indication that the ruling *Socialist Party of Serbia* (SPS) had a significant presence outside of Pristina and the Serb-dominated north of Kosovo (Salla 1995; Judah 2000; Bekaj 2010).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	Radical Kosovo Albanian groups, including the KLA, benefitted from external sanctuary in Albania. While the Albanian government sought to prevent military activities on its territory during the early 1990s (see above), the prospects for military training in Albania improved dramatically in the spring of 1997 when Albania as a state simply imploded after the pyramid or 'Ponzi' schemes – in which hundreds of thousands of people had invested their savings – collapsed (Judah 2002, 127-129). Confronted with violent demonstrations across the country, the Albanian government lost control, the army dissolved, the police ran away and arms depots were thrown open. Albania was suddenly awash with hundreds of thousands of Kalashnikovs – guns and ammunition suddenly available for virtually nothing and no more central government in Tirana to prevent the KLA from smuggling weapons back to Kosovo. Accordingly, young men slipped back across the mountains from Albania with guns and ammunition. Altogether, the collapse of the Albanian economy and state in 1997 allowed for the development and consolidation of the KLA.
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	The LDK and the KLA relied on financial support from the Kosovo diaspora in several European countries, which raised a lot of money, including 'dirty money' from the drug trade (Judah 2000, 70-71, 103-104, 129). These funds were used by the KLA to buy weapons on the black market (Bekaj 2010, 17).

		Russians 1991-2000 (Moldova)
Outcome/ conditions	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	The conflict in Moldova appeared in the early 1990s as the country started to liberate itself from the USSR (UCDP 2013). The Slavic minority east of the river Dniestr objected to Moldova's independence in 1991 as they feared a unification with Romania. In 1992, violent clashes occurred between Moldovan troops and the self-proclaimed PMR (*Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic*). The conflict caused an estimated 585 battle-related deaths in 1992 (ibid.) and remains unresolved until today. It is somewhat debatable whether this armed conflict was really ethnic in nature as the ethnic lines are not neatly drawn in Moldova (Kaufman 1996, 119): most of Moldova's ethnic Russians live outside the separatist Dniestr region, while the Dniestr region's ethnic mix before the war was over 40% Moldovan, 28% Ukrainian, and only 25% Russian. However, Russians in the Dniestr region formed a coalition of ethnic interests with 'Russified' Moldovans and Ukrainians who all considered Russian their language and the Soviet Union their country. These Dniestrian Russophones united in opposition against the alleged domination of Moldovan ethnic interests and ultimately resorted to violent means. As such, the conflict between the Moldovan government and the separatists on the left bank of the Dniestr river was arguably largely an ethnically-based conflict (ibid.).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Russians were very marginally disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. Other sources, however, suggest that Russians enjoyed privileged access to urban professions and industry by the early 1990s (Szporluk 1994, 65; Kolstø and Melberg 2002, 69-70). Against this backdrop we prefer to code Russians as 'more out than in' of the group of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	'Russophones' faced discrimination in terms of language rights and ethnocultural practices: Most significantly, the 1989 Law on the Official Language of Moldova proclaimed Romanian the sole state language, raising its symbolic status above that of Russian (Kaufman 1996, 126). Moldovan was also to be the main business language and many – including political leaders, economic managers, service workers etc. – would, within five years, have to be bilingual. These change intensified fears that Moldova would unit with Romania and was widely interpreted as a visible sign of shifting the power away from the 'Russophones' to the Moldovans.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Before the outbreak of armed conflict in 1992, ethnic hostility was relatively low as Moldovan nationalists were more interested in forwarding their own interests than in repressing Russians (Kaufman 1996, 124). This is not to deny that 'Russophone' activists in the Dniestr region were on a number of occasions harassed and detained by the security forces, yet this state violence remained selective in nature.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus	0,00	The territorial reach of the Moldovan security apparatus was limited: While the police and army retained a presence in some parts of the Dniestr region, including in the countryside, they were more or less absent in other parts of the

(*secureach*)		region (Kaufman 1996, 129). Here, a coalition of 'Russophone' separatist forces and the Soviet 14th army were in firm control. By the end of the fighting in 1992, Moldovan security forces had largely been expelled from the region (King 1994; Kaufman and Bowers 1998).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	In the immediate aftermath of independence, no single Moldovan political party established any presence beyond the capital (Mosneaga 2005, 76-77).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (King 1994; Kaufman 1996; Kaufman and Bowers 1998).
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	The 'Russophone' rebels received very substantial financial and military support from the USSR/ Russia: While Moscow was initially 'only' arming the rebels, it later sent its 14th army that fought on the side of the Dniestrians (Kaufman 1996, 129-133).

Kurds, 1946-2005 (Turkey)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Turkish Kurds resorted to violent means in 1984: Combining Kurdish nationalism with Marxist-Leninist ideology, Abdullah Ocalan's *Kurdistan Workers' Party* (PKK) fought a separatist guerrilla war in the Kurdish provinces of the south-east. To date, the war has reportedly claimed close to 40,000 lives, destroyed thousands of villages and displaced millions of people (Bacik and Coskun 2011, 249).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	DHS data is not available for Turkey. However, there is substantial evidence that the Kurdish-dominated regions suffered from by far lower per capita income and poorer access to key social services than other regions (Mutlu 2001; Icduygu 1999).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	Kurds faced severe restrictions in terms of language rights and ethnocultural practices (but not in terms of religious rights). The government placed severe restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language, prohibiting its use in education and broadcast media. Following the 1980 coup, Kurdish was even formally banned until 1991 (Ergil 2000, 127). Furthermore, the government repeatedly suppressed organizations that promote Kurdish culture, 'Turkified' the names of Kurdish towns and villages, and prevented parents from giving Kurdish names to their children.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Kurds faced large-scale indiscriminate violence: After the 1971 coup, for instance, Kurds suffered large-scale violence, most evident in sustained attacks on Kurdish villages (Entessar 1992, 89-90). Things got even worse after the 1980 coup, evident in 81,000 arrests, routine torture in prison and the forceful

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		destruction of 4,000 Kurdish villages (Romano 2006, 78; McDowall 2000, 413-414)
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	The Turkish security forces exercised weak territorial control. First, the army had only shallow territorial presence, as military outposts were all in the big cities or near the main roads, not in the mountainous terrain of Kurdistan (Marcus 2007, 86). Similarly, the intelligence services were unable to survey the entire territory due to low budgets, insufficient personnel and inefficient management (Bese 2006; Ünlü 2006). The weakness of the security apparatus reflected the political conditions of the post-1945 period when Turkey experienced recurrent civil-military tensions, evident in the coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 (Romano 2006,40). Such divisions were an obvious impediment to effective territorial control.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	The Turkish political elite entered a process of chronic instability during the 1970s, with ten short-lived coalition governments between 1974 and 1980, which were paralysed by ideological divisions (Marcus 2007, 49-50). The increasing fragmentation of the Turkish party system meant that subsequent governments lacked strong party machinery capable of monitoring political dissent.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	Kurdish activists in Turkey benefitted from ample external sanctuary. In 1979, Ocalan anticipated the imminent coup and the ensuing repression and fled across the border into Syria, which allowed for no less than the PKK's survival (Marcus 2007, 48). While the Assad regime provided the PKK with open financial, material and logistical support only after the start of the rebellion, it tacitly tolerated the PKK's presence not only in Syria but also in Syria-controlled Lebanon where Ocalan and his followers received military training by Palestinian organizations. On the downside, Damascus did not want the PKK to fight from its territory. As a result, Ocalan reached a deal with the KDP in Northern Iraq, which controlled parts of the mountainous Turkish-Iraqi border and allowed the PKK to build a permanent base on 'their' territory (ibid., 68). This agreement was at least as important as ties with Syria in that it enabled the rebels to launch the war from a 'safe haven' outside Turkey.
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Entessar 1992; Romano 2006; Marcus 2007).

Kurds 1946-1958 (Iraq)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (McDowall 2000; Wimmer 2002; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Kurds were very disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. Other sources indicate that Kurds were already economically disadvantaged during the 1940s and 1950s: While some land-owning Kurdish families were extremely wealthy (of 46 magnate families in Iraq

Conditions/Outcome	Coding	Rationale
		no fewer than 11 were Kurdish), the great majority of Kurds lived in abject poverty (McDowall 2000, 297-300). Moreover, as the entire education system was Arabized, Kurds were also disadvantaged in educational terms (Wimmer 2002, 178-179).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	In the context of mounting Pan-Arab nationalism, Iraqi Kurds came to face considerable cultural marginalization (Wimmer 2002, 174-180). As the regime tried to enforce cultural homogeneity and to imprint the independent Iraqi state with a Sunni Arab cultural character, the Kurdish language and Kurdish cultural practices were severely repressed.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Kurdish activists faced state repression during the second half of the 1940s and the early 1950s, yet this repression remained selective in nature (McDowall 2000, 295-297).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	The presence of the Iraqi security forces in the Kurdish-dominated parts of the country was long extremely weak, not least due to the impenetrability of the region (Bengio 2012, 10-12). It was only from the late 1950s and early 1960s that the military presence in the region was reinforced (McDowall 2000, 308).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	We could find no evidence that the ruling Constitutional Union Party had an organizational presence in the Kurdish-dominated parts of the country (McDowall 2000; Bengio 2012).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	After the failed revolt between 1943 and 1945, Mustafa Barzani and many of his followers found external sanctuary in the Soviet-backed Republic of Mahabad (McDowall 2000, 293-297). After the collapse of Mahabad in 1947, the Kurdish activists were expelled from Iran and Barzani and other leaders received sanctuary in the Soviet Union (Lawrence 2008, 16-18).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (McDowall 2000; Lawrence 2008).

Kurds 1976-1990 (Iraq)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	The KDP, which had waged insurgency since 1961, ceased fighting following the conclusion of an agreement between Iraq and its main backer, Iran, in 1975 (UCDP 2013). However, many among the KDP fighters disagreed with KDP-leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani's leadership and wanted to continue the struggle against the Iraqi government. These elements within KDP formed the *Patriotic Union of Kurdistan* (PUK), a new organization under the leadership of Jalal Talabani, a long-standing opponent of Barzani, in June 1975. The PUK insurgency reached the 25 battle-related deaths threshold in 1976 and the 1,000 battle-related deaths threshold in 1988 (ibid.).

		Moreover, the KDP was revived under the leadership of the sons of former KDP-leader Barzani (ibid.). The new organisation was initially called *KDP of Iraq-Provisional Command* (KDP-QM), yet it reverted to its old name, KDP, in 1979. The KDP-QM insurgency reached the 25 battle-related deaths threshold in 1977 and the 1,000 battle-related deaths threshold in 1988 (ibid.).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Kurds were very disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that the Kurds were severely disadvantaged in terms of economic status and educational attainment during the 1960s and 1970s (McDowall 2000, 178-179; Wimmer 2002; Astarjian 2007, 69).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	In the context of mounting Pan-Arab nationalism, Iraqi Kurds came to face considerable cultural marginalization (Wimmer 2002, 174-180). As the regime tried to enforce cultural homogeneity and to imprint the independent Iraqi state with a Sunni Arab cultural character, the Kurdish language and Kurdish cultural practices were severely repressed (see also McDowall 2000, 332, 340).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	The Kurdish population suffered massive indiscriminate repression after the defeat of the KDP in 1975 (McDowall 2000, 339): At least 500 villages were razed and at least 600,000 people were deported; anyone who dared to return was summarily executed (see also Lawrence 2008, 21-22).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	In 1974-75, the Iraqi security forces began to reoccupy the Kurdish-dominated areas and now held more of Kurdistan than at any time since 1961 (McDowall 2004, 337). Following the defeat of Kurdish forces in 1975, over 100,000 Iraqi troops reasserted control over Kurdistan (Catudal 1976). Iraqi security forces also regained control along the Iran-Iraq border (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2003, 172-173; McDowall 2000, 339). In the mountainous areas of Kurdistan, however, the territorial reach of the security apparatus remained more limited.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	We could find no evidence that the ruling Baath party had a significant organizational presence in the Kurdish-dominated parts of the country (Catudal 1976; McDowall 2000; Wimmer 2002).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	The PUK benefitted from external sanctuary in Syria, whereas the KDP-QM found refuge in Iran and – to a lesser extent – in Turkey (McDowall 2000, 344-346).
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	PUK guerillas in Iraq received financial and military support from Syria and Libya, while those of the KDP-QM received support from Iran (McDowall 2000, 346).

Sunni Arabs 2003-2005 (Iraq)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	The Sunni Arab insurgency in Iraq began almost immediately after the US invasion in 2003 and escalated into ethnic civil war in 2004 (UCDP 2013). It was led by at least three major groups, including *Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn* (TQJBR), *Ansar al-Islam* (later *Jaish Ansar Al-Sunna*) and *Al-Jaysh al-Islami fi Iraq* (IAI) (ICG 2006a, 1-2), which all fought both the foreign occupation and the new Shiite-dominated regime. The spectrum of insurgents ranged between the more Sunni Arab nationalistic (including ex-Baathists) on the one hand, and the more jihadi religious on the other. But these were more subtle nuances than rigid distinctions, with all groups mixing Islamic and communal themes in various proportions.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Sunni Arabs were privileged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	We could find no evidence that Sunni Arabs suffered cultural marginalization prior to the insurgency (Eisenstadt and Jeffrey 2005; ICG 2006a; Monshipouri 2009).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	After the US invasion in 2003, many former members of the ousted Sunni-dominated Hussein regime were harassed, arrested, or even killed (Eisenstadt and Jeffrey 2005; ICG 2006). Beyond this selective repression, there was also more indiscriminate anti-Sunni violence: In the context of the broad sweeps of the Sunni Triangle during the early phases of the occupation, tens of thousands of innocent Sunni Arab civilians were detained and often subjected to rough and degrading treatment (Eisenstadt and Jeffrey 2005, 4).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	After the US invasion, the Iraqi army was disbanded and the new Iraqi government had to start almost from scratch in its efforts to arm and equip the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) (Eisenstadt and Jeffrey 2005, 2-4). No sufficient forces were available to secure and stabilize Iraq rapidly: Both the coalition forces and the ISF lacked the numbers needed to ensure security in the Sunni Triangle or to secure Iraq's borders against fighters bent on joining foreign jihadists already in the country. Would-be insurgent groups were thus able to commence operations in the Sunni Triangle without serious interference by coalition forces. This allowed the insurgency to gather momentum relatively quickly.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	There was no ruling political party prior to the insurgency.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	1,00	The insurgents benefitted from external sanctuary in Syria as the Syrian government apparently allowed the would-be insurgents to cross its border with ease (Cardosa 2007, 47; Cordesman and Davies 2008, 466; Connable and Libicki

		2010, 40).
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	There is some indication that the Syrian government supported domestically-based insurgents financially (Rabil 2006). Moreover, the insurgents received financial contributions from wealthy private donors in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iran, Europe, and the Gulf states (especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates); expatriate former regime elements; and members of transnational charities (Eisenstadt and Jeffrey 2005, 17).

Christians, 1970-2005 (Syria)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Collelo 1988; Mousa 2012; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Christians were marginally disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. Other sources, by contrast, indicate that Christians were not only relatively well-off in economic terms but also privileged in terms of educational attainment (Collelo 1988, 99-100; Mousa 2012). Against this backdrop we code Christians to be 'more out than in' of the set of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	No evidence for cultural marginalization. Note that with 'the exception of the Armenians and Assyrians, most Christians are Arab, sharing the pride of Muslims in the Islamic-Arabic tradition and in Syria's special role in that tradition' (Collelo 1988, 99). Moreover, Syrian Christians 'enjoy not only legislative and constitutional freedom of worship, but practical treatment as "full" citizens facilitated by a non-sectarian framework in one of the few remaining Arab countries where, as one bishop puts it, a Christian can "really feel the equal of a Muslim"' (Mousa 2012).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for state repression (Collelo 1988; Mousa 2012).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	In Syria, the Assad regime exercised extremely strong territorial control. The latter was mainly based on loyal and omnipresent security forces, which earned Syria the reputation of one of the world's most notorious police states. Whereas the country had experienced several coups between 1946 and 1970, Assad transformed the military from a system-challenging force into a pillar of the state by integrating it with the ruling party and the civil service (Hinnebusch 1990, 158). In the process, the army's security and intelligence agencies were enlarged and their chiefs were brought into the inner councils of the state (MEW 1991, 38). This gave rise to a tripartite security apparatus, including the traditional mukhabarat (Political Security and Military Intelligence), the newer praetorian units (Special Force, Defence Brigades, and Presidential Guard), and special political military units. These security forces were given extraordinary competences and became simply ubiquitous, with tens of thousands of spies

		throughout the country.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	1,00	Assad relied on the apparatus of the Baath party that was turned into an instrument of control by anchoring it in every corner of the country and endowing it with considerable policing and intelligence functions (Hinnebusch 1990, 166; MEW 1991, 32). The party apparatus, which was larger than the most powerful security agencies, allowed the regime to monitor hundreds of organizations and thousands of small towns and villages and gather information about political dissent.
External sanctuary *(exsanc)*	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Collelo 1988; Mousa 2012).
International support *(intsup)*	0,00	No evidence for international support (Collelo 1988; Mousa 2012).

Sunni Kurds, 1970-2005 (Syria)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (Montgomery 2005; Ziadeh 2009; Tejel 2009; HRW 2009; UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	1,00	DHS data is not available for Syria. However, there is substantial evidence that Syrian Kurds faced lower income, discrimination in the job market and reduced social services (Ziadeh 2009, 3) Even more alienating was Baathist land reform, which expropriated large amounts of land from Kurdish farmers and re-distributed it to Arab 'settlers' (Montgomery 2005, 92; HRW 2009, 10-11).
Cultural marginalization *(culmarg)*	1,00	Sunni Kurds faced severe restrictions in terms of language rights and ethnocultural practices (but not in terms of religious rights). Key elements of Kurdish cultural identity, such as language, publications, music, and celebrations (including the Kurdish New Year festival of Newruz) were banned (Montgomery 2005, 96; Ziadeh 2009, 3). The government also replaced the names of Kurdish villages, businesses and sites with Arabic ones.
Indiscriminate Repression *(indisrep)*	0,00	In Syria, the most serious crackdown on the Kurdish movement had already occurred in 1960 when more than 5,000 members of the *Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria* (KDPS) were arrested, interrogated or even imprisoned (Tejel 2009, 49). After Assad took over, he used the extraordinary judicial powers under the quasi-permanent state of emergency to contain Kurdish mobilisation (Montgomery 2005, 65-66). This meant that Kurdish underground parties were systematically infiltrated by security agents and planned protests were routinely met with bans and preventive arrests. Violence was used whenever necessary but always remained selective in nature, i.e. it was targeted at key activists rather than at the Kurdish population as a whole.

Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	In Syria, the Assad regime exercised extremely strong territorial control. The latter was mainly based on loyal and omnipresent security forces, which earned Syria the reputation of one of the world's most notorious police states. Whereas the country had experienced several coups between 1946 and 1970, Assad transformed the military from a system-challenging force into a pillar of the state by integrating it with the ruling party and the civil service (Hinnebusch 1990, 158). In the process, the army's security and intelligence agencies were enlarged and their chiefs were brought into the inner councils of the state (MEW 1991, 38). This gave rise to a tripartite security apparatus, including the traditional mukhabarat (Political Security and Military Intelligence), the newer praetorian units (Special Force, Defence Brigades, and Presidential Guard), and special political military units. These security forces were given extraordinary competences and became simply ubiquitous, with tens of thousands of spies throughout the country.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	1,00	Assad relied on the apparatus of the Baath party that was turned into an instrument of control by anchoring it in every corner of the country and endowing it with considerable policing and intelligence functions (Hinnebusch 1990, 166; MEW 1991, 32). The party apparatus, which was larger than the most powerful security agencies, allowed the regime to monitor hundreds of organizations and thousands of small towns and villages and gather information about political dissent.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Montgomery 2005; Ziadeh 2009; Tejel 2009; HRW 2009).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support. In fact, Kurdish mobilisation was actively discouraged by outside actors, in particular by Kurdish leaders in neighbouring states. The main reason for this puzzling situation was that the Assad regime – in striking contrast to the repression of its own Kurds – supported Kurdish separatist groups in Iraq and Turkey and in return asked these groups not to support their ethnic brethren in Syria. During the 1970s and 1980s, Syria provided support to the two main Kurdish parties of Iraq, including the *Patriotic Union of Kurdistan* (PUK) and the *Kurdistan Democratic Party* (KDP), whose leadership in return discouraged Syrian Kurds from mobilizing against Assad (Tejel 2009, 71). Moreover, the Syrian government also backed the PKK against Turkey during the 1980s and 1990s. In return, Ocalan publicly condemned the fight for Kurdish rights in Syria and even ordered incursions against Kurdish political parties in Syria, especially against the KDPS (ibid., 78).

Palestinians, 1946-1970 (Lebanon)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Palestinians in Lebanon were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which

		show that the living conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps were characterized by extreme poverty and abysmal access to social services (Sayigh 1978). Moreover, there were limitations placed upon the ability of Palestinians to obtain work, severely attenuating the potential for any improvement in their living conditions: Palestinians were required to apply for work permits, ensuring that they would be limited to those low paying jobs unattractive to the Lebanese population, such as agriculture and construction (Peteet 1996; Khalili 2007).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	While Palestinians were severely marginalized in political and socioeconomic terms, we could not find any evidence for cultural marginalization (Sayigh 1978; Peteet 1996; O'Ballance 1998; Khalili 2007).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Palestinian refugees were subjected to largely indiscriminate violence by Lebanese security forces, in particular at the entrance points to refugee camps, which provided a daily opportunity for Lebanese officials to humiliate and physically abuse refugees (Peteet 2005). These types of abuse were not limited to the camps but also occurred in other contexts (e.g. in the prisons).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	In general, the Lebanese security forces were kept small and under-equipped and thus had only limited territorial reach (Barak 2003, 314-315). However, the Lebanese army managed to use the official camp system to impose state control over the refugee population, at least until the early 1970s (Roberts 2010, 80-82): As the army's intelligence branch, the *Deuxième Bureau*, set up a surveillance system within the camps, the Lebanese government had better control over the Palestinian refugees than other countries in the region.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	We could find no evidence that Lebanese political parties operated within the Palestinian refugee camps (Barak 2003; Peteet 2005; Khalili 2007; Roberts 2010).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Barak 2003; Peteet 1996, 2005; Khalili 2007; Roberts 2010).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Barak 2003; Peteet 1996, 2005; Khalili 2007; Roberts 2010).

	Palestinians, 1971-1991 (Lebanon)	
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Ethnic armed conflict broke out in 1975 and escalated into ethnic civil war in 1976 (UCDP 2013). The main battle of the Lebanese civil war stood between the mainly Christian/Maronite right-wing and the mainly Muslim and Druze left-wing, the latter being supported by the PLO and Rejectionist Front groups. The military challenge to the Christian/Maronite-dominated government was led by Kamal Jumblatt's *Lebanese National Movement* (LNM), an umbrella group

		including parties such as the Druze-based *Progressive Socialist Party* (PSP), the *Independent Nasserite Organisation*, the *Syrian Social Nationalist Party* (SSNP) and the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP). Several Palestinian organizations also joined the LNM, such as the PFLP (*Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine*) and the DFLP (*Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine*). The *Palestine Liberation Organization* (PLO) – the largest Palestinian group – was never a member, but nonetheless at times supported the LNM in combat. The start date of the conflict (when it crosses the 25 battle-related deaths threshold) is by the UCDP set to 2 September 1975, when violent clashes broke out in Zghorta and Tripoli between members of the LNM and President Frangieh's Zghorta Liberation Army (sometimes referred to also as the Marada Brigade).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Palestinians in Lebanon were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which show that the living conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps were characterized by extreme poverty and abysmal access to social services (Sayigh 1978). Moreover, there were limitations placed upon the ability of Palestinians to obtain work, severely attenuating the potential for any improvement in their living conditions: Palestinians were required to apply for work permits, ensuring that they would be limited to those low paying jobs unattractive to the Lebanese population, such as agriculture and construction (Peteet 1996; Khalili 2007).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	While Palestinians were severely marginalized in political and socioeconomic terms, we could not find any evidence for cultural marginalization (Sayigh 1978; Peteet 1996; O'Ballance 1998; Khalili 2007).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Before 1970, Palestinian refugees had already been subjected to indiscriminate violence by Lebanese security forces, in particular at the entrance points to refugee camps, which provided a daily opportunity for Lebanese officials to humiliate and physically abuse refugees (Peteet 2005). After 1970, anti-Palestinian violence escalated even further. A key event in this respect occurred on 13 April 1975 when Kataeb party militants (also known as the Phalange Party, Pierre Gemayel's Maronite right-wing party) attacked a bus in Beirut carrying Palestinians (O'Ballance 1998, 1). The attack – itself a reprisal for an attack by unknown gunmen on a church service attended by Gemayel on the same day – killed 28 Palestinian commandos from the *Arab Liberation Front* (ALF). In the wake of this event recurrent armed clashes erupted between the Phalangists and Palestinian commandos, with rockets being fired into Palestinian camps (ibid., 7-12). More than 2,000 people died between April and July 1975.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	As part of the Cairo Agreement (1969), Arab states and Lebanon agreed that the PLO would use Lebanese territories to launch attacks against Israel and, within Lebanon, manage the affairs of the Palestinian camps with no interference from the Lebanese security forces. As a consequence, the camps were no longer controlled by the heavy-handed Deuxième Bureau (see above) but now placed under the command of Palestinian forces. This allowed the latter to establish a 'state within the state', which served as a valuable sanctuary in the conflict with Israel (Barak 2003, 317).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	We could find no evidence that Lebanese political parties operated within the Palestinian refugee camps (Barak 2003; Peteet 2005; Khalili 2007; Roberts 2010).

External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	While the Assad government supported the PLO in Lebanon (see below), we could find no evidence that the PLO – or other Palestinian groups – were granted external sanctuary in Syria.
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	Syria extended financial and material support to the PLO and some National Movement organizations from April 1975, i.e. before the onset of ethnic armed conflict in September 1975 (Brynen 1990).

Hazaras, 1946-1978 (Afghanistan)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war. There was apparently a brief rebellion in 1946 against a tax that only Hazaras had to pay (which was immediately rescinded) (Mousavi 1998, 163). In the course of the rebellion, some Hazaras killed a number of state employees, took over a police station and held it through the winter. However, we could find no evidence that the 25 battle-related deaths threshold was reached. The rebellion ended peacefully through negotiations (Emadi 2010, 54-55).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	O,67	The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data indicate that Hazaras were not disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. Other sources, by contrast, suggest that Hazaras were marginalized in socioeconomic terms: Pashtuns were given preferential loans in order to purchase lands in Hazarajat, forcing Hazaras to move to cities were they occupied the most menial positions and comprised a large segment of the urban working class of Kabul (Khanam 2005, 281; Doronsorro 2005, 46-48). Furthermore, restrictions against university attendance prevented the development of a professional class until the 1970s (Farr 2007). Against this backdrop we code Hazaras to be 'more in than out' of the group of socioeconomically marginalized ethnic groups.
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	The 1931 Constitution made the Hanafi school of Sunni Islam the official religion (Poladi 1989, 373). The 1961 Constitution made discrimination illegal but in practice it remained widespread. Throughout most of the period, there was so-called 'Pashtunization', which entailed, among others, the imposition of the Pashtun language (Mousavi 1998, 166). Until the 1960s, Hazaras were not allowed into Kabul University, and even after that only the children of powerful *khans* were accepted (Poladi 1989, 366). During most of the period, there were no government schools in Hazarajat, causing many Hazaras to go abroad for schooling (Mousavi 1998, 169). All sources that we consulted highlight the extreme cultural repression against Hazaras.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	While there was no indiscriminate state violence against Hazaras, many Hazaras were harassed and intimidated by Pashtuns – a practice that was apparently encouraged by official clerics (Mousavi 1998, 162).
Territorial reach of the security	0,00	During the 1950s and 1960s, much of the Afghan army was located along the border with Pakistan, as well as in the areas around the larger cities. By 1978, not a single army unit was listed as being stationed in Hazarajat (Adamec 2006,

apparatus (*secureach*)		170-172). The police apparently maintained some presence within Hazarajat, primarily during pasture season in order to protect nomadic Pashtun herders grazing in the region. There was, however, only one primary police station in the entire region.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	There was no ruling political party under the monarchy. During the early 1950s, the Prime Minister attempted to form a government party, yet this failed (Bajpai and Ram 2002, 109).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Poladi 1989; Mousavi 1998; Farr 2007).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Poladi 1989; Mousavi 1998; Farr 2007).

Uzbeks, 1997-2005 (Tajikistan)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013). In 1997 and 1998, there were two mutinies that were both led by supporters of Uzbek leader Mahmud Khudoberdiev. However, these mutinies were framed as 'northern' (rather than Uzbek) and mainly based on opposition to the integration of Islamist rebels into the post-conflict government. Traditional north-south rivalries rather than ethnic animosity were at play here.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Uzbeks were marginally disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. Since the late 1990s, however, the economy in the northern Sughd Oblast has been improving and, as during the Soviet era, is more prosperous than the south. As a result, the north, including its large Uzbek population, no longer has serious economic grievances (Fumagalli 2005, 94-95).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Cultural grievances were primarily linguistic, demanding greater rights to teach and publish in Uzbek and to use Uzbek in their dealings with the government (Landau and Kellner-Heinkele 2001).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Uzbeks suffered selective state repression (Fumagalli 2005; Hiro 2009). After the signing of the peace treaty ending the civil war in 1997, there were multiple murders of ethnic Uzbeks in the Panj district. In addition, Khudoberdiev and some of his supports as well as Abdumalik Abdullajanov, the leader of the National Revival Movement, were targeted for arrest and extradition. Also, the ethnic Uzbek mayor of a town in Khatlon district disappeared in September 1999 under mysterious circumstances.

Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	After the 1997 civil war, the government made some progress in rebuilding a functioning state, yet the latter was still weak by 2005, with regional and clan networks operating independently of the central government (ICG 2001; Fumagalli 2005). Both the Tajik army and police remained small, under equipped and dominated by regional elites. From 2000, the police slowly began to expand its presence in rural areas, yet this process was highly uneven (Marat 2012).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	The scant available evidence suggests that the ruling *People's Democratic Party* (PDP) had a weak organizational presence in the Uzbek-dominated North (Feiman 2009, 2; Heathershaw 2009, 80).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (ICG 2001; Fumagalli 2005).
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	Uzbekistan apparently briefly provided Mahmud Khudoberdiev in Qurghonteppe and Ibadullo Boimatov in Hissor with limited financial support during the late 1990s (Horowitz 2001, 652).

Uzbeks 1991-2005 (Kyrgyzstan)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013). Note that Kyrgyzstan had experienced *non-state* ethnic conflict between its two largest ethnic groups (the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks) in 1990 when grievances over land-ownership led to brutal clashes which resulted in over a hundred deaths.
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Household data from the 1997 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/) suggest that the Uzbeks were not disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 0) and only very marginally disadvantaged in terms of educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 1,08).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Uzbeks faced some cultural discrimination in that the Uzbek language was not granted official status in Kyrgyzstan (Bond and Koch 2010). Also, they were confronted with greater obstacles in seeking independent sources of information in their own language, despite having their own media (ICG 2001a, 25).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	Selected members of Hizb ut-Tahrir were arrested or even tortured, and nearly all of the members apprehended were Uzbeks (ICG 2001a, 17). And even though Hizb ut-Tahrir was not mainly an Uzbek political organization (see below), this apparently contributed to the sense among many Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan that they suffered discrimination and repression. Kyrgyz police officials also frequently harassed Uzbeks merchants at the bazaars (more so than Kyrgyz traders) (ibid.).

Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	The Kyrgyz security forces were unable to fully control the border with Uzbekistan, including the Fergana Valley where Uzbeks live (Megoran 2004, 742). The relative ease with which the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) entered Kyrgyzstan in 1999 highlighted the deficiencies of the security services and the lack of territorial control (ICG 2001, 3). After 2000, the police expanded its presence in rural areas as part of the modernization and demilitarization of policing, though the process was apparently uneven (Marat 2012).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	There was no single ruling political party with strong territorial reach during the Akayev administration. The President was initially the head of an anti-communist coalition, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, yet following his election the coalition faltered and split apart (Babak, Vaisman, and Wasserman 2000, 183). Afterwards, there were a number of competing pro-presidential and pro-government parties (for an overview see ICG 2001a, 29), none of which had a significant national infrastructure (ibid., 19). Instead, all parties (including opposition parties) remained regionally focused: strong in the cities of their leaders and weak elsewhere.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (ICG 2001a, Megoran 2004, Bond and Koch 2010).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (ICG 2001a, Megoran 2004, Bond and Koch 2010).

Russians 1991-2005 (Kyrgyzstan)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	Household data from the 1997 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/) suggest that the Uzbeks were not disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 0$) and educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 0$). This is in line with other sources, which suggest that Russians have traditionally dominated the Kyrgyz economy (Commercio 2004), even though this Russian economic dominance apparently decreased after from the early 1990s as part of the shrinking of the industrial economy (Abazov 1999, 247) and favoritism toward Kyrgyz business (Anderson 1999, 45).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Russians did not experience cultural marginalization: While the 1989 Language Law made Kyrgyz the official language, the 1991 Constitution made guarantees for the preservation and promotion of the Russian language (Commercio 2004). In 2000, Russian was finally formally declared an official language. In education, individuals could choose to be educated in Russian and all students had to learn both Russian and Kyrgyz (ibid.).

Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	We could not find any evidence for instances of violence directed specifically toward Russians (Commercio 2004, 2009, 2011; Anderson 1999).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Russians are regionally concentrated in the densely populated and urbanized Chui Valley surrounding the capital Bishkek. Here, the territorial reach of the security forces was apparently stronger than in the poorly policed southern parts of the country (see above). Moreover, the police expanded its presence in rural areas as part of the modernization and demilitarization of policing in 2000, though the process was apparently uneven (Marat 2012).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	There was no single ruling political party with strong territorial reach during the Akayev administration. The President was initially the head of an anti-communist coalition, the Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan, yet following his election the coalition faltered and split apart (Babak, Vaisman, and Wasserman 2000, 183). Afterwards, there were a number of competing pro-presidential and pro-government parties (for an overview see ICG 2001a, 29), none of which had a significant national infrastructure (ibid., 19). Instead, all parties (including opposition parties) remained regionally focused: strong in the cities of their leaders and weak elsewhere.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Commercio 2004, 2009, 2011; Anderson 1999).
International support (*intsup*)	1,00	The Russian government has given limited financial support to some of the above-mentioned Russian NGOs in Kyrgyzstan (Commerico 2009), despite the fact that in general Russians have refrained from meddling in the domestic ethnic politics of the Central Asian republics (Commercio 2011, 19).

Hindus 1972-1981 (Bangladesh)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Hindus were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which show that Hindus in Bangladesh have long suffered socioeconomic marginalization (Riaz 2004). Most notably, Hindus were targeted by the 1974 Vested and Non-Resident Property (Administration) Ordinance that was used by the state to take over Hindu-owned land (ibid., 65-67). Moreover, they were also discriminated against in educational terms as state revenue was used to fund Islamic education, especially by the military government after 1975 (Khan 1985).
Cultural marginalization	0,00	As Hindus and Muslims in Bangladesh share the same culture and language, religion is the major factor differentiating the two groups. After independence,

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(*culmarg*)		the founder of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, enshrined secularism in the country's first constitution and publicly recognized the disproportionate suffering of the Hindu population during the liberation war. After the 1975 military coup, however, President Ziaur Rahman abandoned the move towards secularism (as Bangladesh turned toward the Middle East for political, economic, and cultural reasons) and instead began to openly promote Islam in national life, in particular in the educational sphere (Khan 1985; Karim 2004).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	In the context of the above-mentioned 1974 Vested and Non-Resident Property (Administration) Ordinance, thousands of Hindus had their lands forcibly taken away by the state's security forces (Riaz 2004, 65-67).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The security forces had relatively strong territorial control, including in those areas where Hindus are concentrated. The Bangladeshi military has long had bases throughout the entire country, with at least some reach into the more rural areas (Wignaraja and Sirivardana 2004, 158). In addition, the state has since 1972 relied on auxiliary paramilitary forces in on rural and border areas, including the voluntary Ansar and Village Defense Party.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	After independence, the ruling Awami League built and maintained an extensive party apparatus at the grassroots (Khan 1981, 559). However, this strong territorial reach of the ruling party came to an abrupt end with the advent of military rule in 1975.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Khan 1985; Karim 2004; Riaz 2004).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Khan 1985; Karim 2004; Riaz 2004).

Hindus 1982-2005 (Bangladesh)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data are not available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that Hindus were disadvantaged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which show that Hindus in Bangladesh have long suffered socioeconomic marginalization (Riaz 2004). Most notably, Hindus were targeted by the 1974 Vested and Non-Resident Property (Administration) Ordinance that was used by the state to take over Hindu-owned land (ibid., 65-67). Moreover, they were also discriminated against in educational terms as state revenue was used to fund Islamic education by subsequent governments (Khan 1985; Karim 2004; Riaz 2004).

Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	As Hindus and Muslims in Bangladesh share the same culture and language, religion is the major factor differentiating the two groups. After independence, the founder of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, enshrined secularism in the country's first constitution and publicly recognized the disproportionate suffering of the Hindu population during the liberation war. After the 1975 military coup, however, President Ziaur Rahman abandoned the move towards secularism and instead began to openly promote Islam in national life, in particular in the educational sphere (Khan 1985; Karim 2004). In 1988, Islam was even formally declared as the state religion by President Hussein Mohammed Ershad (under the Eighth Constitutional Amendment). Though this change sparked a lot of protest, it was not revoked after the return to multi-party politics during the early 1990s.
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Hindus were subjected to large-scale indiscriminate violence by Islamic fundamentalists (Riaz 2004, 71-72). Hindus were first attacked in mass in 1992 when more than 200 temples were destroyed by the mob and many Hindus were raped and killed. In 2001, there were again widespread reports of violence against Hindus before and during the elections. Thousands of Bangladeshi Hindus fled to neighbouring India to escape the violence unleashed by activists sympathetic to the new government. While Hindus were never directly targeted by the state's security forces, the latter largely ignored the violence and did little to prosecute its perpetrators (Uddin 2006).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	The security forces had relatively strong territorial control, including in those areas where Hindus are concentrated. The Bangladeshi military has long had bases throughout the entire country, with at least some reach into the more rural areas (Wignaraja and Sirivardana 2004, 158). In addition, the state has since 1972 relied on auxiliary paramilitary forces in on rural and border areas, including the voluntary Ansar and Village Defense Party.
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	The scant available evidence suggests that the subsequent ruling political parties during this period were largely urban-based organizations with very little reach into rural areas (Karim 2004; Riaz 2004; Uddin 2006). This was apparently especially true for the the BNP and the Jatiya Party, whereas the Awami League had long had a more substantial organizational presence at the grassroots.
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Karim 2004; Riaz 2004; Uddin 2006).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Karim 2004; Riaz 2004; Uddin 2006).

Indian Tamils 1964-1983 (Sri Lanka)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013). Note that Indian Tamils did not take part in the below-discussed separatist insurgency by Sri Lankan Tamils

		(Winslow and Woost 2004, 5).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We thus use data from the 1987 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that Indian Tamils were strongly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership (Soecmarg$_{assets}$ = 2,53) and educational attainment (Soecmarg$_{education}$ = 2,71). In line with these data, other sources confirm that Indian 'Plantation Tamils' (Indian Tamils were largely estate labourers) have historically been among Sri Lankan's poorest groups as subsequent governments refused to intervene in plantation labor practices that maintained low wages and poor working conditions for the primarily Indian labor force (Peebles 2001, 19-21).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	Both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils faced very serious cultural marginalization in post-independence Sri Lanka. The identification of the state with Sinhalese interests became apparent in the constitution of 1972, which stipulated the primacy of Sinhala and Buddhism – the language and religion of the Sinhalese majority (Tamils speak Tamil and are mostly Hindus) (Wilson 1988, 128-129; ICG 2006b, 3). At the same time, anti-Tamil discrimination was extended to the educational sphere where newly introduced legislation restricted the number of Tamils in higher education (Ghosh 1999, 31-36; Jenne 2003, 227).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	A few Indian Tamils were also targeted during riots of the 1970s and early 1980s, yet this violence remained more selective and small-scale than in the case of the Sri Lankan Tamils (Palanithurai and Mohanasundaram 1993, 82; Ghosh 1999, 6). Violence against all Tamils was tolerated by the security forces (Richardson 2005, 363-364).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	Rural areas were relatively unpoliced throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It was only after the beginning of the first violent attacks by Tamil militants in the late 1970s that the Sri Lankan government began to 'militarize' the Tamil-dominated areas in the North by deploying the policy and the army (Bush 2003, 121; Richardson 2005, 365)
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	The *Sri Lanka Freedom Party* (SLFP) developed a significant rural apparatus from the 1950s, yet this party apparatus was mainly concentrated in the Sinhalese-dominated parts of the country (Richardson 2005, 146). The rival *United National Party* (UNP), which came to power in 1977, was at the time primarily urban (Samaranāyaka 2008, 114). Only leftist parties established a significant organizational presence in plantation areas populated by Indian Tamils (Kanapathipillai 2009, 40).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (De Silva 1986; Peebles 2001; Kanapathipillai 2009).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	The *Ceylon Workers' Congress* (CWC) apparently had the political and moral support of the Indian government, and the state government of present-day Tamilnadu (De Silva 1986, 222).

Sri Lankan Tamils 1964-1983 (Sri Lanka)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	1,00	Sri Lanka has been torn by ethnic civil war between its governmental forces and militant Tamil forces fighting for a separate state since 1983. The conflict has pitted the Sinhalese majority against the minority Tamils (UCDP 2013), with the *Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam* (LTTE) as the main rebel group. The latter initiated a violent insurgency through sporadic military attacks and political assassinations during the late 1970s. Regular fighting did, however, not erupt until late 1983. In 2009, the conflict was ended through a decisive victory of the government over the LTTE. Between 80.000 and 100.000 were killed during the conflict (at least half of the victims were civilians).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We thus use data from the 1987 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that Sri Lankan Tamils were strongly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 1,11$) and educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 1,17$). Other sources highlight that Sinhalese were systematically advantaged in terms of development funds and licenses for private sector activities (Ghosh 1999, 28-30, 34). Moreover, the below-mentioned anti-Tamil discrimination in the education sector caused high unemployment among Tamil university graduates and thus became major driving forces behind the development of Tamil militancy in the 1970s (Manogaran 1987, 58-59).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	1,00	Both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils faced very serious cultural marginalization in post-independence Sri Lanka. The identification of the state with Sinhalese interests became apparent in the constitution of 1972, which stipulated the primacy of Sinhala and Buddhism – the language and religion of the Sinhalese majority (Tamils speak Tamil and are mostly Hindus) (Wilson 1988, 128-129; ICG 2006b, 3). At the same time, anti-Tamil discrimination was extended to the educational sphere where newly introduced legislation restricted the number of Tamils in higher education (Ghosh 1999, 31-36; Jenne 2003, 227).
Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	1,00	Sri Lankan Tamils suffered massive indiscriminate state violence. Throughout the 1970s, young Tamil militants were beaten, arrested and mistreated in custody (Manogaran 1987, 62). In July 1979, the Prevention of Terrorism Act allowed the state expanded powers, which it used against Tamils in particular (Bush 2003, 119-120). More importantly, Sri Lankan Tamils were repeatedly the victims of bloody mob attacks, particularly in 1977, 1981, and 1983, which the security forces were unable or unwilling to stop. The worst incident occurred in July 1983 when – following the killing of thirteen policemen in Jaffna – Sinhalese mobs burned Tamil homes in Colombo and murdered as many as 1,000 Tamils, while the security forces stood by (ICG 2006b, 3). The more or less tacit complicity of the Sri Lankan army during the events boosted recruitment to the Tamil militant groups.
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	Rural areas were relatively unpoliced throughout the 1960s and 1970s. It was only after the beginning of the first violent attacks by Tamil militants in the late 1970s that the Sri Lankan government began to 'militarize' the Tamil-dominated areas in the North by deploying the policy and the army in large numbers (Bush 2003, 121; Richardson 2005, 365)

Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	The *Sri Lanka Freedom Party* (SLFP) developed a significant rural apparatus from the 1950s, yet this party apparatus was mainly concentrated in the Sinhalese-dominated parts of the country (Richardson 2005, 146). The rival *United National Party* (UNP), which came to power in 1977, was at the time primarily urban (Samaranāyaka 2008, 114).
External sanctuary *(exsanc)*	1,00	Militant Tamil groups, including the LTTE, obtained refuge in India, and more specifically in Tamil Nadu (just twenty-nine miles from Sri Lanka's coastline). In the 1970s and 1980s, Tamil Nadu provided financial assistance to the LTTE, as well as arms, safe homes, and training camps for insurgents (Jenne 2003, 228; ICG 2006b, 3). These activities apparently received the tacit approval of the Indian government. Indeed, the Indian intelligence service even trained the Tigers in their infancy, ensuring their safe haven and transit.
International support *(intsup)*	1,00	From the 1970s, diaspora communities became the primary source of financial support for militant Tamil organizations in Sri Lanka (Manogaran 1987, 65).

Indian Tamils 1984 (Sri Lanka)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war *(ethnicwar)*	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013). Note that Indian Tamils did not take part in the below-discussed separatist insurgency by Sri Lankan Tamils (Winslow and Woost 2004, 5).
Socioeconomic marginalization *(soecmarg)*	1,00	Relevant DHS data for the 1960s and 1970s are not available. We thus use data from the 1987 DHS (available at http://www.measuredhs.com/), which suggest that Indian Tamils were strongly disadvantaged in terms of asset ownership ($Soecmarg_{assets} = 2,53$) and educational attainment ($Soecmarg_{education} = 2,71$). In line with these data, other sources confirm that Indian 'Plantation Tamils' (Indian Tamils were largely estate labourers) have historically been among Sri Lankan's poorest groups as subsequent governments refused to intervene in plantation labor practices that maintained low wages and poor working conditions for the primarily Indian labor force (Peebles 2001, 19-21).
Cultural marginalization *(culmarg)*	1,00	Both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils faced very serious cultural marginalization in post-independence Sri Lanka. The identification of the state with Sinhalese interests became apparent in the constitution of 1972, which stipulated the primacy of Sinhala and Buddhism – the language and religion of the Sinhalese majority (Tamils speak Tamil and are mostly Hindus) (Wilson 1988, 128-129; ICG 2006b, 3). At the same time, anti-Tamil discrimination was extended to the educational sphere where newly introduced legislation restricted the number of Tamils in higher education (Ghosh 1999, 31-36; Jenne 2003, 227).
Indiscriminate Repression *(indisrep)*	0,00	No evidence for state repression (De Silva 1986; Peebles 2001; Kanapathipillai 2009).

Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	0,00	Rural areas were relatively unpoliced throughout the 1960s and 1970s, allowing for the establishment of guerilla bases from the early 1970s. It was only after the beginning of the first violent attacks by Tamil militants in the late 1970s that the Sri Lankan government began to 'militarize' the Tamil-dominated areas in the North by deploying the policy and the army in large numbers (Bush 2003, 121; Richardson 2005, 365)
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	The *Sri Lanka Freedom Party* (SLFP) developed a significant rural apparatus from the 1950s, yet this party apparatus was mainly concentrated in the Sinhalese-dominated parts of the country (Richardson 2005, 146). The rival *United National Party* (UNP), which came to power in 1977, was at the time primarily urban (Samaranāyaka 2008, 114). Only leftist parties established a significant organizational presence in plantation areas populated by Indian Tamils (Kanapathipillai 2009, 40).
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (De Silva 1986; Peebles 2001; Kanapathipillai 2009).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	The *Ceylon Workers' Congress* (CWC) apparently had the political and moral support of the Indian government, and the state government of present-day Tamilnadu (De Silva 1986, 222).

Chinese 1953-1965 (Thailand)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	No DHS data is available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that the Chinese were privileged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that the Chinese have long been are economically advantaged in relation to the majority Thais, owning up to 90% of private businesses in Thailand (Unger 1998; Phongpaichit and Baker 2004).
Cultural marginalization (*culmarg*)	0,00	Due to compulsory education laws and restrictions against private education in Chinese, most Chinese Thai are bilingual and relatively well assimilated into Thai society. This particularly true in Bangkok where most Chinese live and where Thai-language education is compulsory (Chansiri 2008, 137). Generally, however, it has been the policy of the Thai state to encourage assimilation but to not suppress Chinese culture (Bun and Kiong 1993, 150). During the 1960s, the state actively promoted Chinese-language education (Coughlin 1976, 144-168).
Indiscriminate	0,00	No evidence for anti-Chinese state repression (Bun and Kiong 1993; Chansiri

Repression (*indisrep*)		2008).
Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Chinese live primarily in urban areas, in particular in Bangkok, but there are also a number of Chinese communities in Northern Thailand. Here, the security forces had a relatively strong territorial control since the North was at the time the site of Communist insurgencies (Huang 2010).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party (*partyreach*)	0,00	Military government = no ruling political party
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Bun and Kiong 1993; Chansiri 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Bun and Kiong 1993; Chansiri 2008).

Chinese 1966-1971 (Thailand)		
Conditions/ Outcome	**Coding**	**Rationale**
Ethnic civil war (*ethnicwar*)	0,00	No ethnic armed conflict/ civil war (UCDP 2013).
Socioeconomic marginalization (*soecmarg*)	0,00	No DHS data available. The Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch (2011) data suggest that the Chinese were privileged in terms of per capita income by the early 1990s. This is in line with other sources, which indicate that the Chinese have long been are economically advantaged in relation to the majority Thais, owning up to 90% of private businesses in Thailand (Unger 1998; Phongpaichit and Baker 2004).
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Indiscriminate Repression (*indisrep*)	0,00	No evidence for anti-Chinese state repression (Bun and Kiong 1993; Chansiri 2008).

Territorial reach of the security apparatus (*secureach*)	1,00	Chinese live primarily in urban areas, in particular in Bangkok, but there are also a number of Chinese communities in Northern Thailand. Here, the security forces had a relatively strong territorial control since the North was at the time the site of Communist insurgencies (Huang 2010).
Territorial reach of the ruling political party *(partyreach)*	0,00	Military government = no ruling political party
External sanctuary (*exsanc*)	0,00	No evidence for external sanctuary (Bun and Kiong 1993; Chansiri 2008).
International support (*intsup*)	0,00	No evidence for international support (Bun and Kiong 1993; Chansiri 2008).

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