Geo-political rivalry and anti-immigrant sentiment.

A conjoint experiment in 22 countries[1]

Andreas Wimmer, Bart Bonikowski, Charles Crabtree, Zheng Fu, Matt Golder, and Kiyoteru Tsutsui*

* AW is the Lieber Professor of Sociology and Political Philosophy and ZF is a sociology graduate student at Columbia University; BB is Associate Professor of Sociology at NYU; CC is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Dartmouth; MG is Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University; KT is the Henri H. and Tomoye Takahashi Professor and Professor of Sociology at Stanford University. AW and BB are fellows of the group *Membership, Boundaries, and Belonging* of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.

Direct correspondence to andreas.wimmer@columbia.edu.

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[1] The experimental design, hypotheses, and primary analytical strategies were pre-registered at https://osf.io/kh2ft (see Appendix F). The data and code are available at the APSR Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZZYSIZ.

Abstract:

Introducing an international relations perspective into the literature on anti-immigrant attitudes, we hypothesize that immigrants from rival countries will be shunned and immigrants from allied countries preferred, especially by respondents who identify more strongly with the nation. We fielded a forced-choice conjoint experiment in 22 countries, whereby respondents chose between applicants for permanent resident status with randomized attributes. We identified rival and allied countries of origin for each surveyed country, with one such pair sharing a similar racial and cultural make-up as the majority of respondents, and one pair being more dissimilar. We find that discrimination against immigrants from rival states is so pronounced that it results in net preference for racially and culturally dissimilar immigrants. Since we fielded the surveys amidst the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we are able to leverage exogenous changes in the intensity of one rivalry, providing further evidence for the proposed mechanism.

In many countries around the world, right-wing populists have turned against immigrants and their descendants, describing them as burdens on public welfare, illegal intruders, unfair competitors for jobs, abusers of the asylum system, or threats to national security. Who is targeted by anti-immigrant rhetoric and who is singled out as an especially problematic group varies over time and by country. Mexican and Muslim immigrants, for instance, are favorite targets of U.S. xenophobes today, while the vilification of Japanese as well as Japanese Americans that occurred during World War II has subsided. A large literature in the social sciences has sought to explain which immigrants are the most vilified and why.

Two kinds of arguments dominate this literature, which we review in more detail below. Some studies suggest that the skills of individual applicants matter most, as citizens prefer highly educated and younger applicants who work in highly skilled jobs (such as engineers and doctors) because such immigrants may benefit the national economy the most (e.g., Hainmueller and

Hiscox 2010). Other researchers argue that animosity towards racial others or towards Muslim immigrants (in Christian-majority countries) determine whom natives reject (e.g., Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2016, Yemane 2020; Polavieja *et al.* 2023).

In recent years, several studies have introduced a third perspective, focused on the political relations between countries of origin and the host country, rather than the characteristics of immigrants themselves. They show that refugees are more likely to be welcomed by governments with a hostile relationship to the country of origin (e.g. Moorthy and Brathwaite 2019)—such as the Communist dissidents and refugees from Eastern Europe who found open doors in the West during the Cold War. This research focuses on government policy towards refugees, rather than citizen preferences for immigrants. But we can build on its international-relations perspective to argue that when it comes to immigrants (as opposed to refugees who flee their own governments), the relationship is turned on its head: Immigrants from allied states should be preferred over immigrants from hostile states, because immigrants are generally perceived not as persecuted opponents *to*, but as everyday ambassadors *of* their governments (in line with He and Xie 2022).

Increasingly, the literature on preferences for immigrants uses experimental methods to identify various characteristics of immigrants that may appear, in the eyes of natives, as potentially problematic and lead to their rejection. One strand of this research relies on field experiments, for instance through labor market correspondence tests (also known as audit studies; cf. Koopmans *et al.* 2019). A second strand uses forced-choice conjoint or vignette experiments. In the conjoint design, respondents typically have to choose between two applicants for permanent

resident permits, citizenship, or refugee status (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Triguero Roura 2021).

We follow the conjoint approach to test our international-relations focused theory. Respondents were forced to decide between two applicants for permanent residence status, distinguished by their country of origin as well as their education, profession, and a range of other attributes commonly used in the experimental literature to test if labor market concerns dominate preferences for immigrants. To disentangle preferences related to international relations from those related to perceived racial and cultural similarity, which should matter as well according to the second approach in the literature, we randomly assign four countries of origin to the immigrant profiles: two countries of origin with a similar racial and cultural make-up as the majority of the survey respondents, one of which is a rival country and the other an ally (or at least a non-rival); and two countries with a racial and cultural make-up that respondents are likely to perceive as different from their own country's majority race and culture, one of which is again a rival country and the other one an ally (or non-rival).

This experiment was fielded with nationally representative samples in 22 democracies, mostly in Europe and the Americas, but also in Asia as well as South Africa. The results strongly support the geo-political rivalry argument: In each of the survey countries, immigrants from non-rival countries are strongly preferred over those from rival countries. The effect is so large that it results in a net preference for immigrants from countries with a dissimilar racial and cultural makeup than the majority of the host country. We also delve into mechanisms and show that the greater the respondents' sense of their own country's superiority (i.e., the more "chauvinist"

respondents are), the stronger the international relations of their governments are mirrored in their preferences for immigrants. Similarly, members of ethno-racial majorities are more prone to the rivalry effect, presumably because they are more strongly identified with their nation compared to minority members.

Our survey happened to be fielded during the leadup to and initial days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022—two countries we had featured as a rival/ally pair in 14 of the 22 survey countries. We are thus able to employ an "unexpected event during survey design" (UESD) approach (Muñoz *et al.* 2020) and examine how the ratcheting up of a geo-political rivalry, which was exogenous to our experiment, affected respondents' attitudes towards prospective immigrants from the two countries. The analysis shows that the escalation of the rivalry to the level of a hot war strongly increased anti-rival and pro-ally bias. This encourages us to interpret the rivalry effect as causal, at least in this crucial test case, since we do not have to worry about confounders that don't vary quickly over time—such as regime type or the relative appeal of a country's pop culture. For the other cases, we interpret the results with caution since countries of origin represent a bundle of characteristics from which it is difficult to precisely isolate the foreign policy component. We deal with some of the most plausible confounders in supplementary analyses.

How important is this foreign policy component for our understanding of anti-/pro-immigrant sentiments? After all, many immigrants come from countries that are either of negligible foreign policy significance for the host country or are seen as neither allies nor rivals. We can offer a

rough estimate of the relative relevance of our findings based on the OECD database[2] on immigrant stocks by country of birth or citizenship. By cross-referencing this information with a recently updated dyadic dataset on geopolitical rivalries and alliances (through 2020, see Diehl *et al.* 2021), we conclude that about one third of migrants in highly developed OECD countries come from either allied or rival states. The mechanisms we document in this paper thus play an important part, we think, in the overall dynamic leading to selective rejection or acceptance of immigrants.

Literature, theory, and hypotheses

Social scientists have long sought to understand anti-immigrant sentiment, as manifested in popular opinion as well as in political movements and party platforms. One strand of this research attempts to explain varying levels of hostility towards immigrants across countries, identifying as possible factors labor market conditions, the influence of right-wing populist parties, levels and composition of immigrant stocks and flows, global integration, the history of nation-state formation, and so on.

A second body of research is more directly relevant to the study presented here. It is not concerned with overall levels of anti-immigrant hostility but with its targets: Which immigrant groups are the least wanted, most discriminated against, or perceived as the gravest threat to native interests? Indeed, many studies show that individuals do not evaluate all immigrants

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[2] https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/keystat.htm

equally but make distinctions based on the latter's places of origin[3] and individual

characteristics. Broadly speaking, the experimental literature, on which we mainly focus here,

offers three explanations for such preferences.

Racism, cultural distance, and economic competition

First, many authors argue that preference for and avoidance of specific immigrant groups is

driven by racial resentment. The overwhelming majority of studies look at discrimination against

non-white immigrants in white majority countries.[4] Most recently, a series of arguments have

emerged suggesting that blaming China for the COVID-19 outbreak resulted in a resurgence of

"anti-Asian hate" and the rejection of Asian immigrants as "forever foreigners" (Li and

Nicholson Jr 2021; but see Daniels *et al.* 2021).

Second and relatedly, other authors have focused on perceived cultural distance as a factor

explaining preferences for or rejection of certain immigrant groups, most importantly Muslims in

non-Muslim-majority countries. Most experimental studies that treat granting permanent

residence permits or citizenship as the outcome report a strong and consistent anti-Muslim bias.[5]

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[3] See among others Koopmans *et al.* 2019; Fibbi *et al.* 2022; Donnaloja 2021; Wright and co-authors 2016;
Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Clayton *et al.* 2021; Findor 2022; Weiss 2021; Ford and Mellon 2020; Bansak
and co-authors 2016; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015.

[4] Quillian and co-authors 2019; Newman and Malhotra 2019; see also Malhotra and Newman 2017; Brader and co-
authors 2008; on the basis of survey data: Berg 2013, Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2016; Polavieja *et al.* 2023;
Yemane 2020.

[5] Donnaloja (2021); Findor (2022); Weiss (2021); Wright and co-authors (2016: 2247); Denney and co-authors
(2021); Bansak and co-authors (2016); Adida and co-authors (2019); Adida and coauthors (2010); Hou et al. (2020).
Hellwig and Sino (2017) find that the anti-Muslim sentiment is related to security fears (and not concerns about
crime, for example). Helbling and co-authors (Helbling and Traunmüller 2020; Helbling *et al.* 2022) report that anti-
Muslim bias applies to religiously radical immigrants only; moderate Muslim immigrants are preferred over radical

In a German labor market correspondence test, Koopmans and co-authors (2019) find that "objective" cultural distance (as measured through survey questions in origin countries) explains call-back rates across origin groups.

Third, most of the literature emphasizes the skills of individual immigrants as the crucial factor shaping natives' preferences. All studies using a conjoint experiment format (that we know of) arrive at the conclusion that highly skilled and educated immigrants, as well as those seeking work, are preferred over low-skilled immigrants and those not seeking (or not able to) work. Regarding possible mechanisms, the vast majority of studies find no evidence for labor market competition arguments (except in very specific niches, see Malhotra and co-authors 2013) and support the idea that highly skilled immigrants are preferred because they are seen as benefitting the overall economy. [6]

Theory and hypotheses: International rivalry and political competition

The literature has not considered a fourth possible factor that may also shape preferences for specific groups of immigrants: the global configuration of political alliances and hostilities between countries. In particular, immigrants from rival countries with whom the host country has a history of contentious and conflictual encounters are likely to be the least welcome while immigrants from allied countries may be the most welcome. Preferences for immigrant groups could thus represent a popular reflection of geopolitical relations of opposition and alliance (in line with the case study by He and Xie 2022).

Christian immigrants. No anti-Muslim bias or inconsistent results are found in Fraser and Cheng 2022; Ford and Mellon 2020.

[6] See most recently Valentino *et al.* 2019; Ford and Mellon 2020.

This argument rests on a particular tradition in the study of public opinion formation in the foreign policy domain, according to which the public largely follows elite cues (see for example Berinsky 2007). A recent article shows empirically for the United States that elites' and citizens' foreign policy preferences closely align during most periods (Kertzer 2022). Based on these results, it is thus reasonable to assume that individuals know and care about the foreign policy relationships with allied and rival countries alike. Indeed, our supplemental validation survey (discussed below and in Appendix D[7]) confirmed that respondents' perception of foreign policy alignments consistently mirror those of their governments.

At the micro-level, the mechanisms translating geopolitical competition and rivalry into anti-immigrant sentiment likely include national identification and/or statistical discrimination. National identification leads respondents to see themselves as well as immigrants from specific countries as embodying their respective national communities (a form of "banal nationalism", Billig 1995). An immigrant from Japan, for example, thus comes to represent the Japanese nation—and, importantly for our international relations argument, the Japanese state. Respondents, in turn, identify with their own country and its government, assuming an international relations perspective when evaluating immigrants hailing from different countries.

Given that most people know very little about the composition of specific immigrant streams, they make rational assumptions about the average foreign policy dispositions of immigrants, in line with the statistical discrimination approach to stereotyping (Phelps 1972). On average,

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[7] For all appendices, see online Supplementary Materials.

natives thus assume that the average Japanese migrant holds similar foreign policy stances as those of the Japanese government. This reinforces preference for immigrants from allied countries over immigrants from rival countries, all else being equal, given that the dispositions of immigrants from allied countries resemble those of respondents on average and given the fear of fifth columns that often accompanies nationalist thinking (Mylonas and Radnitz 2022).

Our argument is agnostic to the relative weight of the national identification and the statistical discrimination mechanisms as they lead to observationally equivalent outcomes. Through either or both of these two mechanisms, dislike of a foreign country's political and economic stances can spill over into dislike of the citizens of that country.[8] Anti-Israel positions can tip into antisemitism. Anti-China sentiment can slip into Sinophobia, and so on. Note that our argument also does not take the role of national media into account, which are known to amplify local concerns about immigration (Hopkins 2010). Given that news coverage about rival countries (and their citizens) is both more negative and more extensive (Hufnagel et al. 2022), the media are likely to amplify perceptions of rivalry and thus the rivalry effects posited by our theory.

Our perspective further implies that individuals distinguish between political refugees and immigrants when making evaluative judgments, as suggested by a long line of research.[9] From an international relations perspective, the distinction may be crucial because refugees are often

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[8] For quasi-experimental evidence of how the ratcheting up of a rivalry increases dislike of the rival country among citizens in Japan, see Igarashi 2018.

[9] De Coninck 2020; Abdelaaty and Steele 2022; for experimental evidence, see Wyszynski *et al.* 2020; Steele *et al.* 2023; Bilgen *et al.* 2023; Fraser and Murakami 2022; Hedegaard and Larsen 2022; Czymara and Schmidt-catran 2016; Hager and Veit 2019; Hedegaard 2022; but see Graf *et al.* 2023; Findor *et al.* 2021.

opposed to the policies of their governments (otherwise the latter would not persecute the former), leading to their acceptance if they hail from a rival country, as the warm welcome of dissidents and refugees from Communist countries during the Cold War illustrates. Immigrants who leave their countries for non-political reasons, however, are more likely to hold similar foreign policy views as their government, as discussed above, leading to their rejection if hailing from a rival country and their acceptance if they come from an allied country. Note here that this argument conceives of refugees in a narrow, legal way as citizens who are persecuted by their own government. Ukrainians should thus not be evaluated as refugees in the strict sense of the term, but as migrants, because their move across the border was prompted not by repression at the hand of their own government but by a foreign military invasion.

In this study, we focus exclusively on migrants, rather than refugees. We note here, however, that our intuition is supported by recent research on the reception of refugees by host governments: Governments are more willing to accept refugees from rival countries than from allied countries (Moorthy and Brathwaite 2019; Chu 2020; Jackson and Atkinson 2019), because refugees fleeing adversarial states can be regarded as allies, especially if a host country supports rebel groups operating on the rival's territory (Turkoglu 2022) or if the rival country adheres to a hostile political ideology (Jackson and Atkinson 2019). We are not aware of any research that explores this conjecture with regard to the attitudes of citizens, the focus of our analysis, rather than government policy.

We derive three observable implications from our arguments about how regular citizens evaluate immigrants from different countries of origin. First and most generally, individuals should show a clear preference for immigrants from allied countries and an aversion towards immigrants from

rival countries with a history of competition or conflict with the respondent's country (H1). Immigrants from neutral countries should be neither preferred nor discriminated against. Second, if the national identification mechanism operates as argued above, we expect that members of ethnic majorities will be more sensitive to international rivalries when expressing preferences for immigrants from specific countries (H2). This is because according to both social dominance theory (Pratto *et al.* 2006) and the in-group projection model (Mummendey *et al.* 1999) in social psychology, national majorities tend to identify more strongly with their country than minorities.[10]

Third, individuals who believe that their country is superior to other nations (an attitude commonly referred to as "chauvinism") may be particularly attuned to geopolitical competition and the threat it can pose to their nation's status. They are therefore likely to be more strongly opposed to immigrants from rival countries and more warmly disposed towards immigrants from allied countries than respondents with less pronounced chauvinist attitudes (H3). Note that H2 and H3 represent moderation arguments, which we test using interaction terms in statistical models introduced later.

The logic of the overall theoretical argument is illustrated by some prominent examples from the history of the United States, including Germanophobia during World War I, anti-Japanese propaganda and persecution during World War II, or Islamophobia in the wake of the 9/11 attacks launched from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. We discuss these and other cases briefly in Appendix B.

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[10] For empirical support, see Staerklé *et al.* 2010; Elkins and Sides 2007: 697f.; Hadler et al. (2021).

The survey experiment

We administered a survey experiment to large online samples from 22 democracies. Because the experiment was embedded in a larger collaborative survey project, the countries were not primarily chosen based on their foreign policy relationships. Rather, we primarily focused on Western democracies and supplemented these cases with other stable democracies from around the world. This meant that we sometimes had to ask respondents about countries of immigrant origin that were less clearly identifiable as either rivals or allies than we would have wished for, a complication we discuss below in more detail. The final list of survey countries included Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, UK, the US, Argentina, Brazil, and Peru in the Western Hemisphere, and Turkey, India, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, and South Africa outside of it.

Experimental design

The surveys were fielded between late February and early March 2022 via Lucid Marketplace, a popular online survey platform. Appendix C describes how we complied with APSA's Principles for Human Subjects Research during and after fielding. To help maximize the external validity of our inferences, we used a quota-based sampling procedure, with quotas for age, gender, and education. The surveys were conducted in the national language and script. In Canada, the Philippines, and South Africa, we added a second national language and survey (in French, Tagalog, and Zulu, respectively). In total, 46,549 respondents completed the survey and passed a

two-part attention check (Aronow *et al.* 2020). The survey included sociodemographic and attitudinal questions and several randomly-ordered conjoint and vignette experiments, including the one examined in this paper.

To test our theoretical claims, we conducted an immigrant officer conjoint experiment adapted from Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015), which has been replicated in many different variations. We asked respondents to choose between a pair of applicants for permanent residence status with randomly assigned characteristics. The latter included variables that are relevant for economic competition as well as sociotropic concerns: age, education, language competence, and profession, as well as length of residency. Each respondent was asked to make six successive choices between paired immigrants. Appendix G illustrates the experimental set-up with a screenshot from one of the surveys.

To disentangle the role of geopolitical rivalries from the perceived racial and cultural proximity to respondents, a core mechanism of an important strand of the literature discussed above, we selected four countries of origin for each survey country that varied across both race/culture and rivalry. The four countries included 1) a country of origin whose majority population is likely to be perceived as racially and culturally similar by the majority of respondents and which has a non-rival relationship with the respondents' country; 2) a country with a similar perceived racial and cultural makeup but a rival relationship with the respondents' country; 3) a country with a population perceived as dissimilar in racial and cultural terms and a non-rival relationship; and 4) a country with a dissimilar racial and cultural makeup and a rival relationship. We validated our

assumptions about perceived rivalries and alliances as well as perceptions of cultural and racial

difference with a separately fielded representative survey in these 22 countries, conducted after

the main, experimental survey had already been concluded (Appendix D describes this validation

survey). The results of this validation exercise are discussed below.

Note that we do not measure racial distinctiveness directly, as for example by varying the skin

color in images of the faces of immigrant applicants (as done by Harell *et al.* 2012; Helbling and

Kriesi 2014; Hopkins 2015; Valentino *et al.* 2019), nor does our experiment include attributes

related to the cultural practices and beliefs of individual immigrants (such as their religion). This

is because there is little plausible skin tone or religious variation among many of the country-of-

origin populations (e.g. among Japanese people), making such a research design impractical.

Instead, we choose pairs of rival and non-rival countries in close geographic proximity to each

other, such that, from the standpoint of the respondents, they plausibly resemble each other in

terms of average phenotypical features and perceived culture, language, and religion. One of

these pairs was situated continents away from respondents and was not tied through past

migration and ancestry with majority respondents, while the other pair was in close geographic

proximity or linked through ancestral ties to majority respondents, making it very likely that the

latter pair would be perceived as culturally and racially more similar. In the additional validation

survey, outlined in Appendix D, we checked our initial assumptions against how a nationally

representative sample of respondents saw rivalry and alliance relations as well as the degree of

racial and cultural similarity or difference between their countries and the hypothetical

immigrant-sending countries featured in our experiment. With very few exceptions, which we note below, our initial assumptions were validated.

We acknowledge that this design cannot isolate rivalry and cultural/racial distance in an unequivocal way as there are other characteristics of countries of immigrant origin that respondents may be reacting to as well. After all, countries of origin represent bundles of attributes. We are not aware of a research design that would have allowed us to do so. Shifting to individual-level variation (by providing information about the foreign policy stances of individual immigration candidates), for example, would have created ecological or external validity problems, since outside of the experimental context such individual preferences are unobservable for average citizens. We discuss some of the main possible confounders (such as regime type or the humanitarian circumstances under which migrants leave their country of origin) further below.

Forced-choice experiments like our conjoint offer several advantages over both standard survey instruments and vignette experiments (cf. Denney and Green 2021). Respondents are asked in concrete terms whether they would grant permanent residency to specific individuals, rather than more abstract questions about the desirability of immigrants from particular countries. The latter approach cannot disentangle compositional characteristics of a given migration stream in terms of profession, age, or language competence from respondents' preferences for that country of origin. The conjoint experiment allows us to do precisely that, resulting in less measurement

error[11] and better mapping onto real-world behavior than observational survey questions or vignette experiments (Hainmueller *et al.* 2015). Second, a conjoint experiment is helpful at minimizing social desirability bias since respondents' preferences for certain countries of origin are inferred from several of their choices (Horiuchi *et al.* 2022). The prompts are framed as decisions about individuals, rather than countries of origin, allowing respondents to plausibly deny that their choices are influenced by country stereotypes. This is especially important for questions that could be understood as relating to ethnic or racial prejudice (An 2015).

Countries of origin: Rivals and non-rivals, same race/culture and different race/culture
In choosing immigrants' countries of origin, we relied on a broad understanding of rivalry. Following Thompson (2001), rivalries represent dyads of states that "regard each other as a) competitors, b) the source of actual or latent threats that pose some possibility of becoming militarized, and c) [potential or actual] enemies" (ibid.:560). This understanding relies on perceptions, rather than government actions, and thus doesn't depend on the frequency of Militarized Interstate Disputes, in contrast to many other definitions. Alliances are defined by opposite features and are characterized by a shared focus on co-operation and mutual interests, as well as by trust in the peaceful and friendly nature of the relationship.

Before we describe the rivals and allies used in our experiment, it is important to note that in

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[11] Clayton and co-authors (2023) show that conjoint experiments come at the cost of less consistency across repeated experiments compared to survey questions repeated across waves, resulting in increased measurement error. However, it is unclear if this reflects measurement error or results from respondents' actual uncertainty about their preferences. In any case, our experimental results are largely consistent across 22 country samples for the survey experiment as well as across the 22 additional validation surveys, making it unlikely that they are systematically biased by measurement error.

some cases, we had to make sub-optimal choices due to the fact that survey countries were not primarily selected with our experiment in mind and sometimes did not have clear-cut rivalries and alliances with both culturally/racially similar and dissimilar countries of origin. In a few cases, this forced us to choose countries of origin that were in a neutral or ambiguous relationship with the survey country. We discuss the specifics of these compromise choices below.

For all survey countries except Japan, we used China and Japan as rival and non-rival countries of immigrant origin with a majority non-white population and a large perceived cultural distance (in South Korea, they represented the culturally and racially more proximate pair). The rivalry between China and the West has broken into the open recently (cf. Mearsheimer 2021), while Japan remains firmly in the camp of the anti-China coalition that has emerged over the past decade (Maizland and Cheng 2021). From the point of view of many residents outside of East Asia, the citizens of China and Japan are racially similar and equally culturally distant, as the validation survey confirmed. Political relationships with China and Japan are less clear-cut for South Africa, where the official economic and financial co-operation with China, in the framework of the increasingly formalized BRIC alliance, was heavily criticized in recent years (Lu 2021). We therefore classify this relationship as ambiguous, rather than as an instance of clear-cut rivalry. Correspondingly, our subsequent validation survey revealed that average South Africans do not see China as more hostile or friendly than Japan.

Across all our survey countries in Western Europe and Northern America, Russia has emerged as a second rival for regional and global dominance, from the autocratic turn under Putin onwards,

and most openly since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Saad 2019). Correspondingly, the Western public now sees Russia as an enemy as much as it did during the height of the Cold War. The obvious allied country with racially and culturally similar characteristics is Ukraine, which has been driven into an even closer alliance with the West since the 2014 Maidan Revolution. Our post-experiment validation survey confirmed these assumptions with a single exception: In Hungary, Russia is seen by average Hungarians as more friendly than Ukraine, a reflection of Victor Orbán's foreign policy stances.[12]

For survey countries outside of Western Europe and North America (i.e., Argentina, Peru, Greece, Turkey, India, South Africa, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan), we looked at the rivalry literature in international relations (Diehl and Goertz 2001; Thompson 2001; Klein *et al.* 2006; Dreyer and Thompson 2012) and analyzed existing rivalry datasets to identify suitable immigrant origin countries distinct from the Ukraine-Russia pair. We did not know in advance how active, persistent, strong, and publicly known the rivalries actually were in these countries in 2022, since no updated dataset were available when our surveys were fielded. Taking older rivalries into account was the most sensible solution, since a rivalry could leave a long-term legacy. We therefore include historical rivalries in some cases, even if those rivalries are listed as terminated in available datasets. The post-experiment validation survey, in which we asked respondents about their perception of how friendly or hostile they saw the countries of immigrant origin, allowed us to clarify which rivalries are still perceived as such in the average citizen's mind. This was the case for all but one (discussed below).

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[12] See https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/03/hungary-orban-russia-conservative-politics/#:~:text=When%20he%20was%20still%20in,excessive%20dependence%20on%20Russian%20energy.

We again chose one pair of rival and non-rival countries as distant and the other as proximate in racial and cultural (including religious) terms to the majority of respondents in order not to confound rivalry with perceived racial and/or cultural distance. We deviated from this principle in the Philippines, Greece, India, and Turkey, where we chose pairs of countries that differed significantly in terms of religion and that, in the case of the Philippines and India, were also racially dissimilar from the majority population. This deviation allowed us to choose a meaningful second rival (Libya for the Philippines, Turkey for Greece, Pakistan for India, and Greece for Turkey). The post-experiment validation survey revealed that in the case of Turkey, India, and the Philippines, racial or religious difference sometimes trumped, in the eyes of the survey respondents, other considerations of national similarity, making these choices of countries of immigrant origin less than ideal for our overall research design (see Supplementary Materials, Table D1 for details).

Conversely, we also had to make some compromise choices regarding allies and rivals in order to maintain strict selection rules regarding racial/cultural similarity and difference. For South Korea, we chose Australia as a second culturally and racially distant country of origin besides the allied United States, knowing that the relationship between South Korea and Australia is best described as one of mutual neglect, rather than rivalry (Robertson and Gerszberg 2021; Robertson 2021). Still, the validation survey (for details see Appendix D) showed that South Koreans see the United States government as more friendly than that of Australia—but none of them as hostile. Relationships with Japan are ambiguous as well, torn between legacies of the colonial past and the shared security interests vis-à-vis China (Park 2008), which have become

increasingly important over time[13]. Again, however, the validation survey showed that China is seen by South Koreans as more hostile than Japan.

Table 1 classifies the countries of origin based on their rival and non-rival status as well as their perceived racial/cultural similarity and dissimilarity. We mark with a single asterisk those cases (3/88) for which our validation survey did not produce clear differences in the perception of friendliness/hostility between assumed rival and assumed non-rival countries. Countries of immigrant origin with two asterisks are those for which our assumptions about perceived racial/cultural distance were not validated by the survey (also 3/88). For 82/88 cases (or 93%), our assumptions were validated. In the online Supplementary Materials, Figures A6a-A6c, we successfully replicate the main results without responses from survey countries where either of the two assumptions were not confirmed.

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[13] See https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/whats-behind-japan-and-south-koreas-latest-attempt-mend-ties.

Table 1. Survey countries and immigrant origin countries

Survey country	Rival 1	Rival 2	Non-rival 1	Non-rival 2	Similar racial/cultural make-up	Sources for rivalries
Argentina	China	UK	Japan	Ireland	UK, Ireland	Thies 2005
Australia	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
Brazil	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
Canada	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
France	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
Germany	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
Greece	China	Turkey	Japan	Jordan	Turkey, Jordan	Maoz and Mor 2002; Klein *et al.* 2006
Hungary	China	Russia*	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
India	China	Pakistan	Japan	Turkey	Pakistan, Turkey**	Maoz and Mor 2002; Klein *et al.* 2006
Italy	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
Japan	China	Russia	Taiwan	Ukraine	Taiwan, China	See main text
Netherlands	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
Peru	China	Ecuador*	Japan	Paraguay	Ecuador, Paraguay	Thies 2005; Klein *et al.* 2006
Philippines	China	Libya	Japan	Indonesia	Libya**, Indonesia	For Libyan support of Moro separatists, see Abuza 2005
Poland	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
South Korea	China	Australia	Japan	USA	Japan, China	See main text
South Africa	China*	Zimbabwe	Japan	Angola	Zimbabwe, Angola	Lande 2017
Spain	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
Sweden	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
Turkey	China	Greece	Japan	Serbia	Greece, Serbia**	Maoz and Mor 2002; Klein *et al.* 2006
UK	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text
US	China	Russia	Japan	Ukraine	Russia, Ukraine	See main text

Notes: * Denotes that the validation survey did not indicate that the assumed rival was perceived as more hostile, on average, by respondents; ** denotes that the assumedly more similar population (in terms of race and culture) was not perceived as such, on average, by respondents; in the case of Libyans in the Philippines, and Serbians in Turkey, this exception was partial because it emerged only with regard to racial, but not cultural proximity (see Table D1 in the Supplementary Materials).

Analytic strategy

We present results of the forced choice experiment using marginal means. We prefer them to average marginal component effects (AMCEs) because they are more appropriate for comparing preferences across subgroups of respondents (such as different survey countries) (Leeper *et al.* 2020), which we do below. Since marginal means are not dependent on the choice of a reference category, we are also able to easily compare their magnitude across immigrants' countries of origin and other attributes. As a reminder, since the experiment was fully randomized and the assignment of conjoint attributes balanced across respondents of each survey country, we do not present results with respondent-level covariates.

By coincidence, the online survey experiment was launched a couple of days before Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and remained in the field for a few days afterwards, allowing us to conduct an over-time analysis of responses for those survey countries where Ukraine and Russia were chosen as countries of immigrant origin. Building on the assumption that the *timing* of Putin's declaration was as-if-random within the temporal window of our survey, we leverage this event to help us determine the causal effect of rivalry and alliance on preferences for immigrants. This effect would normally be difficult to estimate, since many countries of immigrant origin differ not only in the degree of rivalry with the survey country, but in many other, unobserved ways as well. We discuss sample balance issues as well as the possible role of humanitarian concerns for Ukrainians, which may confound the change in the intensity of the rivalry, in the corresponding section below. With respect to other rival/ally pairs outside of the analysis of Russia and Ukraine, we will also attend to regime type as another

possible confounder.

Results

Geopolitical rivalry and perceived racial/cultural difference

We start with the main results based on a pooled sample of all survey countries. Results by

survey country will be discussed in later sections. We first present estimates for rivalry and

perceived racial/cultural proximity as two separate attributes. The x-axis in Figure 1 represents

marginal means, that is, the probability that an immigrant with certain attributes will be chosen

by respondents, with higher values indicating a higher chance of acceptance. The vertical dotted

line represents the absence of an experimental effect: that is, on average, an equal probability of

acceptance or rejection of an immigrant with the corresponding attribute. Confidence intervals

overlapping with this line indicate that the corresponding attribute does not influence

respondents' choice at the conventional, two-tailed significance level of $p < 0.05$.[14]

Figure 1 provides the full set of immigrant attributes that we experimentally varied, thus offering

comparisons for effect sizes (note that the confidence intervals are too small to be visible due to

the large sample size). The four attributes listed at the bottom of Figure 1 provide strong support

for the first hypothesis: The probability that an immigrant from a rival country is granted

permanent resident status is 7.6 percentage points lower compared to an immigrant from a non-

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[14] Note that marginal means do not depend on a comparison category. To arrive at a treatment effect of foreign
policy alignments as a whole, we thus refer to the difference between the estimated probabilities of acceptance of an
immigrant from a rival country and an immigrant from an allied country.

rival country. As we will see in a moment, the antipathy towards certain rivals and the sympathy for certain non-rivals is so strong that there is a net preference for country of origins with a larger perceived racial/cultural distance—the opposite of what important strands in the literature would expect. According to Figure 1, immigrants who are perceived as culturally and racially similar are 1.2 percentage points less likely to receive permanent resident status in the experiment compared to immigrants who are perceived as racially and culturally more distant. How do these effect sizes compare to those of other often-studied attributes? The effects of rivalry are smaller than those of unemployment status or language proficiency, as Table 1 shows, but larger than length of residency and gender. We will come back to the question of effect sizes further below.

To what extent are these results an artifact of our choice of rival and non-rival countries, in particular of the frequently used China-Japan as well as Russia-Ukraine pairing? Regarding the latter, the results are similar for the subsample of respondents (from 8 of the 22 countries surveyed) who did *not* choose between Ukrainians and Russians (see Figure A1 in the online Supplementary Materials). In other words, the results presented in Figure 1 are not dependent on the strong anti-Russian sentiment generated by the war in Ukraine. How about the specific nature of the China-Japan comparison, which appeared in all but the Japanese survey? We cannot directly investigate the possibility that the heterophilia effect is influenced by the pro-Japanese sympathy that we find in all countries except in South Africa, because Japan appears as a country of origin in all but the Japanese surveys. But we note here that respondents in Japan and South Korea also preferred dissimilar (meaning American and Australian) immigrants over those from East Asia, thus contributing to the overall pattern.

Figure 1. Effects of rivalry and perceived racial/cultural similarity on probability of being

granted permanent resident status

To further disentangle rivalry from perceived racial and cultural similarity and to examine what

is driving the preference for dissimilar immigrants, we interact racial and cultural similarity with

rivalry, thus distinguishing between rivals of dissimilar (perceived) racial and cultural

background, non-rivals with dissimilar backgrounds, rivals with similar backgrounds, and non-rivals with similar backgrounds. The results are visualized in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Interaction effects of rivalry status and perceived racial/cultural similarity on probability of being granted permanent residence status

Notes: Plotted points are marginal means. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. Other conjoint attributes omitted from the plot. For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table II.

Clearly, the association between rivalry and receiving permanent residence status is pronounced for immigrants from both similar and dissimilar racial and cultural backgrounds, but it is stronger for the racially and culturally similar rivals. This indicates a stronger aversion against Russian immigrants compared to Chinese immigrants in the 14 Western countries that were offered this choice, as well as a strong anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea and Japan. It is plausible that both are due to the high intensity of the rivalry in question: A full-scale proxy war in Ukraine in the case of the West, and the spatial proximity to a rising and increasingly assertive China in the case of Japan and Korea. Indeed, the validation survey revealed that Russia is perceived in

Europe and North America (with the exception of Hungary) as far more hostile, on average, than China. We explore and support this interpretation in more detail in Appendix E.

To further disentangle cultural/racial proximity from rivalry, we can also point to auxiliary analyses of the separately fielded validation survey (described in Appendix D). We asked respondents about how different/similar they perceived the culture and the race of the population of the countries of immigrants origin—offering a continuous rather than a dichotomous coding of this variable. To measure rivalry at the level of citizen perceptions, we asked how friendly or hostile (on a 5 point scale) respondents perceived the government of the countries of immigrant origin. Mirroring the outcome variable in the experiment, we asked how likely respondents would admit applicants for a permanent work visa from these countries. As Figure A2 in the online Supplementary Materials shows, perceived degrees of rivalry trump perceptions of racial or cultural proximity by far.

Moving on to a discussion of possible confounders, how confident should we be that these effects are attributable to rivalry, rather than to regime differences between survey and origin countries? More specifically, do respondents dislike Chinese and Russian immigrants because their countries of origin are foreign policy rivals or because they are autocracies? Indeed, the average 2022 electoral democracy score from the V-DEM dataset (which ranges from 0 to 1; see Coppedge *et al.* 2020) is 0.73 for survey countries (being a democracy was as a sample selection criterion) and 0.63 for allied countries of immigrant origin, whereas it is only 0.2 for rival countries of immigrant origin (China at 0.075 brings down the mean). These differences reflect

the fact that all-democratic dyads are less likely to develop rivalries in the first place compared to mixed dyads or autocracy-autocracy dyads (Conrad and Souva 2011; Hensel *et al.* 2000).

Still, we can evaluate the possible confounding of rivalry by regime type differences, taking advantage of the full range of variation in our data. To that end, we regressed the marginal mean values for each country of immigrant origin generated by the survey experiments on a rival-ally dummy and on differences in the democracy scores between each survey country and country of immigrant origin (again relying on the V-Dem dataset). The results of this dyadic analysis with 88 observations indicate that regime difference is not significantly associated with the marginal means of immigrant preference (beta= -0.068; p= 0.416), whereas a rival geopolitical relationship clearly is (beta= -0.752; p= 0.000).

Over-time analysis of the preference for Ukrainian immigrants and rejection of Russian immigrants

A more direct way to isolate the international relations dimension from other attributes of the countries of immigrant origin is to identify cases where levels of rivalry/alliance change dramatically over time, while other attributes, including regime type, remain constant. As mentioned earlier, the survey experiment was fielded both prior to and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24 of 2022. The Russian aggression represents an unexpected exogeneous shock within the duration of our survey.

We can therefore use the "unexpected event during survey design" (UESD) (Muñoz et al. 2020), whose validity rests on several assumptions: excludability (that only the event in question affects the outcome variable); ignorability (that the pre- and post-event samples do not vary

systematically); compliance (that respondents in the post-event sample are actually aware of the event); and lack of post-treatment bias (that the event does not affect survey responses to covariates and moderators other than the outcome of interest). We only view ignorability bias as a serious challenge for our design, to be discussed below together with humanitarian concerns as a possible alternative causal channel.

For the main analysis, we chose survey countries that contained the Ukraine-Russia pair and that had daily responses both before the war and for every post-war day until day 5. This generates a sample with about 23,000 respondents from Europe and the United States. Since daily sample sizes are small for many countries, we aggregate responses into two-day periods to arrive at sufficiently precise estimates for each period.

Figure 3 shows an increasing pro-Ukraine preference and a growing anti-Russian antipathy over time. The pro-Ukraine effect is especially pronounced, increasing from a 0.53 probability of being offered permanent residency status to nearly 0.6 over the course of a week. The alliance effect thus mirrors in magnitude the effect of the rivalry status, as was already the case in Figure 2. Note that initially, before the outbreak of the war, respondents did not express a preference for Ukrainian over Japanese immigrants, but in the aftermath of the invasion, these preferences increasingly diverged. Note also that according to Figure 3, the anti-Chinese preferences are not significantly affected by the war, thus offering a placebo test that further supports the rivalry hypothesis.

Figure 3. Preference for Russian and Ukrainian immigrants before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Notes: Plotted points are marginal means. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. Other conjoint attributes omitted from the plot. For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table III.

Coming back to the question of effect sizes, the rejection of Russians and the preference for Ukrainians after the war broke out (and the rejection of Chinese in both Japan and South Korea, see Figure A3 in the online Supplementary Materials) exceed the magnitude of all individual attributes—with the exception of being a doctor or of being unemployed or lacking any language skills. This reflects the widespread sympathy toward Ukrainians and the generous welcome they received upon migration to Western and Eastern Europe after the outbreak of the war,

irrespective of other desirable attributes of migrants such as profession or language skills. In other words, the rivalry effect varies with the intensity of the rivalry/alliance (see also Appendix E) and is thus particularly pronounced in extreme cases such as during the Ukraine war or the threat posed by China to its neighbors in East Asia—and presumably during the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and other such intense historical conflicts.

This over-time experimental evidence demonstrates that the country-of-origin effect for the same two countries changes as the intensity of rivalry/alliance increases, while other country-of-origin characteristics, including regime type, the appeal of Ukrainian and Russian popular culture, or the frequency and nature of respondents' previous encounters with Ukrainians/Russians all remain constant. We note here that Bansak et al. (2023) also find that Ukrainian refugees are far more welcome in 2022 than they were in a previous experimental study with an identical design that they had conducted in 2016.

We do, however, have to be concerned about ignorability, one of the conditions for a valuable UESD mentioned above. We observe some imbalance in the sample composition before and after the invasion of Ukraine, particularly on demographic variables associated with immigration preferences. To address these concerns, we use optimal matching to balance the samples on observables and then reran the conjoint analysis on the matched sample. The results, illustrated in Figure A4 in the online Supplementary Materials, are consistent with our main findings reported above.

Another objection relates to a possible alternative causal channel linking the war to immigrant preferences. Could it be that Ukrainians were increasingly preferred by our respondents because

they felt sympathy for people who had to flee from an unprovoked and violent military assault, independent of the intensifying alliance with Ukraine? First and as shown in Figure 3, the penalty for Russian immigrants increases steadily over the days before and after the invasion, which clearly cannot be attributed to a decrease in humanitarian concerns for Russians. Second, we can rely on other data to see if humanitarian concerns systematically influence the reception of refugees, for which such concerns are obviously of greater relevance compared to immigrants. Indeed, refugees who were personally tortured or otherwise persecuted were preferred over other immigrants in prior experimental research (e.g., Bansak et al. 2016; Bansak et al. 2023). It is unclear, however, what to expect at the aggregate country-of-origin level, where other considerations (including foreign policy relations with the respondent's country) come into play as well (cf. Moise et al. 2023).

To explore the possible role of humanitarian concerns, we relied on the results of two conjoint experiments, one from 2015 (Bansak et al. 2016) with European respondents and one from 2019 with U.S. respondents (Steele et al. 2023). They both calculate preferences for refugees from different countries of origin, net of other applicant characteristics. We use the relative rank of each country of origin as a dependent variable and regress it on two indicators of the degree of civilian victimization in that country: the average annual death count of civilians in the years before the survey and the level of state terror against citizens during the year of the survey. The results, shown in Figure A5 in the online Supplementary Materials, suggest that countries of origin with a greater degree of civilian victimization are not systematically preferred by Western respondents. We therefore do not think that escalating humanitarian concerns after Russia's invasion of Ukraine sufficiently confound the observed rivalry/alliance effects to undermine our interpretation of the results.

Results by individual survey country

Next, we analyze the results by survey country. For ease of interpretation, Table 2 provides a summary of the findings. The corresponding plots can be found in Figure A3 in the online Supplementary Materials. The foreign policy effects are clear-cut: In all 22 survey countries, immigrants from non-rival or allied countries are viewed significantly more positively than immigrants from rival countries. If we look at each pair of countries of origin separately, however, there are four pairs (out of a total of 44) that do not produce a clear preference for non-rivals.

Table 2: Summary of results by survey country

Survey country	Dissimilar perceived racial and cultural background		Similar perceived racial and cultural background		Results	
	Non-rival	Rival	Rival	Non-Rival	Rivalry	Racial/cultural dissimilarity
Argentina	Japan	China	United Kingdom	Ireland	preference for both non-rivals	preference for UK over China
Australia	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	no preferences
Brazil	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference of China over Russia
Canada	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	no preferences
France	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference for China over Russia, Ukraine over Japan
Germany	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference for Ukraine over Japan
Greece	Japan	China	Turkey	Jordan	preference for both non-rivals	preference for China over Turkey, Japan over Jordan
Hungary	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference for Japan over Ukraine
India	Japan	China	Pakistan	Turkey	preference for both non-rivals	preference of China over Pakistan, Japan over Turkey
Italy	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	no preferences
Japan	Ukraine	Russia	China	Taiwan	preference for both non-rivals	preference of Russia over China, Taiwan over Ukraine
Netherlands	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference for China over Russia

Peru	Japan	China	Ecuador	Paraguay	only partial preference for non-rivals: Paraguay not preferred over Ecuador	preference for Japan over Ecuador
Philippines	Japan	China	Libya	Indonesia	preference for both non-rivals	preference for Japan over Indonesia
Poland	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference for China over Russia, Ukraine over Japan
South Korea	USA	Australia	China	Japan	only partial preference for non-rivals: USA not preferred over Australia	preference for Australia over China, USA over Japan
South Africa	Japan	China	Zimbabwe	Angola	only partial preference for non-rivals: Angola not preferred over Zimbabwe	preference for Zimbabwe over China
Spain	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference for China over Russia
Sweden	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference for China over Russia
Turkey	Japan	China	Greece	Serbia	only partial preference for non-rivals: Serbia not preferred over Greece	preference for China over Greece, Japan over Serbia
UK	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference for China over Russia
USA	Japan	China	Russia	Ukraine	preference for both non-rivals	preference China over Russia, Ukraine over Japan

How do we interpret these exceptions—setting aside the possibility of Type II error? In the case of Australia and the United States as countries of immigrant origin in the Korean survey, the results are not surprising, as we chose Australia on the basis of its perceived cultural and racial dissimilarity knowing that it was not a rival, but maintained a relationship of mutual neglect with South Korea, as discussed above.[15] We are also not surprised by the case of Paraguay vs. Ecuador in Peru, because the intense territorial rivalry between Peru and Ecuador concluded more than twenty years go with the 1998 peace agreement (Schenoni *et al.* 2020), and correspondingly, the validation survey came back showing that average Peruvians do not distinguish between Ecuador and Paraguay (the non-rival) in terms of perceived friendliness/hostility. In the case of South Africa[16] and Turkey,[17] upon further reflection and with the benefit of hindsight, our choice of one of the two rival or non-rival countries, respectively, turned out to be less than optimal.

To verify whether our results are robust to the exclusion of all survey countries for which our assumptions about foreign policy relationships or the perceived cultural and racial distance were not validated by the auxiliary survey, we re-ran the main analyses presented above on a reduced sample.

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[15] South Koreans prefer Americans over Australian immigrants, as the point estimates indicate, but the difference is not statistically significant. The validation survey revealed that the American government is seen as slightly more friendly than the Australian government.

[16] Nigeria would have perhaps been a more appropriate choice for a contemporary rival country (Olanrewaju and Nwozor 2022) even though our validation survey revealed some lingering effects of the rivalry with Zimbabwe.

[17] The estimates point in the right direction, but the difference between Serbian and Greek immigrants is not statistically significant. Serbia may well be associated, in the eyes of the Turkish public, with the genocidal wars against (Muslim) Bosniaks during the Bosnian wars, as well as the oppression of and war against (Muslim) Kosovars three years later. Romania would have been a better choice for a similar race/culture non-rival country.

As is shown in the Supplementary Materials, Figures A6a-A6c, the results are largely unchanged and all our hypotheses are supported.[18]

Moderation by degree of national identification

We are now ready to explore the second and third hypotheses, which regard treatment heterogeneity: the rivalry effect should be moderated by respondents' majority or minority status as well as by their belief in the superiority of their country. Note that these moderation analyses should not be interpreted in causal terms as we do not know what other (observed or unobserved) respondent characteristics correlated with chauvinism or minority status could drive the observed effects.

Figure 4 explores the hypothesis that majorities react more to the foreign policy relationships with origin countries than do minorities. We included in each survey country specific questions, often drawn from national censuses, that measured respondents' membership in linguistic, religious, racial, or other ancestry-based minority groups. Figure 4 shows that the rivalry effect is considerably stronger for members of national majorities. But the rivalry effect is still pronounced for minorities as well. Note also that minorities and majorities do not react to racial or cultural proximity of potential immigrants in different ways, as one would except if these considerations would drive overall responses.

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[18] The only substantial difference is that in the reduced sample of survey countries, there is now a slight preference for immigrants from non-rival countries with a culturally / racially more similar population. The more pronounced preference for immigrants from rival countries with a more dissimilar population remains.

Figure 4. Effects of rivalry and racial/cultural similarity by respondents' majority status

Notes: Plotted points are marginal means. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. Other conjoint attributes omitted from the plot. For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table IV.

The third hypothesis maintains that the rivalry effect is stronger for respondents who view their own country as superior to all other countries. Figure 5 shows exactly this. To determine whether this is the consequence of the Ukrainian war taking place in Europe, where most of the respondents lived who had to choose between Ukrainian and Russian immigrants, we carried out a further robustness analysis limited to the subsample of respondents who were presented with different rival-ally pairs. The results are again broadly similar, as Figures A7 and A8 show.

Figure 5: Effects of rivalry and racial/cultural similarity by respondents' perceptions of national superiority

Notes: Plotted points are marginal means. Bars denote 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by respondent. Other conjoint attributes omitted from the plot. For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table V.

Conclusion

This article introduced a novel international relations argument into the literature on anti-immigrants sentiment. In addition to the racial, cultural, or labor-market characteristics of immigrants, the focus of the existing literature, we argue that the political relationship between origin and destination countries influences how migrants are perceived and evaluated. Drawing on the rivalry literature in international relations, we showed that immigrants from sending countries with a contentious and conflictual

relationship with respondents' countries are less welcome than those hailing from allied countries. The preference for immigrants from allied countries and the discrimination against those from rival countries trumps considerations of racial and cultural similarity, at least in this sample and with our choice of countries of immigrant origin.

In the specific empirical set-up of our study, aversion against Russian immigrants among many respondents from Western countries and against Chinese immigrants among respondents from East Asian countries produces a net preference for immigrants of dissimilar racial and cultural backgrounds. A more detailed analysis of the data by survey country (see Appendix E) revealed that there is little evidence of broad anti-Asian or a more specific Sinophobic bias beyond the rivalry effects. These results hold across survey countries, continents, and origin countries.

Some limitations of our approach have been noted. Since all surveys contained a choice between Chinese and Japanese immigrants, we do not know the extent to which the specificity of an apparently widespread Japanophilia drives the results regarding the net preference for racially and culturally dissimilar immigrants. We also were not able to identify clear-cut rival and non-rival pairs from racially and culturally dissimilar/similar origins for all the 22 survey countries. Moving beyond these limitations would demand a larger sample of survey countries, a more precise and up-to-date measurement of rivalry, and a larger choice set of immigrant origins for respondents to choose from.

Another note of caution concerns the generalizability of our findings. First, we do not know if rivalry would matter more than racial or cultural preferences if we had included other non-white immigrants besides East Asians in our design. Similarly, our findings have little to say about the widespread evidence of anti-Muslim bias in Western countries—itself a consequence, our theory would suggest, of decades of violent conflict and wars between Western powers on the one hand and states (such as

Afghanistan, Iran, or ISIS) and political movements (such as the Taliban or al Qaida) associated with radical Islam on the other hand. Future work would do well to investigate these possibilities by including survey countries that are involved in rivalries and alliances with Muslim-majority countries as well as non-white and non-Asian-majority countries.

Our study has larger implications for the study of anti-immigrant sentiment. It shows the importance of going beyond the preoccupation with the individual background characteristics of migrants and embedding the study of xenophobia within the global context of political competition and alliances between countries. This obviously does not preclude the possibility that racial animus or Islamophobia may develop independently or in tandem with these global political forces. Delving deeper into these questions would demand a different research design where racial and cultural features (such as religion) can plausibly vary among immigrants from the same country of origin.

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Supplementary Materials

for Wimmer, Bonikowski, Crabtree, Fu, Golder, and Tsutsui, "Geo-Political Rivalry and Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: A Conjoint Experiment in 22 Countries," forthcoming in *American Political Science Review*.

Appendix A. Additional figures and tables

Figure A1. Effects of rivalry and racial/cultural similarity; survey countries without Russia-Ukraine condition


Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.I.

Figure A2. Effects of rivalry and racial/cultural similarity; validation survey sample

Note: Perception of similarity is a variable composed of the averaged values of the perceptions of racial as well as cultural similarity between the majority population of the survey country and the country of immigrant origin. Both variables were coded on a 5-point Likert scale. Perceptions of hostility refers to how friendly or hostile respondents saw the government of a country of immigrant origin (also coded on a 5-point scale). The outcome variable is how likely respondents would admit an immigration candidate from a country of origin (again coded on a 5-point Likert scale). For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.II.

Figure A3. Preferences for immigrant countries of origin by survey country

India

China
Japan
Pakistan
Turkey

0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7
Marginal Mean

○ Country of origin: Non-rival   ● Country of origin: Rival

Italy

China
Japan
Russia
Ukraine

0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7
Marginal Mean

○ Country of origin: Non-rival   ● Country of origin: Rival

Japan

China
Russia
Taiwan
Ukraine

0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7
Marginal Mean

○ Country of origin: Non-rival   ● Country of origin: Rival

Korea

Australia
China
Japan
USA

0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7
Marginal Mean

○ Country of origin: Non-rival   ● Country of origin: Rival

Netherlands

China
Japan
Russia
Ukraine

0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7
Marginal Mean

○ Country of origin: Non-rival   ● Country of origin: Rival

Peru

China
Ecuador
Japan
Paraguay

0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7
Marginal Mean

○ Country of origin: Non-rival   ● Country of origin: Rival

Philippines

China
Indonesia
Japan
Libya

0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7
Marginal Mean

○ Country of origin: Non-rival   ● Country of origin: Rival

Poland

China
Japan
Russia
Ukraine

0.3   0.4   0.5   0.6   0.7
Marginal Mean

○ Country of origin: Non-rival   ● Country of origin: Rival

Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.III.

Figure A4. Preference for Russian and Ukrainian immigrants before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine; matched sample

*Note*: Samples before and after the declaration of war were matched on age, gender, work status, and relationship status. For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.IV.

Figures A5. Preference for refugee countries of origin by level of civilian victimization

2015 Experiment

Preference rank vs. Average yearly civilian death (UCDP):
Kosovo (7), Iraq (6), Afghanistan (5), Pakistan (4), Eritrea (3), Ukraine (2), Syria (1)

2015 Experiment

Preference rank vs. Political terror by the state (from 1=none to 5=entire pop is targeted, Amnesty):
Kosovo (7), Iraq (6), Afghanistan (5), Pakistan (4), Eritrea (3), Ukraine (2), Syria (1)

Note: Sources for the 2015 experiment, Bansak *et al.* 2016; for the 2019 experiment, Steele *et al.* 2023; for the ACLED data, Raleigh *et al.* 2010; for the UCDP data, Eck and Hultman 2007; for the political terror data, Amnesty International Yearbooks 2015 and 2019.

Figure A6a. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity effects; reduced country sample

*Note*: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VIa.

Figure A6b. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity interaction effects; reduced country sample

Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VIb.

Figure A6c. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity effects by respondents' majority status; reduced country sample

Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VIc.

Figure A7. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity effects by respondents' majority status; survey countries without Russia-Ukraine condition


Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VII.

Figure A8. Rivalry and racial/cultural similarity effects by respondents' perceptions of national superiority; survey countries without Russia-Ukraine condition

Note: For tabluar results, see the APSR Dataverse repository, Full Model Results Tables, Table A.VIII.

Appendix B. Historical examples of xenophobia driven by geopolitical rivalry

There are myriad historical examples of geopolitical rivalries stoking negative sentiments toward specific immigrant groups. After the United States and Germany ended up on opposite sides of the First World War, for instance, a wave of anti-German sentiment swept over the United States. It was more intense, as Ferrara (2020) has shown, among local communities with a greater number of war casualties, forcing German Americans to leave these communities and hide their ethnic ancestry. During the Second World War, Japan entered into the war with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which rekindled long simmering anti-Japanese sentiments and transformed them into a tornado of anti-Japanese propaganda (Saavedra 2021), culminating in the forced internment of and widespread hostility against Japanese Americans. In these two cases of open war, perceptions of immigrants' split loyalties and fear of their potential subversive behavior played a crucial role in the stigmatization process. A conspiratorial security discourse is often produced and amplified by the state itself amidst such conflicts, as when U.S. President Woodrow Wilson claimed during World War I that "any man who carries a hyphen about with him, carries a dagger that he is ready to plunge into the vitals of this Republic when he gets ready" (Wilson 2006:412).

While open war represents the most intense form of rivalry, less violent forms of competition may stoke anti-immigrant sentiment as well. For example, even though anti-Japanese sentiments dissipated with Japan's defeat in World War II and the United States' subsequent dominance over the country's politics, they reemerged in the late 1970s and 1980s, as competition intensified between Japanese and U.S. companies in manufacturing and electronics (Morris 2013). In the early 2000s, anti-Muslim resentment, which had been in decline for over a decade, reached unprecedented heights after the initial Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, the ensuing September 11 attacks (Ayhan and Kayaoğlu 2017: 57), and a string of terrorist incidents in Europe, the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, and the re-emergence of a Taliban controlled Afghanistan in 2022. Finally and most recently, China's relationship with the West shifted after the financial crisis of 2008 from a decades-long policy of accommodation and co-dependence to open competition and rivalry for global economic, political, and military hegemony (Mearsheimer 2021). Correspondingly, publics in the West came to view China in

increasingly negative terms (PEW 2020 October), eventually leading to a surge in Sinophobia during the COVID pandemic, for which China was directly blamed by President Donald Trump.

Appendix C. Compliance with APSA's Principles and Guidance for Human Subjects Research

This appendix documents our research design's compliance with the APSA principles. It uses the same numbering as in the original guidelines.

Power
4. When designing and conducting research, political scientists should be aware of power differentials between researcher and researched, and the ways in which such power differentials can affect the voluntariness of consent and the evaluation of risk and benefit.
Response: We conducted a representative survey with no particular attention to low-power or vulnerable participants and communities or, conversely, with powerful parties.

Consent
5. Political science researchers should generally seek informed consent from individuals who are directly engaged by the research process, especially if research involves more than minimal risk of harm or if it is plausible to expect that engaged individuals would withhold consent if consent were sought.
Response: Respondents consented, at the beginning of the survey, to participate in this study. No coercion or influence was used to entice individuals to participate and the study does not involve any risk of harm. Those who decided not to participate were led out of the survey immediately.

Deception
6. Political science researchers should carefully consider any use of deception and the ways in which deception can conflict with participant autonomy.
Response: Our research design did not involve deception.

Harm and trauma
7. Political science researchers should consider the harms associated with their research.
Response: We are not aware of any harm, including psychological harm, that could result from participation in this study.

8. Political science researchers should anticipate and protect individual participants from trauma stemming from participation in research.
Response: We are not aware of any trauma triggers in the online survey, which did not ask individuals about their personal experiences or circumstances.

Confidentiality
9. Political science researchers should generally keep the identities of research participants confidential; when circumstances require, researchers should adopt the higher standard of ensuring anonymity.
Response: The survey company (Lucid Marketplace) transferred responses in fully anonymized form.

Impact
10. Political science researchers conducting studies on political processes should consider the broader social impacts of the research process as well as the impact on the experience of individuals directly engaged by the research. In general, political science researchers should not compromise the integrity of political processes for research purposes without the consent of individuals that are directly engaged by the research process.
Response: Our research design did not interfere with the political experience of individuals or with political outcomes. The survey did not ask questions about upcoming elections using actual candidates or in other ways offer information that could have influenced real world political behavior by participants.

Laws, Regulations, and Prospective Review
11. Political science researchers should be aware of relevant laws and regulations governing their research related activities.
Response: We are aware of the laws and regulations applying to survey research and complied with them. We also received IRB approval [Dartmouth University STUDY00032391] for the research.

Compensation
In addition to the Principles, there are other ethical concerns. One of them is fair compensation, particularly in contexts where participants engage with research projects as work for which they are paid, such as online surveys. Please clarify in the appendix whether you compensated participants. If you did not compensate participants, please explain why not. If you did, please explain how you calculated their compensation and whether it was fair in both global and local contexts (e.g. how it compares to relevant wage standards).
Response: The survey company compensated respondents with a competitive rate in order to get sufficient response rates in a short period of time. It ranged from 2.1 dollars per survey in Korea to 0.65 dollars per survey in Brazil. We thus did not calculate compensation rates on our own but relied on the survey company to do so in a way that reflects local market conditions for survey responses.

Appendix D. Validation survey

We fielded an additional, supplementary survey to validate our assumptions about which countries of immigrant origin should be classified as rival or allied and which of their populations are perceived as culturally and/or racially more similar or dissimilar.

The survey was fielded simultaneously through Lucid Marketplace in November 2023 in 22 countries. The survey was pre-registered in August 2023 (see online link here [insert link]) and approved by the IRB of the main author's home university (Columbia AAAU8663). We aimed for a sample size of 420 individuals per country with quotas for age, gender, and education. After removing respondents who failed both attention checks, we were left with an average sample size of 360. The survey was fielded in each country's national language(s).

Each respondent was asked how friendly or unfriendly they saw the governments of the four countries of immigrant origin used in the experiment (for the exact wording of the questions, see the document *Supplementary Survey Instrument* in the APSR Dataverse at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZZYSIZ). Response categories ranged from "very friendly" to "very hostile". Respondents were also asked how similar or dissimilar they saw the culture and, in a separate question, the race of the population of the country of immigrant origin compared to the majority of their own country (with response options going from "very similar" to "very different"). Finally, we asked respondents to rate the probability that they would, if they were in the role of a government official, admit a person from the country of origin as an immigrant who applied for a permanent residence permit in the survey country (responses ranged from "very likely" to "very unlikely").

Overall, the survey validated the assumptions about rivalry status and cultural/racial difference made in the survey experiment, as Figure D1 shows.

Figure D1. Assumed *versus* observed country hostility, cultural similarity, and racial similarity

Note: N=8365; 1="very friendly" or "very different", 5="very hostile" or "very similar"; 95% confidence intervals are added but too small to be visible.

Table D1 lists the detailed results by survey country. We don't separate out perceptions of cultural and racial similarity since these were highly correlated at 0.73, in line with our assumptions. With six exceptions (out of a total of 88 pairs), two of which are partial exceptions that related only to perceptions of racial or cultural similarity, the assumptions made in the experiment were validated by the new survey. We briefly discuss the exceptions in the main text.

Table D1. Comparison of assumed and observed country hostility, cultural similarity, and racial similarity by survey country.

	Rivalry						Perceived cultural/racial distance						
Survey country	Assumptions made in survey experiment		Validation through new survey	Assumptions made in survey experiment		Validation through new survey	Survey country	Assumptions made in survey experiment		Validation through new survey	Assumptions made in survey experiment		Validation through new survey
	Culturally/racially distant			Culturally/racially closer				Non-rival			Rivals		
	Non-rival	*Rival*	*Assumed rival seen as "less friendly"?*	*Rival*	*Non-Rival*	*Assumed rival seen as "less friendly"?*		*More distant*	*Less distant*	*Assumedly more distant seen as "more distant"?*	*More distant*	*Less distant*	*Assumedly more distant seen as "more distant"?*
Argentina	Japan	China	Yes	United Kingdom	Ireland	Yes	Argentina	Japan	Ireland	Yes	China	United Kingdom	Yes
Australia	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Australia	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Brazil	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Brazil	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Canada	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Canada	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
France	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	France	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Germany	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Germany	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Greece	Japan	China	Yes	Turkey	Jordan	Yes	Greece	Japan	Jordan	Yes	China	Turkey	Yes
Hungary	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Russia seen as more friendly	Hungary	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
India	Japan	China	Yes	Pakistan	Turkey	Yes	India	Japan	Turkey	No stat. sign. difference	China	Pakistan	Yes
Italy	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Italy	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Japan	Ukraine	Russia	Yes	China	Taiwan	Yes	Japan	Ukraine	Taiwan	Yes	Russia	China	Yes
Netherlands	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Netherlands	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Peru	Japan	China	Yes	Ecuador	Paraguay	No stat. sign. difference	Peru	Japan	Paraguay	Yes	China	Ecuador	Yes
Philippines	Japan	China	Yes	Lybia	Indonesia	Yes	Philippines	Japan	Indonesia	Yes	China	Lybia	Yes for culture, no for race
Poland	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Poland	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
South Korea	USA	Australia	Yes	China	Japan	Yes	South Korea	USA	Japan	Yes	Australia	China	Yes
South Africa	Japan	China	No stat. sign. difference	Zimbabwe	Angola	Yes	South Africa	Japan	Angola	Yes	China	Zimbabwe	Yes
Spain	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Spain	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Sweden	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	Sweden	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
Turkey	Japan	China	Yes	Greece	Serbia	Yes	Turkey	Japan	Serbia	Yes for culture, no for race	China	Greece	Yes
UK	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	UK	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes
USA	Japan	China	Yes	Russia	Ukraine	Yes	USA	Japan	Ukraine	Yes	China	Russia	Yes

Appendix E. Geopolitical rivalry and Sinophobia: A tentative exploration

Figure A2 disentangles racial/cultural preferences from those related to the foreign policy status of countries of origin. It is based on continuous measures of racial/cultural distance as well as rivalry/allyship generated by the validation survey that we ran after the experimental survey had already been conducted. We can further analyze this issue by having a closer look at how respondents reacted to the experiment when confronted with Chinese and Japanese immigrants, which outside of Japan and South Korea always represent the culturally and racially more dissimilar choice, as the validation survey confirmed (see Table D1).

We distinguish between survey countries in which the choice was between Russia and China and those where the second rival was a country other than Russia. Arguably, the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict to the level of a proxy war represents the most intense form of rivalry—short of a direct war—for the West in recent history. Comparatively speaking, the rivalry with China is of lesser intensity. Indeed, the validation survey resulted in an average perception of hostility (ranging from "very hostile"=1 to "very friendly"=5) with Russia of 1.9, while it was 2.6 for China. If the intensity of rivalry dominates the observed responses, as our theory predicts, we would expect respondents outside of East Asia to prefer Chinese over Russian immigrants. If respondents do not favor Chinese over Russian immigrants or even prefer Russians, this could be evidence of racial bias or of a more specific (perhaps COVID-related) Sinophobia, as highlighted by arguments about racial discrimination discussed in the main text.

Table E 1 (which summarizes results from Table 2 in the main text) shows that in the 13 surveys where respondents could choose between China and Russia, 0 surveys yielded a preference for Russian over Chinese immigrants, 8 surveys showed a preference for Chinese immigrants, and in 5 other surveys there was no statistically significant difference between these two countries of immigrant origin. Among the 7 survey countries with a second rival other than

Table E1. Preference for immigrants from China and other rivals by survey country

	Other rival preferred	China preferred	No significant difference	Total
Countries with Russia as second rival	0	8	5	13
Countries with second rival other than Russia	2	3	2	7
Total	2	11	7	20

Russia (and thus less intense rivalries on average), respondents from 3 surveys, on average, preferred China over the other rival, only those from 2 surveys preferred the (racially and culturally more similar) second rival, and in two cases there was no significant difference between the two rival countries.

These findings are in line with the expectations of our theory.[19] As already mentioned in the main text, rivalry also matters more than considerations of racial and cultural similarity in South Korea and Japan. In fact, the anti-Chinese bias among South Korean and Japanese respondents in the survey experiment represent the two strongest country-of-origin effects in this study (see Figure A3), reflecting the intensity of rivalries with China in East Asia.

We arrive at similar conclusions if we look at the choice between the two allied countries. In 16 out of 20 survey countries, preferences for Japanese immigrants are either indistinguishable from those for immigrants from the other, culturally and racially more similar non-rival country or they are even significantly preferred over the latter (this is the case in 5 surveys; see Table E2). Only in 4 surveys did respondents prefer the culturally and racially more similar immigrants. Invariably, these were Ukrainians—the consequence, our theory would suggest, of the especially intense alliance between Ukraine on the one hand and Poland, Germany, France, and the United States on the other.

Table E2. Preference for immigrants from Japan and other non-rivals by survey country

	Other non-rival preferred	Japan preferred	No significant difference	Total
Countries with second non-rival other than Ukraine	0	4	2	6
Countries with Urkaine as second non-rival	4	1	9	14
Total	4	5	11	20

The remarkable popularity of Japanese immigrants and the fact that Russians are never

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[19] This suggests that to the degree that Sinophobia was present in our sample, whether induced by COVID-19 or not, it was not strong enough to cancel out the effects of rivalry intensity. We arrive at the same conclusion if we count as evidence of Sinophobia results from those surveys that did not show a significant difference between Chinese and Russian immigrants. To evaluate citizens of a country that just started a war of aggression as equally (un)desirable as the citizens of a country not at war with any other country would suggest that respondents harbor other kind of resentments—above and beyond those induced by rivalry—against the more peaceful country. The five surveys without statistically significant differences between Russian and Chinese immigrants, however, are outweighed by the eight surveys where Chinese immigrants are significantly preferred over Russians, again consistent with the rivalry argument.

preferred over Chinese immigrants indicate that there does not seem to be a systematic anti-Asian bias—though such bias may of course motivate some more specific segments of the population. This interpretation is in line with recent experimental evidence offered by He and Xie (2022), who found that American respondents considered Chinese immigrants less trustworthy, competent, warm, and moral than Japanese immigrants, pointing at the possible role of international rivalry in generating these differences.

The above interpretations are suggestive not conclusive, because our research design does not allow us to explore the entire range of variation of perceived cultural and racial similarity/dissimilarity as well as rivalry/alliance and thus to disentangle the two from each other with more precision.

Appendix F. Pre-analysis plan

Date and place registered: March 13, 2022 at https://osf.io/kh2ft

Description
The literature on anti-immigrant attitudes and social exclusion has typically focused on the role of religious, ethnic, racial, and cultural boundaries. According to standard arguments in the literature, immigrants perceived as distant from the native population on these criteria are particularly likely to be viewed unfavorably, especially by those who subscribe to ascriptive definitions of nationhood. What this research tradition has not attended to, however, is the role of geopolitical rivalries in shaping anti-immigrant exclusion.
Negative evaluations of countries that are perceived as the focal nation-state's geopolitical foes can spill over onto those countries' emigrant populations, so that immigrants from those countries are seen as dangerous, untrustworthy, and undesirable. Indeed, such stigma can influence views of immigrants even in the absence of other bases of difference, such as religion, race, or culture.
Immigrants who belong to the same racial or religious categories as the majority of the domestic population may become stigmatized primarily on the basis of being perceived as "enemies" on the geopolitical stage. In this study we investigate the role of geopolitical rivalries on immigration attitudes by administering a conjoint experiment to survey respondents from 22 countries (more details below). The experiment places the respondent in the role of a hypothetical immigration officer who must evaluate pairs of applicants for permanent residency. The applicants vary on several characteristics, including country of origin, with the country sets including a 2x2 combination of geopolitical foes and allies and racial/ethnic similarity and difference. Identifying the marginal component effects of country of origin will allow us to evaluate our central research question. Pre-treatment items measuring nationalist attitudes enable us to examine treatment effect heterogeneity.

Study Information
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 (devaluation of geopolitical rivals): Respondents will be less favorably disposed toward immigrants whose countries of origin are considered to be the geopolitical foes of the respondents' countries of residence than toward immigrants whose countries of origin are seen as allies. Hypotheses 2 (rivalry trumps racial prejudice): Respondents will be more unfavorably disposed towards immigrants from countries that are geopolitical rivals with majority populations sharing the same racial characteristics as the racial majority in the survey country when compared to immigrants from racially dissimilar countries of origin that are considered foreign-policy allies. Hypothesis 3 (moderation by preexisting nationalist attitudes): The effects of geopolitical rivalry on immigrant attitudes will be greater among respondents who espouse exclusionary nationalist beliefs (measured prior to treatment). Hypothesis 4 (moderation by respondents' ethno-racial background): The effects of geopolitical rivalry on immigrant attitudes posited in Hypotheses 1-3 will be greater for members of national majorities than for ethnic, racial, or religious minorities.

Design Plan
Study type
Experiment - A researcher randomly assigns treatments to study subjects, this includes field or lab experiments. This is also known as an intervention experiment and includes randomized controlled trials.

Blinding
For studies that involve human subjects, they will not know the treatment group to which they have been assigned.

Study design
The survey experiment is part of a larger cross-national study on populist politics. The survey asks a wide range of questions about respondents' demographic characteristics, geographic mobility, economic wellbeing, and political attitudes. It also features several distinct experiments presented in random order. Upon arriving at the focal conjoint experiment, respondents are presented with five successive binary comparisons between pairs of fictional immigration applications. Each profile varies on six criteria, including country of origin. Respondents are then asked which applicant makes for a better fit with the host country. After completing this portion of the survey, respondents proceed to other experiments and/or concluding survey items.

Sampling Plan
Existing Data
Registration prior to any human observation of the data

Explanation of existing data
The data have been collected but they have not been viewed by any members of the research team.

Data collection procedures
To test these hypotheses, we have fielded an online survey with samples of between 1-2,000 respondents in the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South Korea, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The surveys were fielded simultaneously via Lucid Marketplace, an increasingly popular online survey platform. To help maximize the external validity of our inferences, we have used a quota-based sampling procedure, with quotas for age, gender, and education. In some countries, we have also employed geographic and language quotas.

Sample size
The sample consists of about 2,000 respondents per country across 22 countries.

Variables
Manipulated variables
The conjoint experiment is preceded by the following prompt: "Imagine that you are an American immigration officer tasked with deciding who should be granted permanent resident status in your country. You will be given brief excerpts from two applications. Please choose which of the two applications should be given priority. The choice is entirely up to you, so please use your best judgment about which candidate would make for a better fit. We will ask you to make this choice for 6 pairs of candidates." Following the prompt, respondents see two side-by-side tables that distill key information from two immigration applications. Each table varies the following attributes of the applicants: gender (male or female), age (21, 38, or 62), occupation (unemployed, janitor, farmer, accountant, teacher, doctor), host country language fluence (fluent, limited, none), duration of stay in the country (5, 10, or 15 years), and country of origin. The latter criterion varies across countries in which the survey is being administered to fit with those countries' geopolitical relations. In all countries, however, the country-of-origin attribute takes on four possible values: two categories of racially/ethnically distant immigrants from an "enemy" country and an "ally" country and two categories of racially/ethnically similar immigrants from an "enemy" country and an "ally" country. For instance, in Poland the four categories include China, Japan, Russia, and Ukraine.

Measured variables
The main moderator measured pre-treatment is nationalism. Nationalism is measured using an 11-item reduced version of the 23-item scale from the National Identity Supplement to the International Social Survey Program, as featured in XY (20XY). These items will be used to identify … distinct types of nationalism …. (XY (20XY) and XY (20XY)). The study will also use an alternative operationalization of nationalism, which will focus solely on ethnic vs. civic criteria of national belonging, via an additive index of the four symbolic boundary items from the broader nationalism battery.

Analysis Plan
Statistical models
To test the unconditional hypotheses related to the conjoint experiment, we will calculate marginal means. If there are apparent differences across moderators, we will conduct formal tests

of these differences using an ANOVA nested model comparison test. For all these tests, we will cluster standard errors at the respondent level.

Inference criteria
In all cases, we will rely on two-tailed p-values with 0.05 as the threshold for declaring statistical significance.

Missing data
We will employ listwise deletion for missingness on pre-treatment variables. Outcome questions were designed with forced response and we should not have any missingness on those variables.

Exploratory analysis
We do not have strong theoretical beliefs about differences in the experimental effects across countries, except that the intensity of the geopolitical rivalry and the public awareness of them at the time of the experiment will obviously influence the responses. It is possible that the hypothesized treatment effects will be muted by floor and ceiling effects stemming from respondents' exposure to radical political discourse outside of the experimental setting. If so, we may shift our analysis into an exploratory mode in order to identify such effects (for instance, by moderating the treatment effects by the strength of agreement with the experimental vignettes).

Appendix G. Experimental design example

The following screenshot provides an example, taken from the U.S. survey, of how respondents were prompted to choose between pairs of applicants for permanent residence status.

Imagine that you are an American immigration officer tasked with deciding who should be granted permanent resident status in your country. You will be given brief excerpts from two applications. Please choose which of the two applications should be given priority. The choice is entirely up to you, so please use your best judgment about which candidate would make for a better fit. We will ask you to make this choice for 6 pairs of candidates.

	Person 1	Person 2
Proficiency in country's official language	None	Fluent
Age	38	21
Origin	Japan	Ukraine
Gender	Female	Female
Occupation	Unemployed	Cleaner
Length of residence	15 years	5 years

Which person do you think would be a better fit to settle in America?

Person 1	○
Person 2	○

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