

Waves of War

Nationalism, State Formation, and
Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World

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Introduction and summary

I THE NARRATIVE IN A NUTSHELL AND THE MORAL OF THE TALE

Nationalism demands that rulers and ruled hail from the same ethnic background. The gradual adoption of this principle of legitimate statehood has transformed the shape of the political world over the past 200 years and has provided the ideological motivation for an increasing number of wars fought in the modern era. Before the age of nationalism set in at the end of the eighteenth century, individuals did not pay much attention to their own ethnic background or that of their rulers. They identified primarily with a local community – a village or town, a clan, or a mosque. In much of Europe and East Asia, their overlords ruled in the name of a divine dynasty, rather than “the people,” and many were of different ethnic stock than their subjects. In parts of the Middle East, Africa, or Central Asia, charismatic leaders held tribal confederacies together and were respected and feared for their political skills and military bravery. Vast stretches of land in the Americas, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe were ruled by emperors whose legitimacy derived from spreading God’s word across the world (as did the Ottomans and Bourbons) or bringing civilization to “backward” peoples (as France and Great Britain claimed to do in their colonies). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, such empires covered about half of the world’s surface, while dynastic kingdoms, tribal confederacies, city-states, and so forth, made up most of the rest, as Figure 1.1 shows.

In this world of empires, dynastic kingdoms, city-states, and tribal confederacies, few wars concerned the ethno-national composition of government. Rather, they were fought by dynastic states over the balance of power between them or over the rightful successor to a throne. Empires conquered fertile lands

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


FIGURE 1.1 Empires, nation-states, and other types of polities, 1816–2001

Notes: states smaller than 25,000 km² are excluded; data are from Chapter 4.

far away from their capitals. Alliances of city-states competed over trade routes or rural hinterlands. Rebellious movements saw to bring heavenly order to the corrupt politics of the day or to repeal an unjust tax increase. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, still only one-fourth of the wars were ethno-nationalist, as can be seen from Figure 1.2, while balance-of-power wars between states, wars of conquest, and non-ethnic civil wars each comprised another quarter of all violent conflicts.

A contemporary observer looks at a different world and through different eyes. The globe is divided into a series of sovereign states, each supposed to represent a nation bound together by shared history and common culture. To us, this political map seems as obvious as the shapes of continents and the rivers that run through them. With the exception of the Middle Eastern monarchies and some small European principalities, most of today's states are ruled in the name of a nation of equal citizens, rather than dynasty or divine will. Statehood has become so much associated with nationalist principles that the terms nations and states are often used interchangeably, as in the "United Nations" or in "inter-national."

Most of today's more prominent and protracted wars are also associated with the national principle – the idea that each people should be self-ruled, that ethnic like should be governed by like. The independence struggle of Abkhazians against the Georgian state or the conflict between Protestant and Catholic parties and militias in Northern Ireland come to mind. Figure 1.2 shows that at the end of the twentieth century, over three-quarters of all full-scale wars – those armed conflicts costing more than 1,000 battle deaths – were fought either by




FIGURE 1.2 The ethno-nationalization of war, 1816–2001

Notes: ten-year moving averages; for data sources see Chapter 4; 1 marks wars associated with the conquests of Africa and Central Asia; 2 marks wars associated with World War II.

nationalists who seek to establish a separate nation-state or over the ethnic balance of power within an existing state. Contrary to what Karl Marx had predicted, the twentieth century has turned into the age of ethno-nationalist conflict, rather than revolutionary class struggle.

This book seeks to explain this momentous transformation of the political world – from a world of multiethnic empires, dynastic kingdoms, tribal confederacies, and city-states to a world of states each ruled in the name of a nation properly seated in the general assembly of the UN; from localized political identities to large-scale ethnic or national communities with often millions, sometimes tens of millions, of members; from wars of conquest, succession, and tax rebellions to wars in the name of national sovereignty and grandeur, ethnic autonomy, and the like.

How has this transformation come about? Existing scholarship has mostly focused on how strong, territorially centralized states have emerged in Western Europe and beyond. Charles Tilly's famed dictum that "wars made states and states made war" referred to the rise of these absolutist states from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. This book takes this story from the early modern period into our present day and from Western Europe to the world. It is not concerned with the development of the sovereign territorial state, as were Tilly and his successors, but why these states became nation-states and how this particular model of legitimizing political power proliferated across the world. It shows that

the shift from dynasticism and empire to the nation-state was both the cause and consequence of a new wave of wars long after early modern states had been formed in previous centuries of warfare. This new wave, carried forward by the power of nationalist ideologies, reached different parts of the world at different points in time, rolling over Latin America during the early nineteenth century and finally arriving in the Soviet Union by the end of the twentieth.

In a nutshell, the argument offered in this book proceeds along the following lines. Nationalism as a new principle of legitimacy emerged from Tilly's war-making Western states. Increasing state centralization and military mobilization led to a new contract between rulers and ruled: the exchange of political participation and public goods against taxation and the military support by the population at large. The idea of the nation as an extended family of political loyalty and shared identity provided the ideological framework that reflected and justified this new compact. It meant that elites and masses should identify with each other and that rulers and ruled should hail from the same people.

This new compact made the first nation-states of Great Britain, the United States, and France militarily and politically more powerful than dynastic kingdoms or land-based empires because they offered the population a more favorable exchange relationship with their rulers and were thus considered more legitimate. Ambitious political leaders around the world adopted this new model of statehood, hoping that they too would one day preside over similarly powerful states. These nationalists subsequently were able to establish new nation-states wherever the power configuration favored their ascent and allowed them to overthrow or gradually transform the old regime, leading to cascades of nation-state creations that altered the political face of the world over the past 200 years.

This shift from empire, dynasticism, or theocracy to national principles of legitimizing political power is a major source of war in the modern era. First, nationalists who now portrayed the ethnic hierarchies of empire as violations of the like-over-like principle resorted to arms to fight for independent nation-states. Second, newly founded nation-states competed with each other over ethnically mixed territories or over the political fate of co-nationals across the border who were ruled by ethnic others. Third, civil wars broke out when the new nation-states were captured by ethnic elites who excluded others from the political and symbolic benefits of self-rule. Such ethno-political exclusion and conflict is especially marked in states that lacked the institutional capacity and organizational bases to realize the project of nation building and to offer political participation and public goods to the population at large, rather than only to the ethnic constituencies of the dominant elites.

Nationalism thus motivated a bloody, generation-long struggle over who should rule over whom. It lasted until the like-over-like principle was realized through border changes, expulsions and ethnic cleansings, assimilation and nation building or political accommodation and power sharing between various

ethnic elites. Based on the global datasets introduced further below, we can calculate that the likelihood of war more than doubles after nationalism has gained a foothold in a political arena; and it remains high over generations after a nation-state has been founded.¹

2 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS

While the book tells this story of the rise and global spread of the nation-state and the waves of war it generated, it is not a history book, and it does not have a narrative structure. Rather, it explores the forces underlying these historical developments with the help of social science techniques of analysis and with large datasets that cover the entire modern world – the kind of datasets that make it possible to draw the preceding two figures. Besides introducing such new datasets, the analysis offers important substantial insights for our understanding of world history over the past two centuries. Both contributions are briefly summarized here.

2.1 Bringing power and legitimacy center stage

The book aims to show that political power and legitimacy need to move center stage in all three areas of scholarship that it addresses: on nation building and ethnic politics, on nation-state formation, and on war. It will demonstrate how particular power relations between the state and other political actors combine with their varying visions of a legitimate political order to produce different political identities, forms of statehood, and dynamics of violent conflict.

More specifically, the book derives the political salience and legitimacy of political identities from a specific distribution of power and resources between the state and the population at large. Both ethnic group formation and nation building result from a renegotiation of the relationship between rulers and ruled during the process of political modernization (in line with Bates 1974; Wimmer 2002). Depending on how the distribution of resources and power between rulers and ruled change, political alliances form along ethnic lines, or the population at large shifts its loyalty to the state elite and identifies with the overarching national category. Ethnic groups and nations thus both represent equilibrium outcomes of the modernization process. This analysis contributes to the “constructivist” literature on ethnicity and nationalism by offering a precise, mechanism-based

¹ More precisely, the predicted probability of war is 1.1 percent in territories without nationalism – controlling for degrees of democratization, neighboring wars, the presence of oil resources, and political instability. This probability increases to 2.5 percent in the period after a first national(ist) organization has been founded. These figures were calculated on the basis of Model 1 in Table 4.2. Results are almost identical if we also control for levels of economic development and population size, which reduce the number of observations considerably.

analysis of the power configurations that provide either nations or specific ethnic cleavages with popular legitimacy and political meaning.

The book also introduces a power-cum-legitimacy approach to our understanding of the global spread of the nation-state. Shifts in the power relations between adherents of different ideas of legitimate statehood – dynasticism, imperial universalism, or national sovereignty – are crucial in understanding this momentous transformation of the political world over the past 200 years (in line with the general thrust of the work of Roeder 2007). The nation-state form was not universally adopted because one society after the other gradually ripened enough – as theories of modernization would have it – to finally fall as fully blossomed nations onto the garden of the inter-“national” community. Nor did the nation-state proliferate across the globe because the international system forced national sovereignty upon people after people. Similar to contagion processes, the global rise of the nation-state resulted from the concatenation of local and regional power shifts in favor of nationalists without much help from the global system. This power-configurational analysis sheds new light on a process that remains poorly understood, despite its obvious historical importance, in comparative sociology and international relations scholarship.

Finally, the book offers an analysis of war that again brings questions of political power and legitimacy to the foreground. It demonstrates that the shift of these principles of legitimacy – from empire to nation-state – is a major cause of both inter-state and civil wars over the past 200 years. This is often neglected in existing scholarship in international relations, which has paid only scarce attention to how transforming the nature of the units composing the inter-“national” system has affected war processes. The book also brings power and legitimacy to the study of civil wars that is at the core of a vast and fast-growing comparative politics literature. It demonstrates that civil wars and armed conflicts are most likely in ethnocracies that violate the principles of ethnic self-rule. Dominant political economy approaches to civil war, which focus on the conditions that make rebellion economically attractive or militarily feasible, need to be complemented with an analysis of the struggle over the power and legitimacy of the state.

2.2 New data to answer old questions

Studying nation-state formation and war has long been the exclusive domain of qualitative styles of historical research. The classic oeuvres on nationalism and the nation-state, for example, were written by historically minded social scientists such as Ernest Gellner, John Breuilly, or Michael Mann. They traced the origins of the nation-state in England, France, and the United States and then described, using examples from across the world, how it diffused over the globe. Besides these world historical narratives, entire libraries have been written on each individual trajectory of nation-state formation in the West. Others have

teased out the differences, similarities, and interlinkages between a handful of cases, often deriving big conclusions from small numbers.²

Most of the chapters that follow use the tools of statistical analysis to identify recurring patterns in the tapestry woven by hundreds of such specific historical threads. They will analyze newly created datasets that cover the entire world over very long periods of time and will thus allow identifying those causal mechanisms that structure more than one context and period. Such a quantitative approach based on global datasets can counterweigh against the “European provincialism” that plagues the literature on nationalism and nation-state formation, as one of its most prominent authors has trenchantly observed (Anderson 1991: xiii).³ Emphasizing old-world developments would be less problematic if the nation-state had remained confined to the area of its origin instead of proliferating across the world, or if the earliest nation-states had indeed all been located in Europe such that those of “the rest” could be seen as belated completions of a universal sequence. However, as Anderson reminds us, the first continent to become thoroughly nationalized was the Americas, not Europe. And many non-Western nation-states came into existence before those of Europe. There is thus no reason why Holland should be given more analytical weight than Haiti, Germany more than Japan, or Belgium more than Bolivia. A quantitative approach based on global datasets gives equal weight to all cases, while allowing analysis of how they relate to each other through diffusion and imitation.

An inverse bias exists in work on ethnic politics and conflict. Here, Western scholars see themselves standing above the abyss of violence into which the leaders of many new nation-states in the East and South have thrown their populations. Studying ethnic conflicts in Africa, for example, has developed into a small research industry among comparative political scientists. But the history of Western states is punctuated by frequent episodes of ethnic cleansing and nationalist wars as well, not least during the two world wars. To see whether the West and “the rest” indeed show similar patterns of violence and war associated with the spread of nationalism and the rise of the nation-state, we thus need a perspective looking over the long run and the entire globe, rather than restricting the horizon to the world’s new nation-states or the postwar period, as is the case in most comparative politics scholarship on civil war.

In order to develop such a long-term and global perspective, one needs to turn the usual relationship between data and research questions on its head. Instead of searching for new questions that have not yet been answered with

² See the well-known critique by Lieberson (1991).

³ The articles submitted to the leading journal in the field of nationalism studies, *Nations and Nationalisms*, illustrate the disproportionate attention given to Europe: 21.5% of all manuscripts submitted since the first issue was published in 1985 were concerned with Western Europe, followed by Eastern Europe with 13.3% of the articles, then Asia, excluding the Middle East, with 12.6%, followed by Oceania with 8.7%. Only 5.4% of the articles concerned Africa, and even fewer North America (4%) or South America (2.5%).

existing datasets, new data need to be collected to answer old questions. Creating and analyzing such new datasets with global coverage represents a second major contribution that this book seeks to make to the scholarly literature. I review these data-collection efforts briefly here.

Quantitative research on civil wars often uses the readily available ethnic fractionalization index – measuring the likelihood that two randomly chosen individuals speak the same language – to see whether more diverse societies are more war-prone. Obviously, this measurement is only indirectly related to the dynamics of ethnic competition and exclusion that a long line of qualitative researchers – from John S. Furnivall (1939) to Clifford Geertz (1963), Donald Horowitz (1985), and Roger Petersen (2002) – has identified as the source of ethnic conflict. To bring quantitative research on armed conflict closer to this rich qualitative tradition of scholarship, Lars-Erik Cederman, Brian Min, and I assembled a new dataset that measures such competition and exclusion in all countries of the world and for decades of yearly observations. As Chapter 5 demonstrates, this allows us to ask more relevant questions about the nexus between ethnicity and war and to show that it is not demographic diversity that breeds violent conflict, but rather exclusionary ethno-political configurations of power.

Similarly, the relation between nation-state formation and violence cannot be properly understood with off-the-shelf datasets. These mostly take independent states as units of observation and analysis. On the one hand, this is a matter of convenience since only modern, independent states produce statistics. On the other hand, the setup of standard datasets resonates well with how both researchers and lay observers have learned to see the world – as a “family of nations” each represented by a differently colored area on a world map.

To overcome this “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), we need a universe of observations that includes colonial dependencies or pre-colonial states. Chapters 3 and 4 explore two new datasets that contain information on all territories of the world since 1816, independently of whether or not they were governed by sovereign states. This allows tracing the destiny of the world’s entire population over the past two centuries and generates new insights into the dynamics of nation-state creation and its consequences for war and peace.

Another chapter reaches even deeper back into history, at the prize of focusing on two societies only. In order to see whether nation building and ethnic group formation are indeed determined by the resource and power distribution between state elites and the population at large, I have assembled data for France from the Renaissance period to the Third Republic and for the Ottoman empire from the classical age to the Young Turk revolution. These data are then fed into the formal model developed in Chapter 2. It thus takes a step beyond most other rational choice or game-theoretic models of historical processes that often rest on plausibility assumptions alone and thus are only weakly rooted in empirical data.

All five chapters, along with the long appendices that document these various data-gathering efforts, illustrate the price to pay when going beyond existing datasets. It often means struggling for each data-point, toiling through substantial amounts of sources to find that single piece of information to be filled into the cell of a spreadsheet that seems to extend its borders overnight. Are the results worth the efforts? That is for the reader to decide.

3 FOUR METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

But who would want to promote the illusion that context-free and timeless “laws of history” could ever be discovered through quantitative analysis? By adhering to the following four methodological principles, we can avoid such an overly ambitious scientism all the while identifying repeating causal dynamics in historical processes. First, we should acknowledge that causal regularity and contingency do not rule each other out, but combine to produce particular historical outcomes (King *et al.* 1994: chapter 2). It is certainly true, for example, that the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand was a contingent event. His driver took a wrong turn into a side street of Sarajevo, where Gavrilo Princip, a pan-Serbian nationalist conspirator, happened to be on his way to lunch. He spotted and shot the archduke. This series of coincidences kindled the powder keg of World War I. But there was a powder keg waiting for a spark: a system of dyadic, uncoordinated alliances between rival states combined with the pressure of nationalist movements that sought to escape the “prisons of nations” as which they saw Eastern Europe’s empires. Contemporary Europe lacks both of these conditions and it is quite unlikely that any contingent events happening on the continent will trigger a third world war at any point in the foreseeable future.

If this book seeks to explore general causal patterns, rather than historically specific chains of events, it is a matter of emphasis and choice, and not a principled stance against the role of contingency to which historical sociology has recently paid so much attention (Wagner-Pacifi 2010). While currently rather out of favor in much of sociology (*ibid.*) and comparative politics (Pierson 2003), I hope that the search for recurring long-term historical patterns can be revitalized by demonstrating that it produces robust empirical results.⁴

Second, a quantitative approach to historical processes should carefully specify the scope conditions of causal regularities in order to avoid overdrawn claims to universal validity. Some patterns may be local – they only recur throughout the history of Thailand, for example – while others are of a regional

⁴ Development economists (Nunn 2009), neo-Malthusians working on political history (Turchin 2003) or demography (e.g. Bengtsson *et al.* 2004), and comparative political scientists studying democratization (Boix 2011) have started to explore long-term historical patterns using quantitative techniques. Some of this research has found an intellectual home in the new journal *Cliodynamics*.

scope – they exclusively shape the trajectories of former Ottoman dependencies – and still others might affect the entire world. Some causal regularities might be period specific and only effective, perhaps, after the American president Wilson had declared national sovereignty to be the right of every people on the planet. Others are valid for the entire modern age.

When searching for globally recurring causal regularities, we therefore have to pay careful attention to possible regional and period effects (Young 2009). They are best analyzed by “converting context to cause” (Collier and Mazzuca 2006) using dummy variables – investigating, for example, whether having been an Ottoman dependency is associated with a different dynamic of nation-state creation (see Chapter 3). Regional or period-specific regularities can be also discovered by sub-sample analysis, e.g. by analyzing the post-Wilsonian period in one equation and the pre-Wilsonian period in another (also in Chapter 3). To see whether the strength or even the direction of a causal relationship changes over time, key variables can be interacted with time, or we can analyze temporal sub-samples more systematically (as done by Isaac and Griffin 1989).

This book seeks to identify the causes of nation-state formation and war in the modern age, rather than those shaping particular periods and regional contexts. This is again not a matter of principle – nobody would deny that there are elements of nation-state formation and war in nineteenth-century Latin America (Centeno 2003) that are different from those of the late twentieth century Soviet Union (Beissinger 2002). Searching for regularities that hold across as many contexts as possible does come at a price, however: the story will necessarily have to be relatively abstract and general, forming a skeleton of arguments rather than a richly fleshed out and nuanced historical narrative. Whether one prefers the bones over the flesh, or whether one needs both, as lovers of mixed-method stews would argue, is largely a matter of intellectual taste, rather than of choosing between more or less “rigor,” let alone empirical accuracy.

Third, this search for global patterns does not rule out that the same outcome might have multiple causes. The forces leading to ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland, to give an example, might be different from those that produced the Lebanese civil war. Such causal heterogeneity (Ragin 1989) can be discovered in a quantitative research design, for instance, with interaction effects (as in Chapter 3) or through multinomial regression analysis (see Chapter 5).

Fourth, qualitative inspection of cases and quantitative analysis of large numbers has to be combined in order to make sure that the statistical associations capture relevant mechanisms. For example, statistical analysis might discover that oil is associated with armed conflict. When investigating which cases underlie this finding, we encounter, among other “positive hits,” that Mexico has oil and it has seen the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas from 1994 onwards. But the violence was not the result of a greedy hunt for oil rents. Rather, it emerged because Chiapas’ entrenched *Ladino* elite had blocked land reform for generations (Collier and Lowery Quaratiello 1994). If many more such cases underlie

a correlation, it might be entirely spurious. Ideally, one would therefore check case by case whether a statistical association makes historical sense and is based on a causal mechanism that conforms to the theoretical expectations (Lieberman 2005; see also Fearon and Laitin n.d.). In other words, quantitative analysis of historical processes should be undertaken with a qualitative, historically trained, and case-oriented mind-set. It encourages us to take off the faceplate of the statistical machine and examine in detail how the products that it spits out were actually shaped and if they do relate to empirically traceable processes in meaningful ways.

4 ON THEORY: NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, POWER

Now that the general methodological strategy has been outlined, it is appropriate to face the theoretical challenges that understanding nation-state formation, ethnic politics, and violent conflict entail. Since the chapters address different, more specialized audiences within the broader social science community – from the comparative historical sociology of nationalism to the war literatures in comparative politics and international relations – this section sketches out the general theoretical perspective that holds the book together. Its aims are rather modest: it does not offer a new theory, but rather an analytical framework that underlies the empirical research of the coming chapters. This framework is squarely centered on how power, legitimacy, and conflict relate to each other and how they are intertwined with the politicization of social categories such as nations, ethnic groups, and the like. It brings three traditions in political sociology and comparative political science together: relational structuralism, an institutionalism focused on questions of legitimacy, and a power-configurational approach.

4.1 Political alliances and identities

The relational argument assumes that networks of political alliances determine which categorical cleavages – nations, various ethnic groups, social classes, regions, cities, or tribes – will become politically salient and the focus of popular identification. This assumption is shared by a recent strain of comparative historical work. It has shown that such cross-class networks of alliances, rather than social classes and their factions, represent the building blocks of political life and the basis on which politically relevant collective identities are often formed.⁵ Such political alliances can take the form of clientelist and patronage networks (as, for example, in Thailand);⁶ or of linkages between corporatist

⁵ See Gould (1995, 1996); Wimmer (2002); Ikegami (2005); Tilly (2006); Barkey (2008); Levi Martin (2009).

⁶ This is the case in many Mediterranean, Latin American and South and Southeast Asian societies or in American urban “political machines.” On clientelism, see Lemarchand and Legg (1972); Scott (1972); Clapham (1982); Fox (1994); Gould (1996); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007).

organizations such as state-organized peasant unions and the state (see Mexico under the PRI);⁷ or of networks of competing voluntary organizations allied with party machines (as in the United States); or of a system of favoritism and corruption that relate “neopatrimonial” bureaucrats to the population (as in many African states).⁸

Going beyond most relational approaches, I suggest to closely analyze the nature of the exchanges that underlie these political alliances and identities.⁹ Regardless of the different dynamics that the various types of alliance networks entail, the transactions linking state elites and the rest of the population can be described by a common matrix.¹⁰ State elites offer different degrees of political participation, sometimes through full-scale democracy, sometimes via informal influence channels. And they provide varying amounts and types of public goods, sometimes in the form of a welfare state, sometimes through patronage. The population, in turn, offers military support to a varying extent, sometimes in the form of an army based on universal conscription. And they trade public goods for different amounts of economic support, which they sometimes provide in the form of taxes, sometimes through bribes and gifts.

The nature of these exchanges is determined by the distribution of resources between state and other actors as well as the degree to which elites can obtain resources through coercion, rather than exchange. The micro-foundations of this relational part of the overall argument will be elaborated in Chapter 2. It will show how actors with various resource endowments strategize to end up in an alliance system that offers them the most beneficial exchange of goods.

Such exchange relationships are based on consent and mutual commitment and thus have long-term implications. They are not one-shot transactions, such as buying a piece of pork at a farmer’s market, nor are they based on coercion, such as when a soldier takes away a farmer’s pig at gunpoint. If repeated interactions generate relationships of mutual trust and commitment, exchange relationships can lead the partners to identify, over time, with each other,¹¹ thus producing political identities such as estates, nations, ethnic groups, tribes, cities,

⁷ See Schmitter (1974).

⁸ See Bratton and van de Walle (1994).

⁹ This focus on transactions, rather than network structures, follows up on Blau (1986).

¹⁰ For pioneering rational choice research along these lines, see Levi (1988) and Kiser and Linton (2001). See also the “state in society” approach by Midgal (2001), or the post-Tillean emphasis on coalitions and alliances between state builders and other social groups during early modern state formation in the work of Spruyt, Adams, Gorski, and others (summarized in Vu 2009).

¹¹ See also Tilly’s (2005) analysis of the emergence and transformation of trust networks. That exchange and cooperation will be accompanied by a corresponding social classification is shown by a long line of research in social psychology, which provides the micro-foundations for this part of my argument. It stretches from Tajfel (1981) to Kurzban *et al.* (2001), who have shown how coalitional alliances determine identity patterns and that they can even trump established modes of categorization such as race in the United States.

regions, and so forth, that roughly map onto the system of exchange networks and mirror its cleavages.

Social categories that reflect a particular structure of alliances and networks will appear natural and meaningful to participants and thus become taken-for-granted, routinized, and institutionalized. Cultural assimilation – such as through the coordination around shared behavioral norms (Deutsch 1953; Coleman 1990: chapter 11) – is more likely to proceed within such taken-for-granted and salient categories, which in turn leads individuals to choose alliance partners within these categories of culturally similar others (McElreath *et al.* 2003), thus further deepening the process of social closure and leading to a self-sustained equilibrium.¹²

At the end of this “endogenous” process, the corresponding social categories become institutionalized, more resistant to change, and more “sticky.”¹³ Institutionalized cleavage structures provide further incentives to emphasize these cleavages over others, above and beyond the exchange gains that they entail, and to build political alliances on the basis of those categories that are “built into” everyday routines. This basic insight is shared by a variety of historical institutionalist approaches¹⁴ and by a growing group of authors working in the fields of nationalism, ethnic politics, and conflict, many of whom followed the lead of David Laitin’s (1986) pioneering study.¹⁵

4.2 Principles of legitimacy

The resulting institutional structure – a set of routinized exchange alliances between actors and the corresponding social cleavage structure – can be more or less legitimate in the eyes of different segments of the population. Such varying degrees of legitimacy derive from a comparison between this institutional structure and an ideal image of which categories *should* be salient (the “who should be what” question) and what the exchange relationship between members of such categories *should* be (“who should get what”). A legitimate political order is therefore based on a widespread consensus that existing rules of exchange are fair (Levi 1997) and that the sorting of individuals into social categories and power positions is plausible and morally justifiable.¹⁶

¹² A self-reinforcing equilibrium persists as long as non-intended and intended consequences of actions that are influenced by institutional incentive structures tend not to undermine these arrangements. For a brilliant formal approach along these lines, see Greif and Laitin (2004).

¹³ For a more sophisticated approach to the problem of institutional stability, see Streeck and Thelen (2005a).

¹⁴ See diMaggio and Powell (1991); Steinmo *et al.* (1992); Brinton and Nee (2001); Pierson and Skocpol (2002).

¹⁵ See, among others, Brubaker (1996); Koopmans *et al.* (2005); Lieberman and Singh (forthcoming).

¹⁶ Posner’s (2005) institutionalism focuses on incentive structures provided by electoral systems, rather than routinized social categories.

¹⁶ On the concept of legitimacy, see most recently Gilley (2009); Hechter (2009b). My own approach is heavily influenced by Blau (1986).

In the context of this book's topic, we are mostly interested in the cognitive and moral templates of what a "just state" should look like, or more precisely, who has the right to rule.¹⁷ In dynastic monarchies, for example, the right to rule is restricted to the king's clan and no one in their right mind would think that an illiterate serf born in the deep provinces should ever hold the steering wheel of the state ship in her hands. In theocracies, those who have descended from the Prophet should rule, or those who have shown through lifelong religious devotion and study that they are able to act as God's representatives on earth. In some empires, the right to rule is restricted to members of the conquering tribe or ethnic group. In democracies, one needs to have gained the support of the majority of the entire citizenry in order to rule in legitimate ways.

Such principles of political legitimacy – templates of who should rule over whom and what obligations and benefits should accrue to both – can emerge through an endogenous process. When the distribution of power between actors changes, the system of alliances that these resource distributions allow, and the corresponding politically salient cleavages, will be transformed as well. Thus, new exchange relations and social categories emerge. If these offer the population at large a better deal – if fewer individuals are excluded from exchange relationships with the political center and if individuals receive more from state elites than they did under the previous arrangement – the new system of alliance and identification is likely to become transformed into the new moral standard against which reality is assessed. In other words, it will become loaded with normative expectations and thus consolidated as the new template of legitimacy.¹⁸

But categories and principles of legitimacy also travel between societies with differently structured alliance networks and categorical cleavage structures. This works through both a power and a legitimacy mechanism. First, certain modes of alliance and identification prove to be economically and militarily more efficient and are thus likely to draw the attention of state builders elsewhere in the world (a power competition mechanism). Second, intellectuals and other groups with a wide cognitive horizon compare their own political system with that of others and tend to adopt those with higher rewards for the population at large as templates of legitimacy against which their own socio-political order is judged (a legitimacy comparison mechanism). The spread of nationalist ideologies to societies that had not yet seen much endogenous nation building is an example of such a process of "exogenous" diffusion, to be discussed in Chapter 3.

¹⁷ The idea of institutional templates stands at the center of the "new" institutionalism in sociology (for an overview, see Brinton and Nee 2001). The nation-state as an instance of such a template (or "paradigm," "modular form") is discussed by Young (1976), Anderson (1991), and Brubaker (1996). For differences in the conceptualization of institutions in political science and sociology, see Haller *et al.* (2011).

¹⁸ A similar, exchange-theoretic approach to the emergence of legitimacy was developed by Blau (1986: chapter 8), who also provides some micro-foundations for its major propositions.

At most points in time in most societies, therefore, there are more templates of legitimacy and more modes of social categorization available than those endogenously generated and sustained by a particular alliance structure. This opens up the possibility of conflict between different visions of the legitimate political order and thus of institutional change.

4.3 Power configurations and conflict

To understand such conflicts and change – the core preoccupation of this book – we need to add elements of a theory of power configurations. In line with the “contentious politics” tradition in sociology,¹⁹ I assume that political actors struggle for control over the central state as well as over its institutional shape – empire, theocracy, nation-state, dynastic kingdom, democracy or one-party rule, and so on.²⁰ Institutional stability and change is then a matter of the power relations between actors who emphasize different principles of legitimacy and different social categories they claim to represent (class, the nation, estates, ethnic groups, and so forth) (see Wimmer 1995c; Boix 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2010).

If the power configuration is favorable enough, those who aim at changing institutional principles of legitimacy might capture the state either through a revolutionary overthrow of the old regime or in a more gradual way by winning over more and more of its exponents.²¹ They can then reorganize the institutional incentive structures for the next round of political contestation and contention – either by altogether displacing existing institutions or by more gradually layering new institutional rules upon existing ones (Streeck and Thelen 2005b) – and therefore influence the future alliance structures that shape them. Accordingly, the institutional shape of a state depends upon the constellation of actor networks and the power relations between them, rather than on different stages of an evolutionary sequence, as foreseen by Marxists or scholars working in the tradition of modernization theory.²²

According to the analytical framework outlined so far, political conflict and war spring from three different sources. They form the nucleus of the understanding of violent conflict that this book seeks to promote. First, from both the relational and power-configurational points of view, violent conflicts are more likely if certain segments of the population are not part of the exchange

¹⁹ See most recently Tarrow and Tilly (2006).

²⁰ For a review of “state-centric” research on political revolutions, see Goodwin (2001: chapter 2).

²¹ The empowering of agents of change might well be the unintended consequence of existing institutional arrangements, as argued by Goodwin (2001) and formally modeled by Greif and Laitin (2004).

²² For a similar approach, see the elite conflict theory of Lachmann (2011) or more generally the power-distributional approach to institutional change succinctly summarized by Mahoney and Thelen (2010).

networks that bind a state and its society together because the flow of control from the top and of legitimacy from below is then interrupted. Political exclusion, in other words, fosters the mobilization of individual and collective actors, who are driven by their desire to get a more favorable balance of exchange with the state and gain access to the public and private goods at its disposal.

My argument does not specify the organizational and interactional micro-mechanisms through which exclusion produces mobilization and through which such mobilization can then escalate into violent confrontations. These micro-foundations have been elaborated by students of contentious politics (Tarrow and Tilly 2006) and need not be discussed here. The book merely specifies the conditions under which these mechanisms, such as mobilization–repression spirals, will be more likely to be triggered: the larger the population excluded from the exchange networks centered on the state and the more unfavorable the balance of exchanges with the state for those who are integrated into these networks.

Second and according to the institutionalist part of the analytical framework, conflict escalation is more likely if such political exclusion violates the principles of political legitimacy that actors have adopted because this will enhance the mobilization and determination of excluded groups. This “grievance” part of the argument rests on the assumption that frames of legitimacy are important motivational factors and organizational resources for political movements (Snow *et al.* 1986). Rather than assuming a constant level of “grievances” across history and across the world, as in some rationalist accounts of violent conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003), or a constant demand for ethnic self-rule (Hechter 2000), I focus on variation in levels of discontent and its emotional corollaries. Such variation results not only from different power configurations, but also from different principles of political legitimacy adopted by actors. The micro-foundations for such a view have been elaborated by others (Petersen 2002; Pinard 2011) and can be bracketed for the purpose of the present study.

Third and relatedly, political conflict and war are more likely to erupt when the contending forces seek to change the very institutional setup of a state because more is at stake in such “revolutionary” struggles over who has the right to rule. Actors will therefore be more willing to escalate conflict and use violent means to defend their interests. In a nutshell, political exclusion that violates established principles of legitimacy or that involves actors who seek to change these principles represents the most violence-prone contexts.

The theoretical approach outlined so far, centered on the analysis of political alliance networks, principles of legitimacy, and power configurations, thus provides the basis on which the empirical analysis in the following chapters stands. The various feedback loops between networks, institutions, and power configurations have been discussed elsewhere in detail (Wimmer 2008b), so that I can leave it here with this rather short sketch of the theoretical framework. The five empirical chapters narrate a complex causal story, weaving together

the relational, institutional, and power-configurational arguments, and giving them different weights depending on which phase in the transition from empire to nation-state we are focusing upon. The following three sections sketch out the major lines of this analysis and preview the most important findings of the book.

5 THE RISE AND SPREAD OF THE NATION-STATE

5.1 Negotiating nationhood

The analysis starts with the emergence of the first states built on nationalist principles. Existing approaches interpret nationhood either as ideological impositions by manipulative elites (Brass 1979; Mearsheimer 1990; Tilly 1994; Gagnon 2006) or, to the contrary, as popular sentiments nourished by deeply rooted ethnic memories and myths (Smith 1986) or by an eternal desire for ethnic self-rule (Hechter 2000). Both approaches tend to overlook the crucial role played by varying power distributions between elites and masses, and the types of resource exchanges that these allow. Neither ideological imposition “from above” nor popular sentiment rising from “the bottom up,” Chapter 2 will argue, ethnic group formation and nation building are best seen as negotiated accomplishments involving both elites and masses.

In other words, nation building and ethnic group formation result from a new compact between state elites and the population that is built on consent and the mutually favorable exchange of resources. Following the relational argument outlined above, elites and masses will then start trusting and identifying with each other and shift the focus of loyalty to the nation or an ethnic community. The chapter introduces a formal analysis of this process. It combines an exchange-theoretic and a game-theoretic model that together allow understanding the emergence of different political alliances and identities as an interactive process, rather than as a lonely choice that individuals make between different possible identities, as in much of the rational choice literature.

The model lets elites and masses exchange political participation against military support, and taxation against public goods. The exchange-theoretic part of the model assumes that actors exchange these resources and identify with each other on an exclusive basis and close their ranks against outsiders – thus modeling a process of social closure in line with Max Weber’s (1968) short treatment of the subject. The choice of who to enter into an exchange alliance with, and which competitors to best keep at arm’s length, is important because it affects how much of what actors want they can actually get. The exchange model also considers how far actors take cultural similarity into account when deciding with whom they would prefer to form an alliance. In societies where voluntary organizations, such as professional associations or trade unions, have flourished, I will argue, they will be less concerned with such cultural similarity.

The game-theoretic part of the model then determines which alliance system will result, given that different actors will have different preferences regarding whom to enter into an exchange relationship with. In a nutshell, we model the unequal symbolic power of elites and masses by letting state elites propose a system of alliance and identity first – for example nationhood. Other elite segments then react with their own proposal, perhaps ethnic closure. The masses move last and choose between either of these two proposals or the existing alliance system, depending on the resources these different systems would offer them.

This model is calibrated with historical data on how three of the four resources – taxation, military support, and public goods provision – were distributed over various segments of elites and masses in France (from 1300 to 1900) and the Ottoman empire (from 1500 to 1900). Such empirical calibration represents a considerable advantage over most formal models that tend to offer mathematically elegant thought experiments often only weakly grounded in empirical data. What results does this empirically calibrated model produce?

We focus on how political modernization changes the resource distribution between actors and thus the alliance system they negotiate. Increasing centralization shifts control over political decision-making and taxation away from provincial to central elites. Mass mobilization decreases the military role of provincial elites (such as a feudal nobility with armor and horses) and increases that of the masses armed with pikes and halberds. Mass mobilization also increases the population's interest in political participation. A third aspect of political modernization is the development of voluntary organizations that allow rulers to connect with subjects in new ways.

When modernization leads to highly centralized states and mobilized masses, state elites hold political decision-making power over the entire territory and provide most public goods such as hospitals for the poor and sick, roads and waterways, or policing. According to the model results, this allows them to break out of the elite coalition to which they had confined their alliances in the pre-modern period. They now link up to the masses, across existing ethnic and status divides, because they have come to depend on the masses' taxes and military support. The masses, in turn, shift their alliances and "trade" increasing taxation and military support in exchange for political participation and the public goods that the centralized state is able to provide. Corresponding to this inclusionary and encompassing alliance system, the nation as a mode of categorization and identification replaces the older estate order in which peasants identified with peasants and nobles with nobles. Paralleling Margaret Levi's (1997) work on patriotism and consent, we thus show how a state built on coercive resource extraction – as in the pre-modern imperial order – was replaced with a state held together by an exchange system built on voluntary consent and by a shared national identity.

Where state elites were weaker vis-à-vis other elites and the population at large, they were not able to offer sufficient public goods and political

participation to make the nation an attractive enough category to identify with. Furthermore, elite competition over the military support of the masses made an alliance between different elite factions – as it had existed in the imperial order – seem rather unattractive. The result is that individuals ally with their respective ethnic elites, rather than all members of the polity. Political closure then proceeded along ethnic, rather than national, lines. This tendency is even more pronounced, as will be shown, if actors do care about cultural similarity when considering with whom to exchange resources – as they do when there are few voluntary associations that could provide the organizational basis for linking rulers and ruled. Interestingly enough, this is true even if cultural similarity and difference are structured along class divisions, rather than ethnic divides. Ethnic closure can thus result as an equilibrium outcome even if ethnic groups don't share a common cultural heritage.

How well is this formal model able to make sense of actual historical developments in the two societies under consideration? According to our historical research on Renaissance France and the Ottoman empire of the classical age, low levels of state centralization and mass mobilization characterized both polities before the modern age. When calibrated with these two specific resource distributions, the model's actors negotiate an alliance between various elite factions with each other, at the exclusion of all segments of the masses. And indeed, the structure of alliances and identities had set off the nobility (in France) or the military caste (of the Ottoman empire) from the rest of the population, to which it related mainly through coercion, rather than mutually beneficial exchange. When increasing state centralization and mass mobilization until they reach the level that we empirically observe in late eighteenth-century France, the model generates nation building as the equilibrium outcome, again in line with historical reality: the French revolution first introduced the concept of the nation as a community of equals. A century later and after a further leap in state centralization, ethnic and regional identities had faded into the background and the population as a whole identified with the French nation and its state, as the famed book title *Peasants into Frenchmen* by Eugen Weber (1979) suggests.

For the distribution of resources that characterized the Ottoman empire of the early nineteenth century, the model foresees ethnic closure, rather than nation building, given comparatively lower levels of state centralization. This again makes historical sense: from the nineteenth century onward, ethno-religious communities (the *millets*) became institutionally reinforced, politically empowered, and the focus of identity for the minority population. The idea that all subjects of the Sublime Port would "fuse," in the words of Ottoman reformers, into one people loyal to the Sultan and the state was never embraced by the population of the empire. Instead, the ethno-religious *millets* – and later also Kurds and Arabs – were soon politicized and turned into aspiring nations of their own, to paraphrase Kemal Karpaz's (1973) title "From Millet to Nation."

While the aim of this chapter is certainly not “retrodictions” – an impossible task given the complexity of history and the role of contingent events – it is nevertheless assuring that the equilibriums produced by the formal model do relate to actual historical developments in such meaningful ways. The main point of the chapter, however, is to show that nation building and the politicization of ethnic divisions are both the result of political modernization, but represent different equilibrium outcomes depending on the specific resource distribution that emerged.³³ Weakly centralized states will not see durable alliances with all segments of the population and nationalism will not spread and become adopted as a main framework of identity.

This is why ethnic closure – the organization of political loyalties and identities around sub-national communities – is a widespread feature of weakly centralized states with weak civil societies, with important consequences for the dynamics of ethnic politics and the potential for violent conflict, as many students of post-colonial nation building in the developing world have noticed. These consequences will be fully explored in Chapter 5. The next step in the analysis, however, is to understand why the rest of the world adopted the nation-state form, once it had emerged endogenously in France (and elsewhere) from the late eighteenth century onward, although the internal conditions were often not ripe for nation building. This is the task of Chapter 3.

5.2 The global rise of the nation-state

The early nation-states became attractive models to copy because their leaders could rely on the military loyalty and political support of the masses of the population. This had obvious advantages, as the success of Napoleon’s armies demonstrated. The nation-state model was therefore “pirated,” in Benedict Anderson’s terms, by ambitious political leaders across the world and across times. They hoped to one day govern states that matched the military glory, political power, and economic might of the early nation-states that soon came to dominate the entire world. Nationalist intellectuals around the world were also drawn to this new model of organizing politics because it seemed to offer the population at large a better exchange relationship with the central elites – more rights, better public goods provision, and more dignity – and thus became the template of a legitimate political order they were striving for. Power competition and legitimacy comparison thus fueled a global imitation process. The spread of nationalism around the world, however, is not the focus

³³ Is there a problem of reversed causation? France had already reached the high levels of centralization and mobilization at which our model predicts nation building shortly *before* the French revolution produced a nation-state, thus excluding the possibility that nationalism and nation building had created such high levels of centralization and mobilization. To be sure, there is a positive feedback effect: the spread of nationalist ideologies allows further centralization and leads to additional mass mobilization, thus further pushing the exchange relationship toward the new equilibrium.

of Chapter 3.²⁴ Rather, it treats the proliferation of nationalisms as an antecedent and seeks to explore the conditions under which nationalists were able to establish a nation-state.

In contrast to the emergence of the first nation-states analyzed in Chapter 2, I will argue, its further spread across the world depended on a power configuration in favor of nationalists, rather than an endogenous transformation of the exchange relationships and alliance networks binding state elites and the masses together. Many nation-states thus were formed without a previous process of nation building. This analysis parallels Theda Skocpol's (1979) well-known study of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, in which she showed that the political power configuration centered on the state was more crucial than class relations or the revolutionary consciousness of the masses in bringing about a revolutionary cataclysm.

Similarly I will show how a shift in the balance of power in favor of nationalists – brought about by political mobilization, wars, and diffusion effects – explains when and where the nation-state is adopted. Similar to evolutionary biology, then, the emergence of the nation-state as a new institutional form (the analogue to genetic mutation) and the mechanisms of its subsequent proliferation across the world (similar to the effects of natural selection) represent processes of a different nature that need to be analyzed with different tools and in separate steps.

This approach contrasts with much of the existing literature on the rise and global spread of the nation-state, which highlights domestic modernization processes that are supposed to bring about the nation-state whenever they reach a critical level. Political modernization, Tilly (1994) and Hechter (2000) argued, led to a shift from indirect to direct rule, often by ethnic others, which in turn mobilized the population under the banners of nationalism. Anderson's (1991) brilliant book emphasizes cultural modernization. The spread of mass literacy in vernacular languages, so the argument goes, made the imagining of national communities possible and eventually forced state institutions into this new identitarian mold. According to Gellner (1983), industrialization "needs" a culturally homogenous labor force, which is eventually provided by the educational apparatus of a nation-state. Other prominent authors such as John Meyer (Meyer *et al.* 1997) put the finger on diffusion mechanisms at the global level, rather than domestic modernization. A hegemonic world culture holds a monopoly on the definition of legitimate statehood and forces more and more state-builders all over the world to adopt the nation-state form, independent of local political conditions.²⁵

²⁴ See Badie (2000).

²⁵ This style of reasoning can also be found in "international society-centric constructivism" in international relations scholarship (Hobson 2000).

To test these various arguments, Chapter 3 uses a new dataset containing information on 140 territories across the world before they became modern nation-states, covering all years since 1816. Analysis of this dataset shows that nation-states are created when a power shift allows nationalists to overthrow or absorb the established regime. The power balance shifts in favor of nationalists if the established regime is weakened by wars or if nationalists have had ample time to decry ethno-political hierarchies as instances of “alien rule” and to mobilize followers. Diffusion of nation-states among neighbors or within the same empire also empowers nationalists by providing them with a model to imitate and new alliance partners to rely upon. On the other hand, nationalists are at a disadvantage when they struggle against an empire that disposes of much global military and economic power. Figure 1.3 shows how these different aspects of the configuration of power between nationalists and the old regime influence the likelihood of nation-state creation.

There is no evidence, on the other hand, that industrialization, the spread of mass literacy, or increasing administrative penetration and direct rule bring about the nation-state, as maintained by the theories of economic, cultural, and political modernization mentioned above. While endogenous nation building is indeed the consequence of political centralization and the establishment of direct rule, as shown in Chapter 2, the global rise of the nation-state seems to be quite detached from a state’s capacity to directly rule over a territory. Nation-states are also not more likely to emerge the more the world is already populated by nation-states or the more ties a territory has established with the centers of world culture, as predicted by those who believe in the coercive power of the world polity. It thus seems that the global legitimacy of the nation-state model *results* from its proliferation across the world, rather than the other way round.²⁶ As one territory after another became governed as a nation-state, a global consensus emerged that it represents the sole legitimate form of government.

Local and regional processes not coordinated or causally produced by global social forces can thus generate a global outcome: the almost universal adoption of the nation-state form over the past 200 years. As in epidemiology, processes of contagion follow established networks of political relationships and communication that span the entire world. The logic of contagion is purely local, however, and produces a decentralized pattern of diffusion, all the while generating the illusion of a systemic process when seen from a global point of view.

²⁶ This argument is in line with “second image” theories of international politics and more specifically with the revised “liberal” theory of Moravcsik (1997: 540). Note that it does not exclude a possible feedback mechanism – the more states converge on the nation-state model, the more a global cultural consensus emerges that encourages further convergence (see Risse-Kappen 1996) – but it most certainly rules out reverse causation: that world political culture *produces* nationally constituted statehood in the first place.




FIGURE 1.3 How the balance of power affects the likelihood of nation-state formation (in %)

Notes: calculated as percentage change in the likelihood of NSC when the value of a variable is increased over its mean²⁷ as compared to the likelihood when all variables are set to their means; all effects are significant at the $p < 0.01$ level; calculations similar to Model 7 in Table 3.1; $N=16,488$ observations in 145 territories.

6 NATION-STATES AND VIOLENCE

6.1 Nation-state formation and war

Chapter 4 will show that this universal shift to the nation-state model is a major cause of war in the modern world, thus challenging mainstream approaches in international relations and comparative politics according to which principles of political legitimacy and their transformation play no important role in explaining war and peace. How does the shift from imperial or dynastic to nationalist principles of legitimacy produce wars? First, nationalism with its core ideology of political self-rule – the right to be governed by “one’s own” – delegitimizes

²⁷ For years since first national organization and the imperial share of global power I chose an increase close to a standard deviation. All other variables are increased by one unit.

the rule of imperial, aristocratic, or theocratic elites and decries ethnic exclusion hitherto accepted as part of the legitimate order. Nationalism thus motivates and enables political entrepreneurs to fight secessionist wars against “alien rule.” The prolonged and bloody struggles for national independence in Algeria, Angola, Bolivia, Indonesia, Mexico, the United States, or Vietnam are well-known examples. When nationalists face a domestic old regime, rather than an empire, civil wars pitting nationalist reformers against *ancien régime* elites might bring about a national revolution – as through the short “war of the special league” in Switzerland of 1847 or the civil war after Japan’s Meiji “restoration” two decades later.

Once the nation-state has been established, nationalist principles of legitimacy are reinforced and institutionalized, making both civil and inter-state wars more likely wherever these principles are violated. In Chapter 2, we will see that in modernizing states with lower degrees of political centralization and reduced capacity to provide public goods, as well as in societies with weakly developed networks of voluntary organizations, political alliances and identities tend to form along ethnic, rather than national, lines. The ruling elites thus favor their co-ethnics over all others when it comes to providing public good or shaping public policies. This may trigger the second conflict-generating mechanism identified above: leaders of excluded groups can now decry the breach of the principle of ethnic self-rule and demand a nation-state of their own, or at least a fair share of the governmental cake. They can now evoke the very principles of nationalism – that ethnic likes should be ruled by ethnic likes – to legitimize their claims and mobilize followers. The ensuing competition for control over the nation-state might escalate into full-scale rebellions.

The shift to the nation-state model and the political exclusion along ethnic lines that it fosters in weakly centralized states also increases the likelihood of inter-state war. The rulers of new states might interfere in the affairs of neighboring states to protect their co-ethnics across the border from the fate of second-class citizenship they might have to endure as ethnic minorities in a state “owned” by a different people. Apart from pure balance-of-power considerations and strategic motivations (highlighted by Mylonas forthcoming), leaders care for co-nationals across the border because they have to show to their own constituencies that they are indeed concerned by the fate of the nation and that they will not tolerate that their “brothers and sisters” across the border suffer from political discrimination. Such interference and competition over “mixed” territories increases the likelihood of armed conflict between nationalizing states. Examples are the two Balkan wars, the competing movements for independent states that emerged during the world wars, or more recently the tensions between Sudan and the newly independent Southern Sudan.

How can one show that nation-state formation leads to war? Standard datasets take independent states as units of observation and thus cannot analyze the wars associated with their emergence. To overcome this problem, we have




FIGURE 1.4 The big picture: nation-state formation and war since 1816

Notes: moving 20-year average; 95 percent confidence interval in gray; data are from Chapter 4; $N=27,700$ observations on 150 territories.

assembled a new dataset that records the outbreak of war on fixed geographical territories from 1816 to 2001. The shift to constant territorial units also forced us to create a new dataset on all wars that have ever been fought on these 156 territories since 1816, using a wide range of existing war lists, compendia, and historical sources.

Are civil and international wars indeed more likely during nation-state formation? Figure 1.4 offers an unequivocal answer to this question. It plots the percentage of territories on which a war broke out for each year before and after a nation-state was formed. The x-axis therefore does not record chronological time, but shows the transformation clock for all individual territories. The year of nation-state creation is set at zero, which corresponds to the year 1998 in the case of Bhutan, for example, but 1820 in the case of Spain. The vertical bars centered on the line indicate “confidence intervals at the 95 percent level.” In everyday language, this means that where these bars do not cross the line representing the mean probability of war in all territories and years, we can be almost certain that the likelihood of war is different from that mean and not the product of chance alone.

Figure 1.4 shows that the transformation of the international system from a world of empires, kingdoms, city-states, and tribal confederacies into a world of nation-states has indeed been associated with war. This pattern recurs in every wave of nation-state creation since Napoleon and on every continent. The shift to territorial units of observation and a long-term perspective thus reveals what

has so far been hidden from view: that nation-state formation represents a crucial source of war in the modern world. To be sure, nationalism and nation-state formation do not explain all wars ever fought on the globe. My argument is not tailored to understand, for example, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 or the communist insurgencies in Latin America of the 1970s. These are, by the way, responsible for the smaller hump in war probability 120 to 150 years after nation-state formation shown in Figure 1.4.

Still, highlighting the nationalist foundations of many modern wars represents an important insight. Traditional “realist” international relations approaches (see the overview in Levy and Thompson 2010) look at the distribution of military capabilities in an anarchic world of competing states each exclusively concerned with their own security. Rationalist accounts seek to demonstrate that states go to war if their evaluations of who would win diverge from each other. Other scholars identify those pairs of states that are most war-prone: those with territorial disputes and a long history of rivalry, or those in which one of the states is a democracy and the other an autocracy, or those not bound together by dense networks of trade.

In this vast and sophisticated literature, nationalism has not been treated as a serious candidate for explaining wars. “Nationalism,” writes a prominent “realist,” represents a mere “second order force in international politics” (Mearsheimer 1990: 21) because it is “caused in large part by security competition among ... states, which compelled ... elites to mobilize publics to support national defense efforts” (*ibid.*: 12). Obviously, as Miller (2007: 32) notes, this fails to account for why most nationalist movements are directed *against* existing states – as in the anti-imperial, secessionist nationalisms that have transformed the shape of the world in the past two centuries. With the single exception of an article by Maoz (1989), even the very creation of new states has not been treated as a potential source of war in modern history.

Mainstream international relations theory thus overlooks that “unit-level transformation”²⁸ – the shift from an international system composed of empires and dynastic kingdoms to a system composed of nation-states – is *itself* an important cause of war. The small literature on the role of nationalism in international relations is squarely focused either on how states militarily intervene in favor of co-nationals in neighboring states (Miller 2007;²⁹ Woodwell 2007; Saideman

²⁸ On the interesting lack of interest by international relations scholars in the inter-*national* nature of the world polity, see Lapid and Kratochwil (1996; also Spruyt 1996: chapter 1). Some more recent work seeks to overcome this neglect and to address the issue of “unit variation”; see the review by Kahler (2002: 66–71).

²⁹ Miller’s (2007) argument is perhaps the most encompassing and goes beyond co-nationality as a determinant of inter-state conflict behavior. He maintains that whether or not regions (his units of analysis) are peaceful depends on the “nation-to-state balance,” i.e. the degree to which there are irredentist or cross-border nationalisms seeking to redraw the existing borders between states. In regions with strong states, such revisionist nationalism leads to inter-state wars, while regions with weak states will be the arena of civil wars.

and Ayres 2008), or how political elites might stir up nationalist sentiment by attacking a neighboring country to stabilize their own insecure political position (Snyder 2000). Going beyond the important insights offered by these authors, this book shows that nationalism played a much more important role in the history of modern war than commonly assumed. It transformed the number and nature of the global system's constituent units, and this transformation is itself a major cause of war over the past 200 years, as suggested by Figure 1.4.

Moreover, the rise of the nation-state also had a profound impact on the aims and motivations for going to war.³⁰ As Figure 1.2 shows, wars of conquest have almost ceased to be fought since Hitler's failed attempt to build an empire stretching from the Rhine to the Urals. Why? The legitimacy of empires was based on the idea of bringing "true faith," "civilization," or "revolutionary progress" to distant places, if necessary through conquest and the "pacification" of recalcitrant locals who fail to see the light of religious truth or civilizational progress. Imperial elites thus had incentives to conquer other states and to permanently incorporate their territories into their domain. Nation-states, however, cannot legitimately rule over vast numbers of ethnic others, given that they are built on national self-rule as their legitimizing principle. Compare how the Ottoman sultan and then the British crown ruled over Iraqi lands to the policy of the United States after it had invaded the country, and it becomes clear that in a world of nation-states, conquest is no longer a legitimate war aim.³¹ The transformation of the nature of states thus helps to understand why wars between states have become so rare in the contemporary period.

Ethno-nationalism, however, motivates an increasing number of wars in the world. As Figure 1.2 showed, the share of nationalist wars of secession and ethnic

This argument faces serious endogeneity problems, however, since the existence of revisionist nationalist movements is obviously associated with conflict, while it remains to be explained why such irredentist, secessionist, or unification nationalisms emerge in the first place. To avoid endogeneity, one could count, as Miller suggests (*ibid.*: 56), the number of national groups per state ("internal incongruence") as well as the number of ethnic groups with kin in neighboring states ("external incongruence"). However, according to an analysis of the dataset introduced in Chapter 5, neither the number of politicized ethnic groups nor the existence of cross-border ethnic kin have any effect on the probability of armed conflict or civil war (results not shown).

³⁰ This is in line with emphasis on domestic formation of foreign policy preference in "second image" theories of international relations (see Moravcsik 1997). For a historical overview of how the nature of states influences their motivations for going to war, see Luard (1986).

³¹ An alternative explanation in international relations theory attributes the scarcity of wars of conquest in the contemporary world to the fact that multinational corporations have spread over the territories of all the major great powers, which together with the shift to knowledge-based economies decreases the economic attractiveness of conquest (Brooks 2005). This obviously fails to explain why we do not see more conquest between nation-states that host few multinationals and whose economies depend on agriculture and resource extraction, e.g. most of contemporary Africa.

civil wars rose from 25 to 75 percent over the course of a century. The spread of nationalism as foundation of political legitimacy changed the motivations and aims for which humanity goes to war: wars of conquest gave way to wars of nationalist secession, conflicts over dynastic succession or tax levels were replaced by ethno-political struggles over access to central government.³²

6.2 Ethnic politics and armed conflict

Not all transitions to the nation-state are accompanied by war, however. Figure 1.4 shows that at the height of the transformation process, a new war broke out on only about 4 percent of all territories in that year. We thus need to more precisely specify the conditions under which nation-state formation leads to armed conflict and show that ethno-political inequality indeed plays as crucial a role as claimed throughout this book. Given data limitations, a more precise analysis cannot be offered for all phases of the process and all types of war. Chapter 5 zooms in on the period after a nation-state has been founded, and focuses on civil wars only. The analysis will now include low-intensity domestic conflicts that cost as few as 25 battle deaths as well, while previous chapters related to full-scale wars with more than 1,000 deaths. Such detailed data on armed conflicts is only available for the years after World War II.

This restricted view will allow for much more precision in the analysis. The chapter is based on a new, global dataset already briefly mentioned above. It records ethnic power relations in all countries of the world and how they changed since World War II, which will allow us to test the political exclusion hypothesis directly. Equally important and additional mechanisms that trigger ethnic conflict can be identified. I will thus pay more attention to causal heterogeneity than in the previous chapter and show that different types of ethnic conflict are caused by different ethno-political configurations of power. All these different configurations can be portrayed as ethnic underrepresentation in government and thus as violations of the nationalist “like-over-like” principle of legitimacy.

The first configuration is marked by high levels of ethno-political inequality and was already part of the analysis of preceding chapters. Ethnicity is more likely to be politicized and ethnic minority rule is more likely to emerge in weakly centralized states with a limited capacity to provide public goods, tax the population, and control the political process, as well as in societies with weakly developed civil societies. States that exclude large segments of the population on the basis of ethnicity face severe legitimacy problems since they directly violate the principle of ethnic self-rule established by the nation-state model. Saddam Hussein’s ethnocracy provides a good illustration of such regimes. His Baath Party became more and more the party of Sunni Arab nationalists, and

³² For a full empirical analysis of these conjectures, see Wimmer and Min (2009).

Kurdish and Shiite army officers and bureaucrats were increasingly excluded from the circles of power. A long series of insurrections by Kurdish *pesbmerga* and Shiite notables followed (Wimmer 2002: chapter 6). The Alawite minority of the Assad clan has dominated neighboring Syria since the 1970s. Bloody rebellions against their ethnocratic rule were organized by the Sunni Muslim brotherhood in 1982 and by various, more dispersed forces in 2011.

Second, where state power is shared by a large number of ethnic elites, their coalition is beset with commitment problems, and competition over the spoils of government often leads to violent infighting. The higher the number of ethnic elites tied into a government coalition, the less stable their alliances and the more likely such infighting becomes. The Lebanese civil war provides an apt illustration of how this mechanism operates. The power sharing formula inherited from the French mandate period could not be adjusted to new political and demographic realities, given the rivalries and lack of predictable political alliances between the leaders of the numerous ethno-religious communities. Their elites feared losing out in the struggle over the state and being dominated by ethnic others in the future, and political tensions escalated into a full-blown civil war.

Third, the alliance networks that bind a population to the political center will be only weakly institutionalized in nation-states that have been ruled indirectly by empires in the past. Following the relational part of the theory of conflict outlined above, national identity and loyalty toward the central state are therefore expected to be weak as well, and the state and its territorial boundaries enjoy only little legitimacy – independent of the power configuration at the center. Rebels and infighters will then adopt a full-blown nationalist agenda and armed conflicts will take on secessionist forms. Examples are the separatist movements of South Ossetians and Abkhazians, whom Moscow had ruled indirectly as an autonomous republic or oblast during Soviet times. Correspondingly, they maintained only weak political ties and disidentified with the Georgian republic of which they became a part but which they perceived as largely illegitimate. When Georgian nationalists were about to declare independence, both regions hastily claimed the mantle of independent statehood for themselves, and wars of secession ensued immediately.

In summary, three different configurations of alliance and power lead to various types of ethnic conflict instigated by different actors (excluded groups or ethnic elites that share power) pursuing different aims (secession or controlling government). All remain related, however, to the principles of legitimacy – ethnic self-rule – that the nation-state established, and circle around the issue of ethnic underrepresentation and the fear of political domination by ethnic others.

Chapter 5 tests these hypotheses with the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. Since it is a fully dynamic dataset, it goes well beyond static measures of ethnic diversity – such as fractionalization indices – so often used in quantitative




FIGURE 1.5 Ethnic civil wars in independent states since 1945: a disaggregated approach
Notes: first difference effects, calculated on the basis of Model 4 in Table 5.2. All effects are significant at the $p < 0.01$ level, except for the years spent under imperial rule (which has a $p < 0.05$). $N = 6,885$ observations in 156 independent countries.

research. The dataset directly codes the ethno-political constellation of power at the state's center – rather than only focusing on politically marginalized minorities, as does the widely used and pioneering Minorities at Risk dataset. Figure 1.5 summarizes the results of Chapter 5 for readers who are not familiar with the conventions of statistical analysis. The bars tell us how much more likely armed conflict will be when the value of a particular variable (and of this variable only) is increased from its mean by one standard deviation. A standard deviation refers to the maximum difference between observed values and the mean for two-thirds of observations. This is one of the best ways to compare the effects of variables that are measured in different units and that show different degrees of dispersion from their mean.

The bars in the figure are linked with arrows to the type of conflict that the corresponding variable is affecting. Political exclusion is conducive to rebellion, both secessionist and non-secessionist. Infighting (again both in its secessionist and non-secessionist variants) is more likely the higher the number of power sharing elites. A long history of imperial rule increases the likelihood of secessionist conflict, both by excluded and by power sharing groups. These

ethno-political factors are as effective and robust in predicting civil war as the two most important explanatory variables in quantitative studies of civil war: a country's level of economic development and the size of its population. Ethnic politics is clearly not only affecting armed conflict in statistically significant, but also in substantially important ways.

The chapter thus introduces a power-cum-legitimacy argument into a debate that is largely dominated by political economy approaches for which questions of state legitimacy and political inequality play no role in understanding today's civil wars. According to the most often cited article in this literature (Fearon and Laitin 2003), civil wars break out when a government is too weak to suppress the ubiquitous discontent of its population. The fact that Sweden is peaceful while the Syrian population rose up against the Assad regime in 2011 (and before) thus has nothing to do with different levels of state legitimacy, but needs to be attributed to the higher repressive capacity of the Swedish government ... Collier and Hoeffler (2004) see greedy warlords take up arms to gain control over natural resources such as oil or diamonds – leaving students of conflicts in oil- and diamond-free places such as Northern Ireland or Tibet wondering how to make sense of what they observe. Posen (1993a) argues that state collapse leaves ethnic groups no other choice than to attack each other to prevent being attacked first, thus overlooking that state collapse is often the consequence of ethnic violence, not its cause.

Chapter 5 shows that political inequality and legitimacy need to be taken into account if we want to gain a proper understanding of the drama of civil war. Rather than resource competition outside the domains of the state, or the military weakness of the state, or even the disappearance of state authority altogether, it is the ethno-political struggle *over* the state that drives many violent conflicts in the contemporary world of nation-states. This is not to deny that the repressive capacity of the state matters – an armed rebellion is obviously more difficult to organize in contemporary China than it is in a weak and fragmented state with little surveillance capacity such as Congo. Feasibility *must* matter, even if it has hitherto been impossible to establish this relationship in direct ways, perhaps due to the lack of adequate data on the repressive capacity of states. And it might also be that oil and diamonds fuel the flames of competition over the state (see Ross 2012). But perhaps military feasibility and economic resources represent mitigating and intervening factors, rather than the primary cause of armed conflict (for empirical support of this interpretation, see Thies 2010).

6.3 Can peace be engineered?

The final chapter draws some tentative conclusions for the policy debate on how to best prevent ethnic conflict. The analyses of the preceding chapters quite

unequivocally suggest that the most effective way to guarantee peace is fostering inclusionary power structures. Such ethno-political inclusion can be achieved in various ways depending on historical antecedents and contemporary context: through encompassing clientelist networks tying state elites to all other segments of a society; through a governing coalition of ethnic parties such as in Malaysia; through one-party rule within which various ethnic elites find their place (as in Ivory Coast before democratization); or through a non-ethnic party system and informal power sharing arrangements such as in Switzerland. The nature of political institutions – electoral rules, degrees of federalism, levels of democratization, etc. – matters less, the chapter shows, than the power configuration that underlies them.

Most policy-makers and comparative political scientists, however, are convinced that political institutions should be the prime focus of prevention policies. In other words, they believe that peace can be engineered by adjusting the incentive structures for political leaders and followers. Policy-makers often emphasize that democratic institutions will mitigate conflict propensity in the long run. Not only can votes replace bullets as means to voice one's discontent, they argue, but democracies will also politically integrate ethnic minorities and thus produce less exclusionary power structures.

Comparative political scientists have also been engaged in a long-standing debate whether proportionalism, federalism, and parliamentarianism are fostering peaceful accommodation, as maintained by consociationalists. So-called centripetalists, on the other hand, argue that to the contrary majoritarianism, unitarianism, and presidentialism are more apt to tame the flames of ethno-political competition and avoid an escalation into armed conflict. All agree, however, that formal political institutions indeed matter in explaining why certain countries are more prone to armed violence than others.

Chapter 6 empirically evaluates these various claims. It opens by reminding readers that Chapters 4 and 5 showed no support for the idea that democracies are less prone to armed conflict and war than non-democratic regimes. Even the more circumspect finding that regimes in between autocracies and democracies – so-called anocracies – are the most war-prone has not been upheld by recent research, which showed that these earlier findings were based on a problematic coding of anocracy.

But perhaps there is evidence for an indirect effect of democracies on conflict because democracies should be more inclusionary than other political systems? Since minorities have a vote in democracies, shouldn't this allow for at least some representation at the highest levels of government? And shouldn't such more inclusionary power configurations then foster peace? Indeed, I find a strong statistical association between democracy and ethno-political inclusion – measured as the percentage of the population that is represented at the highest level of executive government. However, this

is most likely due to a selection effect: more exclusionary regimes, such as the white ethnocracy of Rhodesia, are likely to resist pressure to democratization more fervently and will thus be less likely to transition into full-blown democracies. Democracies don't necessarily foster ethno-political inclusion, in other words, but ethno-political exclusion prevents democratization. In sum, there is no evidence that democracies are more peaceful either through a direct effect ("votes instead of bullets") or through an indirect effect via the ethno-political power structure.

But perhaps it is not so much democracy per se that prevents civil war, but either centripetal institutions (presidentialism, majoritarianism, unitarism) or to the contrary consociational arrangements (parliamentarism, proportionalism, and federalism)? I test these arguments using all available datasets on political institutions, which rely on different definitions and provide different data coverage. The results are quite straightforward: none of the institutional features, however defined and in whatever combination, seem to matter much for explaining ethnic conflict.

But since rules of the political game offer different incentives depending on whether an actor seeks to preserve power or to achieve it, we should perhaps again disaggregate the dependent variable and distinguish between infighting between power sharing partners and rebellions in the name of the excluded population. Such a fine-grained analysis does not yield any more encouraging results for advocates of institutional engineering, however. Using some specific codings of institutional variables indicates that presidentialism or federalism might be associated with fewer conflicts between power sharing partners. But no institutional arrangement has any effect on the much more prevalent form of ethnic conflict, i.e. on rebellions. These comprise 90 out of the 110 ethnic conflicts that occurred since 1945.

Rather than trying to engineer institutions – finding the right electoral system or the right amount of decentralization – prevention policies should aim at encouraging inclusive power configurations. But how to foster inclusion if this cannot be achieved through engineering electoral systems or decentralizing power? The rather tentative conclusions that Chapter 6 offers are not very encouraging from a policy-maker's perspective, I am afraid.

First, ethnocratic regimes can often only be overcome by violence. It is unlikely, for example, that Saddam Hussein's sultanistic regime could have been seduced to travel down a path of gradual reform that would have ended in meaningful representation of Kurdish and Shia politicians in the inner circle of power. It had to be overthrown by force. Ironically, then, violence is sometimes the only way to prevent it in the long run – perhaps the ultimately "realist" position one can take in the debate about prevention. As the peaceful South African transition away from ethnocracy illustrates, however, this position is

not based on any iron “laws” or strict regularities, but on a more probabilistic argument.

Second, the ideal strategy to overcome the dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict would be effective nation building: shifting the loyalty of citizens toward the central state, increasing their identification with the nation, depoliticizing ethnicity, and thus allowing political competition and alliances to form along other lines, less linked to the basic principles of legitimacy of nation-states and thus less prone to escalation into conflict. As Chapter 2 suggests, however, nations can best be built in strongly centralized states and in the context of mushrooming civil societies. Neither state capacity nor the development of voluntary organizations can be engineered from the outside, and both are processes that evolve over generations, not years. Still, an endogenous process of nation building can be encouraged by focusing foreign aid on strengthening state capacity to deliver public goods and to tax the population effectively, thus encouraging new exchange relationships between state elites and the population at large. As the recent experience in Afghanistan shows, nation building “from the outside” is quite impossible and might delegitimize a state, rather than leading to its gradual rooting in the fabrics of society.

7 LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Just how exactly state capacity and networks of voluntary organizations can be fostered is a question beyond the purview of this book, however. It treats these factors as exogenously given and does not seek to explain them comparatively. Why the French state in the late eighteenth century managed to monopolize political power and the provision of public goods to a much larger extent than the Ottoman empire, to return to the empirical cases used in Chapter 2, is not the object of any systematic empirical analysis. Similarly, I do not attempt to comparatively explain why certain states in the postwar world are unable to achieve much effective nation building and exclude large segments of the population from the exchange relationships with the central government, while others have built up more integrative alliance structures and thus have managed to depoliticize ethnic relations.

This is the object of further research. Following up on the analysis presented in Chapter 2, I show in a forthcoming article (Wimmer in preparation) that the development of networks of voluntary organizations and state capacity to deliver public goods are indeed crucial factors in explaining how inclusive ethno-political power structures will be. Contemporary state capacity and organizational development are in turn related to levels of state centralization achieved during the nineteenth century before colonialism.³³ I also

³³ Most scholars attribute the weakness of many contemporary states to the fact that postwar international norms prevented the consolidation of weak states through conquest and absorption into stronger states

show that such long-term factors of endogenous political development are more important for explaining contemporary ethnic power structures – the success or failure of nation building – than democratization or various legacies of colonial rule.

Despite this extension of the argument presented in this book, a full empirical account of how state formation, organizational development, nation building, and war interact with each other remains beyond our current intellectual reach and capacity, at least of this author's intellectual capacity and reach. It is a major task for future research to develop a fully integrated empirical model that endogenizes all these factors, all the while taking international diffusion processes into account (for a recent conceptual move in that direction, see Levy and Thompson 2011).

Rather than offering such a full account, this book explores two major aspects of the overall history of political development in the modern era. It explains why the world has become a world of nation-states and shows that the creation of these nation-states triggered a global wave of wars and ethnic conflict. Its narrative therefore resembles a tragedy, rather than the heroic drama as which the history of modernity is often told. Indeed, the breakup of empires into a series of states, each supposed to be self-governed by a nation, made many modern achievements possible, especially when the nation-state was accompanied by effective nation building. It provided the institutional and ideological framework within which equality before the law, democratic participation, and a welfare state based on national solidarity could eventually emerge, usually generations after nation-states had been founded.

On the other hand, however, there was a price to be paid for shifting to the national principle: violent nationalist struggles against emperors and kings ended the age of imperial peace; episodes of mass violence erupted here and there, directed against civilians that ended up on the wrong side of new state boundaries and were seen as fifth columns of the nation's enemies; ethno-political competition over control of new nation-states often escalated into armed conflict. Tragedy is not inevitable, however, nor is it universal. After all, many histories of nation-state formation were peaceful, as the experience of the Baltic states after the end of the Soviet empire illustrates. And the book shows empirically that armed conflict is not a consequence of ethnic diversity as such and is thus not inevitable where the population speaks many different tongues or believes in many different gods. Rather, it is most likely where minorities rule, thus violating the nationalist principle of self-rule. Ethnically inclusive government is certainly difficult to achieve in institutionally weak states with a limited capacity of taxation and public goods delivery. But political inclusion

along the lines of European developments from the late medieval period onward (Jackson 1990; Badie 2000; Hironaka 2005). This argument overlooks, however, the fundamental weakness of the nation-states founded in the Americas during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

can durably mitigate the conflict-prone nature of the nation-state, as I will argue in the final chapter – whether through democratic or other institutional channels, through power sharing or power dividing, by integrating ethnically defined political networks or by depoliticizing ethnicity in a process of genuine nation building.